



# AFTER THE WAR

## *A Symposium of Peace Aims*

*Edited by*

WILLIAM TEELING

SIR RICHARD ACLAND, M.P.

THE HON. DAVID ASTOR

MAJOR VICTOR CAZALET, M.P.

CAPT. ALAN GRAHAM, M.P.

THE EARL OF LISTOWEL

HUGH MOLSON, M.P.

CAPT. G. NICHOLSON, M.P.

JOHN PARKER, M.P.

VICTOR RAIKES, M.P.

THE BARONESS RAVENSDALE

THE EARL OF ROSSE

RICHARD STOKES, M.P.

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# Preface

BEFORE THE WAR we were afraid to prepare for war. During the war many of us are afraid to prepare for a peace.

Writing at the beginning of July 1940 I am convinced that this book should appear at once. Victory may to-day seem farther off than when these essays were written. But very little has happened that the authors did not foresee. To all of them victory for the Allies is inevitable.

In some details the essays may seem out of date. The authors were approached last November; all of them had finished their essays by February 1940; the book (after many difficulties due to paper restrictions) was ready in May.

Finally, just before it went to press the Pétain Government signed an armistice with Germany. I have made no attempt to alter any passages referring to France in these essays, for I believe that the majority of Frenchmen still hate Germany, though their hands may be tied for a while. When final victory is achieved, the real France will draw up the peace treaty with us, and it is the real France that is referred to in the following pages.

We have held it up to see how far, if at all, it would be out of date. I have made a few slight alterations, but otherwise the authors feel that their suggestions for After the War remain unchanged and just as attainable.

Some of my contributors wish to add a note of personal explanation or to acknowledge the source of quoted matter. Sir Richard Acland desires it to be clearly understood that his contribution in no way represents the official policy of the Liberal Party; also that he is indebted to Penguin Books Ltd for permission to quote certain paragraphs from his *Unser Kampf*. The Earl of Listowel thanks the Editor of *Foreign Affairs* for permission to quote from an article by Professor Hopper.

I have to thank the Editor of *The Times* and the Editor of *World Review* for the right to reprint copyright material.

W. T.





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 Curzon of Kedleston; for many years keenly interested  
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*William Teeling*

THE OBJECT OF THIS BOOK is to get a few representative people, who are likely to have a strong influence on the public life of this country immediately after the present war, to state their peace aims, as distinct from war aims. Many people hope that those men who were our leaders in the Great War of 1914-18, who led us through the peace years of 1918-39, and who are now leading us again through the present war, will leave the shaping of the post-war world to younger hands. But I thoroughly mistrust anyone who airily lays the blame for all that has happened, and is happening, on any one group of people, on a political party, or for that matter, on any one country. Nevertheless, the time has come to allow the younger generation, at any rate in Great Britain, to have a say in a future which concerns them most of all.

I remember vividly a conversation with some German Youth Leaders of the disbanded Centre Party in 1937 in the Rhineland. They said: 'If only our Party Leaders and our clergy had listened to us more, and let us lead against the Nazi leaders who were the same age as ourselves, then the Nazis would not be in power to-day. Only youth can effectively answer youth. The Nazis came ten years too soon. In ten years we would have been in control of our Party.'

Every day as this war progresses I feel more and more what a lot there is in that statement. It is the youth of Germany to-day who are upsetting all the calculations of our elderly democratic leaders. A German youth in Hamburg proudly told an American friend of mine: 'Of course we'll fight. What have we young people to lose? We may gain all. But if we don't, well, we can bring Germany up again from

nothingness in a few years, just as we have done after the despair of 1930-33, and one day our youth will conquer.'

He was saying something that shocked the elder man; but he despised the elder man for being old. The young German I have always found ready at least to argue with the young Englishman. But the average young Englishman has to admit that it will take years of red tape and traditional drudgery before he will be able to attain the power in England that the youth of Germany hold to-day.

Hitler has said: 'I want to fight my wars before I am fifty-five.' Mr Chamberlain has said: 'I would rather be bored than be bombed.' These are the two mentalities waging this war, the maniac against the bulldog, dangerous and tenacious when roused, and they will be followed by leaders in a post-war world who I think will need still different mentalities; they will have to be reformers with imagination.

I have looked round amongst the members of Parliament, both in the House of Lords and the House of Commons, to find fourteen people, representing the three major Parties, who are at any rate not much over forty years of age, who are likely to take an active part in the reconstruction plans of the post-war period, and who are willing to be brave enough to put down their present opinion as to what they would like that future to be. I have found that, to be truly representative, it is as well to go outside Parliament for at least three of these essays, and I have not included people who for months and even years past have already made their views known on paper and on the platform. Parliamentary Private Secretaries and Under-Secretaries have not felt at liberty to write, but that has still left me with plenty of talent from the Back Benches supporting the Government. The majority, but not all, of my contributors can remember vividly the last Great War, a few of them took part in it, and one at least can remember nothing of it.

While compiling this book, I have met with the criticisms: (1) that we must win the war before we talk of peace; (2) that such a book will inevitably show division of opinion, which the Germans will quickly make use of; and (3) that

it is sheer waste of time, since no one knows who will be on which side when it is all over.

The first criticism can surely be answered by the experience of 1918-19. A superb opportunity was then lost for a really constructive peace because of a feeling of hate, of an almost hysterical feeling of relief, and because of a terrible ignorance of real conditions in Europe and elsewhere. This ignorance was not only displayed by the voters of this country, who have never been very interested in foreigners, but also by our own politicians and statesmen, as countless memoirs can testify. Chatham House (the Royal Institute of International Affairs) owes its very existence to a group of people present at the Peace Conference in Paris, who felt that there was vital need for an organization which would have all the facts at its finger tips about every possible foreign problem. It has now got branches in almost every major city in the British Commonwealth.

During this war we should study to the best of our ability what we want of a post-war world, and we must, if we would be practical, try to imagine the feelings of a defeated Germany. We must then avoid a hurried Versailles Treaty, compromising between different attitudes of tolerance and intolerance, and between different hastily made promises to minority groups while the war is still on. We will need a treaty not unlike the Treaty of Vienna. We must begin long before the treaty is signed, now if possible, to think out what we want, and after the heat of battle is over, we must still spend some time working out ideas before the fatal signature is penned.

It will be as well to remember that all through the Napoleonic Wars English newspapers and every cartoon showed almost as bitter a hatred of Napoleon and Napoleon's France as we can show to-day of Hitler and Hitler's Germany—yet after Napoleon's defeat we made a peace with France which took away from her all her ill-gotten gains, left her internally free, and gave her her old régime. But we had to defeat Napoleon first, although half-way through the wars we made a peace which lasted only a few months. The result was a friendship between Great Britain and France

which at first was, quite naturally, charged with suspicion, but which after 1870 became gradually more trusting, until 1914, when it was sealed with blood. It reverted to suspicion in the years following the Great War, and to-day promises to lead to something uncommonly near to a federation of interests. This has taken one hundred years. At first there was a reconstitution of old régimes in a number of States. They proved to be in a sense anachronisms and led later on to revolutions. Yet out of them came a re-alinement of States, different from what Napoleon envisaged, but more lasting. The Duchies and Principalities of Italy finally merged into the Italy of to-day, and the German States eventually merged themselves into two different Empires.

It is possible, as at least one of the contributors to this book points out, that all this was but a step towards the formation to-morrow, not of a new Germanic Empire, but of a Central European Slav Empire, and a Balkan Slav Empire, and that instead of the growth of a German Nordic Empire, we are seeing the death throes of the Teuton influence in countries where, in spite of artificial efforts on the part of the Nazis, the German birth-rate is gradually decreasing.

Throughout the last century, and especially after 1870, Queen Victoria, and the British Government prevented Bismarck and Prussia from completely eliminating the French influence in Europe (an influence which we in Great Britain considered essential for European civilization). We saved France in 1914 and to-day are saving a fast diminishing French population from extermination, and so may it not be possible that after this war we shall continue to save France? So also may we save the civilization of Germany, from a Slav Communist oppression, Russian, Central European, and Balkan, and be once again a bulwark, this time defending all that has been best in the pre-war German States.

If something like this is likely to happen in the years to come, anything we plan to-day may have repercussions in the future. An instance of this was our support of Masaryk and the Czechs in the last war, and we should remember, as Mr Parker, M.P., so aptly says in his essay in this book, that

'if Anglo-French joint machinery is to be used as a base . . . the steps taken during the war must be criticized as affecting a structure which is intended to be permanent.'

I think a sufficiently effective answer to two of the criticisms of this book—namely, that we must win the war before discussing peace, and that such a discussion must show undesirable divisions of opinion—can be found in a passage in the leading article in *The Times* of 1 January, 1940:

Of the Pope's five points, the one that is likely in the future to set the most urgent and intricate task for the architects of reconstruction is the third, in which he writes of the need for creating or reconstituting international institutions. Beyond question the ultimate task that awaits the nations, neutral and belligerent alike, after the immediate injustices have been set right, is the building up of a new international system capable of succeeding where the League of Nations has failed and of preventing the act of injustice and violence that give rise to war. In the last war many, perhaps most, fought with some vague hope and expectation of ultimately restoring the world they had known before 1914.

That hope was not, and could not have been, fulfilled, and to-day we have learnt not to think on those lines. The Europe of 1939 is gone for ever, and few will regret it; whatever is built out of the ruins will be a very different and, we must hope, a finer structure; in creating an international order capable of perpetuating peace we must be prepared for far-reaching changes; and it may well be that the national sovereign state, as Europe has known it for four hundred years, will consent to modifications hitherto regarded as impracticable. *It is right that, even while we grapple with the stern ordeal before us, some minds at least should be concentrated on working out these problems that lie far ahead.*<sup>1</sup> The immediate task for 1940 is the bitter fight with an unscrupulous, ruthless and formidable adversary; but we can face it with a higher courage and a deeper assurance of victory if our hearts are set on the ultimate achievement of a juster world.

It is with that end in view that I am producing this collection of essays. I am known to be a Conservative. It is not

<sup>1</sup> My italics.



necessary, therefore, to say that there are many things with which I do not agree in this book. My object is not to make this a political pamphlet, and though I ache at moments to write what I consider is the answer to some of the statements made, and to contradict yet others, I am leaving each essay to speak for itself, nor am I attempting to find anyone to sum up at the end.

The Germans, or our other enemies, are perfectly at liberty to say, 'See how they differ one from another.' It is perfectly true, we do. In what totalitarian country could a book of such differences, and with such prominent contributors, be allowed to appear? Is this not the best form of propaganda—if propaganda means information—about our country, namely that we are genuinely, each one of us, trying to see what is the best world, in which all countries could live? We are human beings, and most of us want a world in which our own ideals will *survive*. But our enemies want their ideals to *prevail*.

In this book, taking the authors alphabetically, I start with a Liberal Member of Parliament, SIR RICHARD AGLAND, who hails from Devon. His essay is provocative, especially the suggested leaflet, but it represents, I think, a fairly general Liberal point of view. He is followed by Mr DAVID ASTOR. It will be asked, Why has he been included, since he is neither a Peer nor an M.P.? The answer is that Mr David Astor, the brother of an M.P., the brother-in-law of an M.P., the son of an M.P. and of a Peer, is himself actively working in at least two groups which are working out possible peace aims. This work has taken him to France, as well as to see our own legislators. Moreover, he is an entirely post-war person, and gives us a point of view that cannot be influenced by any attitude held during the last war.

Third on the list is Major VICTOR CAZALET, M.P. for Chippingham. There is probably no one in Parliament to-day who knows personally, and often intimately, more of the really interesting and important figures in public life, not only in Great Britain, but on the Continent. Ever since the Great War I can remember Major Cazalet and his sister, Miss Thelma Cazalet, M.P., actively working for their country,

and always in the lucky position of being able to meet, in order to discuss whatever problem interested them at the moment, the best experts on the subject in question. Major Cazalet has not contented himself with studying Britain's problems. I have often found myself following in his footsteps while abroad. He must be in as good a position as anybody to judge what will be possible and what will not be possible after the present war. And also, which is just as important, he should be able to realize what is essential for a permanent peace and what is not. To-day Major Cazalet is in the Army again; and he has formed a Committee of all the serving M.P.'s in the House of Commons, which should be particularly useful to the heads of the Fighting Services.

Next to Major Cazalet comes a Conservative Member of Parliament for Cheshire, Captain ALAN GRAHAM. Captain Graham saw service in Russia after the last Great War, and since then has been to Oxford, has acted as Private Secretary to Lord Balfour, and later on as Private Secretary to Lord Hailsham, while he was Leader of the Conservative Party in the House of Lords. From the point of view of this book it is particularly interesting that Captain Graham went with Lord Hailsham to Ottawa, for, as his private secretary, he knows probably more than most people about what happened there, and the why and the wherefore of the Ottawa Agreements. For those who talk of Federal Union after this war, or advocate a closer union between the British and French Empires for all time, a study of the Ottawa Agreements is essential. I am very glad that Captain Graham has not ignored the influence they must have on future peace. Captain Graham has also touched on a point that to my mind is essential, if after the war the youth of this country are to be allowed to have some say in the Empire's future. He discusses the type of person likely to be in Parliament, and stresses the impossibility, in the Conservative Party at any rate, of young people, other than those born wealthy, entering public life at all.

Fifth on my list comes the EARL OF LISTOWEL. Lord Listowel is a Labour Whip in the House of Lords. There are few young men who have given up more for their beliefs than

Lord Listowel. His article in this series is to my mind quite striking. If all the younger leaders of the Labour Party and the Conservative Party are as constructive and practical as Lord Listowel would seem to be from his article, then I think we need have no fear for the future virility of our own democracy.

From Labour we move back to Conservatism in a very carefully thought-out article by Mr HUGH MOLSON, the Conservative M.P. for the High Peak Division of Derbyshire. Mr Molson, who is a Canadian by birth, travelled and studied a great deal in those years shortly after the Great War when a permanent peace was taken for granted. Mr Molson, as well as I can remember, never felt that such an idea was anything but stupid Utopianism, unless of course Great Britain kept wide awake and settled down to a clear-cut and firm policy. He studied the commercial situation in India for some time, fought as a Conservative in the depressed area of Merthyr Tydvil in the General Election of 1929; nursed a constituency against Mr Malcolm MacDonald, switched over at the 1931 election to Doncaster in Yorkshire, which seat he won, but lost again in 1935. To-day he holds a safe seat, and at the same time is doing military work in another part of the country. A most interesting suggestion is put forward by Mr Molson, namely that we are about to see a tremendous increase in the power and influence of the Slav population of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.

Captain GODFREY NICHOLSON, M.P. for a Surrey division, follows Mr Molson. For years Captain Nicholson has been one of the leaders, both in Parliament and out of it, of a group anxious to bring about an ever closer rapprochement with the French. I am glad to see that he discusses this in some detail in his essay. He is also one of those Conservatives who feel convinced that conscription must be a permanent feature of our constitution from now on. This is by no means an official Conservative policy, and I believe there are some Labour members who would themselves advocate some kind of physical training, and training in citizenship, for all young people. I think it should be stressed that neither the Conservative, Liberal, nor Labour contributors here write any-

thing that can be considered official. The views expressed are entirely their own personal views. I myself feel that if we are to develop at all constructively in the years to come, if class barriers are to be battered down, if we are to know about each other's worries, and if we are to appreciate sufficiently our heritage in order to develop it along sane lines, then we must have some kind of compulsory camps, or organizations. There we shall all learn to know and appreciate each other better, and there, whether we like it or not, we shall be forced to learn something about those races whom we are supposed to protect and for whom, in some sense, we stand as trustees.

Evacuation has shown us only too clearly the terrible background that some of our children still have to face. Is it any wonder that they have no idea what we are talking about when we say we are fighting this war for 'Christian principles'? Most of them know nothing about Christianity, yet the whole of our system of government is based on Christianity. Is it any wonder they grow up listless and suspicious? They have never before seen the inside of life in the country, nor been given the opportunity of knowing what young people of their own age in other spheres of life are thinking. How can we expect to show the world a united youth, fired with enthusiasm for a better world, if no one of us knows what are the thoughts or hopes of the others? Military conscription may not be necessary, but social conscription, such as Bulgaria enforces, is surely essential.

The Conservative opinion of Captain Godfrey Nicholson is followed by the Socialist opinion of Mr JOHN PARKER, M.P. for Romford, Essex, and also Secretary of the Fabian Society. Mr Parker's very interesting essay shows us that there is one issue for post-war Britain on which there seems to be considerable disagreement—the question of colonies. The colonial question has been all too little studied in Great Britain. Presumably the Labour Party does not need to, for it considers that after the war we should be relieved of that burden, and colonies should be internationalized. I think it is an interesting point to note that Lord Listowel does not seem to agree with this view.

Conservatives, on the other hand, have no such excuse. They intend to develop colonies, and if so, something very drastic must be done to alter our present method of control. Parliament does not give anything like enough time to colonial questions. 'Big Business' men interested in the preservation of certain rights or customs in particular colonies, are adepts at filling up Parliament's allotted time for colonial questions, with questions that are of secondary importance. I fear that the reason why so little is said about colonies is that remarkably few of our younger M.P.'s have had the time or the finance to visit our more inaccessible colonies. This should be remedied. 'After the war' will be as important a period for us in Africa, the West Indies, and the Pacific as in Eastern Europe. It is more than a possibility that France, Great Britain, Portugal, and Holland could come together and develop their far-flung colonies to such advantage for themselves and the world, that internationalization would no longer be necessary, and that the Socialists would be well satisfied. But such a possibility will never be developed without a great deal more study and thought than is given to it by politicians and statesmen at present.

A clearly thought-out scheme giving guarantees to Holland and Portugal, as to the inviolability of their colonies might as easily rally the neutrals to our side as any war aims for the restoration of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, in which countries few neutrals see any very great possibility now of trade for many years to come. Trade with colonial empires about to be developed on a grandiose scale, and for the benefit of natives and settlers alike, would capture the world's imagination, not excluding that of the youth of Germany.

After Mr Parker, M.P. for Romford, comes Mr VICTOR RAIKES, M.P. for the neighbouring constituency of South-East Essex. This is pure coincidence, for I have arranged the contributions in alphabetical order. I should think Mr. Raikes, on most subjects, differs as widely from Mr Parker as any German wanting to show a disunited Britain could ever desire. And yet after reading both their essays, I cannot feel that there is any difference there that could not be eliminated by the pressure of foreign, and especially

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of German, interference, and by the genuine desire of both for a permanent and constructive peace.

Mr Raikes has seen most of Europe, travelling as an M.P. and also as a member of a small group of peers and M.P.'s called the Imperial Policy Group, whose views are, I think, however unofficially, reflected to some extent in Mr Raikes's essay. Here we see, as we will have seen in most of the earlier essays, the stressing of the need for religion and better moral values in the world of to-morrow. It is a very remarkable and, I think, encouraging thing that many of the contributors, entirely of their own accord, and representing otherwise such different points of view and such different parts of the country, ask for a revival of religion. Some of them are a little hazy as to how it is to be brought about, though others are quite specific that it must be Christianity which should be encouraged. Yet we must not forget that the majority of our peoples believe in other than Christian teaching.

My next contributor, the BARONESS RAVENSDALE, goes considerably more into detail here and shows that what she calls 'institutional dogmatic Christianity' is not what is needed. The teachings of all real religions must be respected.

Lady Ravensdale is practising at the moment very actively what she preaches in her essay. Since the war commenced she has started an organization called 'the Committee of Responsibility', and her supporters are frequently to be found speaking at large and small meetings up and down the country. Lady Ravensdale's essay is included in this book for a variety of reasons. First of all, because she is taking an active part in working out possible peace solutions; secondly, because, being a peeress in her own right, it seems wholly illogical that she should not be able to sit in the House of Lords, when women M.P.'s are quite capable of being elected to the House of Commons; and thirdly, because, as the eldest daughter of the late Lord Curzon of Kedleston, she has spent most of her life, and especially the interesting post-war years, in touch with one who, as Foreign Secretary after the last war, knew, perhaps better than anybody, why 'the war to end war' failed so signally in its purpose. Lady Ravensdale

faces the post-war problems with an experience gained by twenty years developing, guiding, and controlling the Highways Clubs of East London for boys and girls. Short of living in their tenements, she has shared their lives in every other way. She knows what she is talking about when she discusses their problems, just as she knows from personal contact the problems of the impoverished musician and artist, and of the hard-hit black-coated worker. Lady Ravensdale brings to this work the feminine side, in which she is supported by Miss IRENE WARD, M.P. for the Tyneside seat of Wallsend, just outside Newcastle. Miss Ward has the distinction of defeating and holding the seat against the first woman Cabinet Minister, Miss Margaret Bondfield; and everyone who has followed the fortunes of the League of Nations at Geneva will remember that Miss Ward and Miss Horsbrugh are the two British women M.P.'s who have most frequently represented the British Government at Geneva. Miss Ward is therefore particularly interesting in her references as to why and where the League, in her opinion, has failed, and in her suggestions for the future. Although she is alphabetically the last of the list of writers, I mention her here because of my reference to Lady Ravensdale, the only other woman writer.

In between them come two other contributors, the EARL OF ROSSE and Mr DICK STOKES. Lord Rosse is an Irish peer who, besides being now in the Army, is particularly interested in the movement called Federal Union. It seemed to me essential in discussing peace aims, as distinct from war aims, that the peace-planning body at the moment being most discussed up and down the country should be represented in these essays. No one is in a better position to do it, in a book supposed to be by peers and M.P.'s, than Lord Rosse, who is so keen on the subject, and who is Chairman of the Federal Union Club in London.

Lord Rosse, it will be seen, spends some considerable time in filling in an historical background for his argument. Several other writers have done the same. Possibly if our students in recent years had read as much history as the Nazi leaders have read inaccurate interpretations of history,

we might none of us be in the mess the world is in to-day. Some of the historical interpretations given by my contributors do not completely tally with those of others. But anyone who thinks we will have an entirely different world after this war must be sadly disillusioned. There will be changes and no doubt drastic ones. Unless we are all to go through the horrors of the Russian revolution, which after all has only served to bring us back to-day to the old historic Russian imperialism (though a little less efficient than that of 1914), then we can only change gradually. We can only do this by taking carefully into account the historical background to every country, group, or idea we want to alter or restart. It is perhaps not inappropriate to quote a Frenchman's attitude to Federalism and the future which recently appeared anonymously in a monthly journal.

The French . . . are quite ready in collaboration with the English *and all the peoples of good will* to try out after the war a reconstruction of Europe on a Federal basis, at least in those places where federation will show itself to be practical and beneficent. But they know enough of the history of Europe to realize the important upheaval that this will entail in traditional ways of feeling and thinking. Even those who believe most in the future of the Federal idea must admit that for the moment it is solely the *future* and only an *idea*. To pass from the present, weighed down as it is with the past, into the future, to turn an *idea* into a reality, requires an endless patience. We have seen this only too well with the League of Nations: *Historia non saltus facit*. One cannot jump overnight into a new world. The old order must be continued and continuously transformed.

The French, an intellectual people, but also a peasant people, who know how much care goes to making a blade of corn, a vintage, a road, a cathedral, a nation—all of them *ideas* which have become facts in the course of time—have the conviction, confirmed by the unhappy experience of these last twenty years, that a long period of adaptation and careful acclimatization is necessary before a new idea—the Federal idea, for example—will have become sufficiently rooted in reality to be stronger than events, nay, strong enough to direct them. And during all this



time *the idea must be protected*. Like a growing tree, or a work of art in the making. Protected against everything, against everybody: friends and enemies, traditions and accidents, slackness and temerity. The greater and newer the idea, the stricter the precautions to be taken during the delicate period of its embodiment in actual history.

Such is essentially the object of those '*positive material guarantees*,' of which on several occasions M. Daladier has spoken in terms which express with admirable exactitude the *unanimous feelings* of the French people, and particularly of the soldiers. It is either useless or impossible to give details of these guarantees now; in a large measure they derive from geographical necessities and historical factors plain to everybody; for the rest, they depend on the state of Europe at the end of the war, which nobody can yet foresee.<sup>1</sup>

One more contributor is Mr STOKES, M.P. for a Suffolk division, who is, I think, one of the most vivid personalities in the present Parliament. He approaches the future of the world from an unusual angle in Great Britain. He writes as a Socialist Member of Parliament, as a Roman Catholic who has a good deal of confidence in the Encyclicals of Pope Pius XI, as a most successful business man, who must therefore be a capitalist, and as a man genuinely convinced that we must make an agreed peace with Germany. His point of view will probably not be accepted by many of the readers of this book, any more than will the pamphlets to be dropped over Germany, as suggested by Sir Richard Acland. But no one who was brought up during the last war, and who was carried away then by the war spirit, and looked at that time with horror on people such as the late Lord Lansdowne for his famous peace suggestions, and then after that war travelled about Europe and saw so many points of view, could be anything else than a Bourbon 'forgetting nothing and learning nothing' if he were to condemn men who have studied their subject thoroughly, for stating their honest opinions. They may be right. The people who take this war and what comes after it seriously enough to read this book

<sup>1</sup> *World Review* (February, 1940).

must read Mr Stokes's contribution with great care, however much they disagree with it.

There is one subject all too lightly touched on in this book: that is, what the Germans will think themselves on the day the war is over. Captain Nicholson suggests that this is not essential. We must not let it influence our policy. Maybe he is correct. Here he seems to agree with one other M.P. who wrote to me refusing to contribute to this book. His reason was that his war aims and peace aims were too simple to justify an essay; they were these: 'I can only remember that my youth was ruined by the Germans; now my middle age is being ruined by the Germans; and unless I take great care, my old age will be ruined by the Germans.'

Those who agree with that theory (as I think I do myself) will feel that there is no need for the third criticism of this book, namely that it is unprofitable to write about peace aims, since none of us know what the position will be at the end of the war.

Only one position must be assumed—that we shall have won a complete victory. There is one thing further of which we can be certain, and it is not a reassuring fact. Lord Halifax in his speech at Oxford on 27 February warned us of it: namely that the youth of Germany have an outlook on life which it will be difficult to fit into a world of our own conception.

Germany now takes all small boys and girls into the Hitler Youth. Here they are taught a variety of Nordic inaccuracies. But too much store must not be set by this. Thus, a certain German bishop informed me, when he heard that the Hitler Youth had become compulsory, that it was the best news he had had for some time. He explained that, until the Hitler Youth became compulsory, no Catholics or real Christians could allow their children to join it in view of what they might be taught. Other youth organizations had to be maintained. The youth belonging to them were jeered at by the Hitler Youth, which had a monopoly of all good things for boys and girls. As a result, the ostracized groups, susceptible as are all young people to processions and pomp, feeling that they belonged to something shameful, already showed

signs of being depressed, or were developing an inferiority complex. They would soon, as the bishop said, 'become ghetto-minded and bitter'. Once the Hitler Youth became compulsory for all, every youth could have the good times given him, and at the same time groups could and would be formed inside to keep up other traditions. This has obviously happened, and those young Germans who have good homes and fearless parents will come through this war all the better for the ordeal of the Hitler Youth. But these, alas, will be fewer than might be wished. And besides the Hitler Youth there are other things to break their spirit.

In each Gau (or county) of the Germany of to-day there are three schools, like our public schools, to which are sent the most promising boys. These are educated in sheer paganism. They continue in the Labour Camps; from there they go to the Army; and after that at least one thousand each year go to the final finishing schools called 'Führer Schools' situated at the four corners of Germany. What is taught there, and what is taught to the 300,000 young men about to join the Himmler S.S. Guard, is blasphemy from start to finish. Moreover, it glorifies force and cruelty, it insists on the essential superiority of the Nordic, and it teaches the German that almost the whole world is at his feet and must one day be his. It also specialises in parachute practice.

It is no exaggeration to say that at the very least three millions of young men are imbued with these ideas and are straining at the leash to turn Europe into a blood-bath. If they fail this time, they intend to try again and never to let the lamp of their teaching burn out. What will become of these? Can they be eliminated? It will not be easy. It has been suggested that once they are disillusioned, as it is rather wishfully believed that they will be disillusioned, then, since they have been taught to scoff at everything we believe in, they will become sheer nihilists and be ready for any form of anarchy. That condition to my mind may be even worse than the former.

It will be no use leaving it to the older people of the world to deal with these young men. And it will not be possible for our own young men to influence them unless we ourselves

have something worth while to offer them in place of what they have lost. They admire physical fitness and prowess at sport. Can we show it to them? They admire a faith in something for which youth will die. Have we got it? They expect youth to be proud and earnest. What are we proud of? They have a genuine belief that they are world reformers. Can our young men show them, too, that we want to reform the world? They do not believe in leisure and short hours. They have been taught to take pleasure in their work. What good can we do by telling them that we work only a few hours and play so many other hours? They do not want to play. Just a desire to hold on to what one has got has never got anybody very far in business, nor is it likely to help us convince the youth of other countries that we have a banner to follow. What are the youth of Britain going to do after this war? Have they thought? Are we ready to broadcast our beliefs?

Oddly enough, the youth who to my mind are most likely to influence the youth of Germany after the war are the youth of the Slav and other Balkan countries. Their organizations are Christian in background; but they are more nationalist than are our boy scouts, and they seem to appeal more to Central European minds. Their objects are constructive. It may be possible for these youth movements to guide the youth of Germany from nihilism into something more constructive. It may be just that force of religion, of Christianity, for which so many of the authors of this book are searching.

It may be true that we must not let anything so problematical as the outlook of German youth after the war influence us in the way we shape the peace. But we shall be strengthening the peace if we start to learn something of the problems that we shall have to face the moment peace breaks out: the types of people we will have to deal with; the material that should then be to hand for making that peace; the colonies which someone will have to develop; the countries, such as India, that are afraid we shall be so exhausted after our war efforts that we shall not take on risky reforms for a long time; the outside neutrals who want to have a hand in the peace; the Dominions, some of whom will have grown richer, and all of whom will feel older and

more important; and lastly the religions who this time will rightly say, 'Your League of Nations failed because none of us were admitted' and 'You cannot rebuild this world without God.' All these are questions that every one of us should be studying—or if we have no time, then we should make certain that those people we elect to represent us should be studying them, rather than the self-appointed, or almost self-appointed, professors tucked away in different ministries and officially working on 'Peace Aims'.

When you have read this book through to the end, I hope you will agree with me that there are in Parliament to-day (if they can get themselves heard above the din of the different party machines) men and women of a calibre suitable to bring us to a durable peace; and that whatever their party colour may be, they have more in common than in dispute for the world of after the war.

May I end this introduction on a reminder that you cannot just clear up a house and then leave it. Cobwebs and dust will enter. In the Bible we are told that after the house had been set in order and the owner had gone away, seven devils entered it and the last state was worse than the first. After 1918 we may have cleared up and left a seemingly perfect world; the seven devils have entered it. The reason must always be that nothing can be left standing, however perfect, unless something is constantly done to it. We may have had a perfect world in 1919, but nothing was done after 1919 to keep it perfect. It was just left to carry on.

So after this war, however perfect and seemingly durable we make the peace, devils and dust and cobwebs will inevitably enter in if we do not go on looking after it, keeping it tidy, well dusted, and always cared for. This is what we did not do after 1919. We were exhausted and we went on a long holiday. After this war there must be no holiday. It is to be hoped that we shall not all be too exhausted to prevent chaos.

*Sir Richard Acland, M.P.*

WHEN I THINK OF PEACE AIMS, I do not think of the sort of things we might do to Europe when once we have finished with this preliminary little job of defeating the Germans. On the contrary, I ask myself what are the aims which, when properly put over to the Germans, as they can be, will persuade those people to desire to stop fighting? This is a very tall order. We have to create in their minds such an intense desire for our aims that they will, in the last resort, rise up and overthrow their own government for the purpose of ensuring that we rather than their government shall 'win the war'.

I am quite sure that the propaganda of our present Government to Germany can never hope to achieve this result. It is not that the Germans do not hear it, or do not understand it. On the contrary, even when it is heard and understood, it makes no appeal whatever. At worst, and this is more true of France than of Britain, we offer the German a peace in which his country shall be cut up in pieces, and any attempt to reunite it shall be prevented by French arms. But I am not concerned with our worst, for if our best were good enough, we might hope that in time it would tame and overcome the worst. But even at best we are offering the Germans a return—domestically and internationally—to the conditions of 1927. There are a lot of trimmings and new names no doubt; but in essentials it is 1927 over again. This may make a considerable appeal, of course, to German industrialists, and these may oblige us by removing Herr Hitler and arranging a new Europe owned and controlled by Big Business and militarily directed against the 'menace of Bolshevism'. But it makes no appeal at all to the German

masses who are ultimately going to settle the matter. They remember 1927 (and of course it is child's play for Goebbels to persuade the German people that what our Government really means is not 1927 at all, but 1919), and they know what followed after 1927, and rather than face all that over again they will prefer to fight against us, even if this means fighting for Herr Hitler, to the last drop of their blood.

Of course on these terms we may still defeat them. But they are a tough people. In the last war they fed themselves and poured out necessary war materials and trained personnel for four years. They had no greater and in very many respects substantially smaller access to the outside world. So it is going to be a very bloody business indeed for us if there is no other way out.

Then again, in thinking of war aims, I do not think of war as something which happens between a number of different nations all of whom can be treated as solid, homogeneous wholes. On the contrary, war is one of the many manifestations of the steady conflict between new and old ideas which goes on in different forms inside each nation. Each country contains within itself representatives both of the new and the old.

Unfortunately, in our case, we have been governed for the last many years by the representatives of the old. By this I do not mean so much that the particular individuals who have made up our cabinets and supported them in the House of Commons have personally thought on the old lines, though this has been the case. Rather I mean that in every department of our national life the whole atmosphere has been dominated by the old ideas, and that on the whole it has been these ideas that have appealed to our people—or at least have been presented in such a way as to seem to appeal to a majority of our people.

My first peace aim is that this situation shall be reversed, and that the new ideas and the people who believe in them shall be brought to the top. Without this I fear we shall face years of futile destruction which may be more than human flesh and blood can endure, and which will certainly leave

European life so shattered that its recovery must be very long delayed.

I should now give some examples of what I mean by the old and new ideas. In 1936, as everyone knows quite well, we would have automatically used the whole of our resources and taken any and every risk to prevent any nation attacking Gibraltar, Malta, or any British island in the Pacific. Yet in the same year Sir John Simon said: 'I would not risk a single ship even in a successful action to restore the independence of Abyssinia.' He was wrong; he was asked to take risks not for Abyssinian independence, but for the rule of International Law. In other words, at that time our dominant national idea was 'Everything for our own interests. Nothing whatever for International Justice.'

As long as this kind of idea prevails and is accepted by every nation there are bound to be wars. These wars will not be caused by the wickedness of Herr Hitler. They will be caused by the prevalence of these old ideas for the destruction of which one million of our countrymen thought they were dying in 1914-18. It is for this reason that my first peace aim is to overcome these ideas; or at least to make sure that when they exist they shall have no chance of guiding the destinies of nations—our own in particular.

It is really stretching international credulity a little bit too far to expect people to believe that we are now fighting merely to restrain aggression and to restore violated countries, when we have been rather self-satisfied in the past because we would not do anything which seemed to contain even the smallest risk of our having to fight to restrain aggression or to restore Manchuria, Abyssinia, Spain, China, Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, Lithuania, and Albania. Nor does it profit us much to say that we tolerated these aggressions because we thought the price was a small one to pay, if aggressors could thereby be satisfied without the necessity of a world war; but that we learned our lesson in March of this year when the Germans went into Prague. After all, two of the unresisted acts of aggression took place after this, and we did nothing about either, and it is at least open to speculation whether we would have done anything if Germany had



attacked Finland at any time between March and August, 1939.

It may, of course, be good propaganda to our own working people to say that we are fighting to destroy Nazism, because beyond any doubt our people loathe Nazism and would sacrifice much to rid the world of this hideous scourge. But how has Nazism appeared to that solid block of our people who have most prominently supported the whole set of ideas which have dominated our nation in the last years? Have they really loathed that part of Nazism which smashed down the standards of the working people and clapped all troublesome 'communist' elements into concentration camps? On the contrary, indeed, taking them as a whole, they have (until this autumn) entertained a sort of cosy hope that Germany could be used, at the very least, as a bulwark against Bolshevism. Against what aspects of Bolshevism? Clearly not against that aspect which may, in certain circumstances, make an armed attack on one of its neighbours; clearly not against that aspect which may prevent men from freely expressing their political views. From both these points of view the bulwark was infinitely worse than the thing that was to be 'bulwarked' against. There is only one thing left. Nazism was regarded as a bulwark not against any incidental effects of Bolshevism, but against its essential feature, the common ownership of the means of production. Indeed, so long as Nazism had discharged its functions as such a bulwark—or if it had even gone a little further and had made an armed attack on common ownership—who will dare to say that anyone inspired with the ideas that have dominated our country would have raised a whisper against it? This really means that we must examine the question of common ownership.

Of course everyone who thinks that peace aims can be adequately stated in terms of frontier adjustments and constitutions of Leagues or Federations will wonder what bearing this can have on the subject we are discussing. I will put the matter in order at once by saying that, in my view, common ownership is an absolutely essential part of any coherent peace aims which are to stand any chance at all of succeed-

ing in the essential purpose of peace aims, namely the task of bringing peace.<sup>1</sup>

It is a most amazing thing that a very large number of the people I know really well refuse to consider common ownership at all. Many of them just give a shrug and say 'Well, after Finland——,' as if, I suppose, one act of aggression by a country under common ownership proved that common ownership itself is economically and morally wrong. If this is a valid argument, is nothing proved by the nine acts of aggression committed by countries under private ownership since 1918?

There is another curious thing too. If we had adopted Socialism in 1920 and if since then there had never been less than one million, often nearly three million, unemployed, would no one have had the slightest doubt that this constituted a positive proof that Socialism was wrong? Not just rather wrong and capable of minor adjustments, but on the contrary, hopelessly wrong? If this is so, then why does anyone suppose that the unemployment figures of the last years are not positive and final proof that private ownership is wrong?

Private ownership, it may be answered, did once succeed in employing all the people, and with a little tinkering about it ought to be able to do so again. This argument can only be advanced by those who have never so much as looked at the argument brought forward by the advocates of common ownership. For it is precisely their case that private ownership during the period of unprecedented expansion, that is to say, during the period between approximately 1800 and 1920 when the world was changed in one dizzy moment from an agricultural to an industrial community, can keep all its expanding resources employed; but that on the contrary as soon as the greatest of the new inventions have been more or less fully exploited, as soon as we stop discovering and opening up new lands, as soon as the populations of the great

<sup>1</sup> By this I do not mean that we must achieve complete common ownership before we can hope for peace. I mean that we must have a government and must have taken one or two preliminary but very definite and unequivocal steps which will guarantee to the world that we shall rapidly achieve common ownership on the conclusion of the peace.

capitalist countries themselves begin to decline, then and then only will private ownership inevitably fail to employ all the people. In view of the fact that the three causes stipulated by the advocates of common ownership have been operating more or less for the last two decades, and that in precisely the same period the effect forecast by these people, namely stubborn unemployment throughout the whole capitalist world, has made its unwelcome appearance, the advocates of common ownership surely have a right to ask the classic question 'What do you make of it, Watson?' It would seem to be worthwhile for all people to pay very serious attention to the quite logical argument by which these two things are shown to be inseparably connected with each other.<sup>1</sup>

Year by year since the last war there have been in the world between fifteen and fifty million people unemployed. From year to year the total fluctuates. From one five-year period to the next it grows worse, except of course when we mortgage our financial future by preparing for and waging war. Taking a big view of these millions of people, looking at them not one by one but as one tremendous whole, what keeps these men from going into the mines and the fields and factories and working to produce the goods they need? There must be an answer to this question. It cannot just be left hanging in the air as something we need not worry about. If these men do not do the obviously sensible thing, there must be some reason for it. There is. They do not do it because the mines, fields, and factories are owned by private owners and these people cannot see their way to earning profit for themselves if they allowed the unemployed to go in and work for mankind.

This explanation surely should not be rejected except by those who are quite certain that they have a better one, and it is worth noticing that not one advocate of private ownership will claim that he can explain unemployment or suggest a final cure. Then are we going to ask mankind to go through all the hell of war in order to re-emerge

<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately this argument requires fully 5,000 words even for its briefest exposition. I would recommend, for example, John Strachey's *The Nature of the Capitalist Crisis* (1935).

into a world in which still millions of us will be denied our most elementary liberty—the right to work and earn a living?

There is another point in the realm of economics. Surely at the end of this war we must end our existing inequality not at some distant date through some slowly-operating process, but at once. It is not tolerable that  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent of our people draw 23 per cent of our national income and the next  $8\frac{1}{2}$  per cent draw the next 19 per cent of the income, and that 90 per cent of our people are left to divide the remaining 58 per cent. It would be one of my peace aims that the system which makes this possible must end. What is the system which makes it possible? Of our people, 10 per cent (the  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent plus the  $8\frac{1}{2}$  per cent mentioned above) own 90 per cent of our property. Do we need to look further than that to know what is the system which causes these inequalities?

But there is also a moral case. Our present system of private ownership, free capitalism, individual initiative—call it what you will—is based upon one essential moral foundation. ‘Promote your own interest,’ is what we say to everyone, ‘and it must follow that you will thereby promote the common good.’ The driving power, therefore, behind our present system is self-interest. Now it is not a question of the two things being slightly divergent and capable of reconciliation by just a little adjustment here and there. On the contrary, the philosophical foundation of our present system is diametrically opposed to the whole of Christian teaching, in particular to the second of the two equal commandments on which hang all the law and the prophets. Maybe, in the days when the world was more or less run in practice according to the rules of free competition on which the economists of the classical period built up their theories, it might seem that self-interest and common good could be reconciled. But to-day the world is not run according to the theory of free competition. The world is dominated by the vast powers of huge masses of capital, so vast that no ordinary man can comprehend them; it is governed by men who, using the powers they possess, are still, under our present theory, quite properly seeking their own personal interests and those of their colleagues.

We cannot build up a tranquil world on the basis of so deep an economic and moral contradiction. The tremendous powers of international and national finance working in its own interest will always neglect and abuse and ultimately distort and destroy any paper plan for international and national organization, however perfect the plan might be in a world in which no one was moved by anything other than the common good. I therefore want common ownership so that the resources of each part of the world may be developed exclusively for the benefit of the people who live there.<sup>1</sup>

This general rule would have to be applied to the colonies. And its application would mean that no one outside the colonies would be allowed to draw any dividends whatever from trade or production in the colonies, and that we in Britain would have to find for the people now earning these dividends whatever rate of compensation we chose to adopt. The only people qualified to decide what are their best interests are naturally the native peoples themselves. They would no doubt require the assistance of white technicians and administrators for some years, and this assistance should be given by an international organization and not by Britain alone. This service should be paid for by the States which supply it and not by the natives. In this way Dives will both make some contribution to the well-being of Lazarus and will also be given direct incentive to educate as rapidly as possible to take on the necessary burdens for himself.<sup>2</sup>

Of course we cannot expect to win common ownership at once. The psychology of our present system will remain for some years in any event. We therefore have to make some provision against renewed outbreaks of war. At the end of the last war we asked ourselves: 'What causes war?' We answered, 'Nations fighting for their own exclusive ends cause war. Therefore let nations promise that they will not

<sup>1</sup> 'Developed' includes of course 'exported and exchanged for other goods'.

<sup>2</sup> It goes without saying that in the same sort of way we must give up political and economic control of India. The Indians would require no technical advice from outside. The Community problems, no doubt, are serious, but they could be solved if they were determined to solve them. The Indian Princes present the same problem as all other rich men who are now getting more than their share.

fight for their own ends and that they will make common cause against anyone who breaks his promise. Then there will be no more war.'

This was a tremendously courageous answer, and the resulting organization might have triumphantly succeeded and led on to a glorious future if we had had in these last years a Government which understood it and was absolutely determined to make it succeed. But now that it has failed, those who so rightly supported it while it might yet have succeeded should realize that great forces have been released into the world, that humanity as a whole is something great and strong and is not easily deflected one way or another by the views and opinions of little men, and that there is really no chance whatever that humanity will direct its steps once again down the same path—a path which of course might succeed but which must lead to disaster if we find at the end of it statesmen as ruthless as Signor Mussolini and Herr Hitler and as unfortunate as Mr Chamberlain and M. Daladier. Humanity will not set out along that path even if there may be learned men saying, 'We know how to guide your steps away from one or two false turnings which you took last time.' We need ideas as different from 'the League' as the League was different from the ideas of 1913.

Let us then go back to the beginning and ask the same question: 'What causes wars?' It is the possession by individual governments of private armies, navies, and air forces which causes war. As long as individual governments possess these forces, there will be risk of war, because whatever governments may promise to do or not to do with these forces, their promises may always be broken. Therefore let us draw the courageous conclusion. There shall be no more private armies at all. There shall be only one army, and in this army, perhaps not in every platoon, but in every battalion, the private soldiers of all countries shall meet and rub shoulders, learn one language, and receive a wide education in internationalism and liberty.

There are no practical difficulties in the way of an international armed force. The only difficulties are political, and these could be swept away by one breath of international

common sense. Carefully examine the heart of any man who conjures up pictures of terrible dangers which might befall this world under an international force. You will find that he has never realized that what we are now suffering is a result of the dangers of not having an international force. But you will also find that what is really troubling him is that he cannot imagine a world in which Britain would not have something of her very own with which to tell the dirty dagoes to go to hell.

These, then, are my peace terms. And these are the things I would talk about in my broadcast programmes to the world, in my leaflets dropped on Germany. These are the things which I would send into Germany through all the illegal organizations. These are the things, in particular, which I would say through loud speakers in the front-line trenches:

'German soldiers—The people of Britain speaking to you—The world for humanity—This is our message to you. There is more than enough for one and all if we divide it sensibly. Why are you fighting us? You say our Government snatched all the richest parts of the world in the last century. We admit it. You say they wrongly took your colonies and accused you of all the guilt of the last war. We admit it. You say that they stood there and watched you attack one country after another in ways which in your hearts you know were wrong; that they thereby gave you the impression that as far as they were concerned you could go on as far as you liked. You say that our Government has turned round to attack you just because it began to look as if you might be strong enough to threaten us next. We admit it.

'But we, the people of Britain, have disposed of the Government which did those things. Our country is now governed by all the people who have for years past opposed all these things of which you rightly complain. Now what are you fighting for? We offer you, German people, liberty from both your tyrants. We offer you liberty from the tyrants who made money out of you, and who falsely told you that it was the Jews who caused your poverty, in order to disguise from you the fact that they themselves were reaping rich rewards

from your privations. Just how much did your wages increase after all the Jews were driven out?

'We also offer you liberty from your political tyrants—from the men who will not let you speak or think or read or meet. It may be that many of you do not mind it very much, but humanity really cannot go on under a system like yours in which there is a quite secret body of men outside any public knowledge and control, who can arrest anyone for anything or nothing and subject him to unbelievable miseries and even death. This system means—does it not, you German sentry listening to this broadcast—that you hardly dare to tell your friend that you are rather attracted by what we say in case he should on that account report you and have you shot. How do you suppose mankind, made in the image of God, can live on terms such as these? We tell you that the human race as a whole will struggle against you for ever rather than accept these conditions.

'Now you will naturally think that these colonies which our Government took from you will be returned. We have another idea. Your colonies and ours are neither yours nor ours to use as counters in an international bargain. They belong by right only to the people who live there. We ask you to co-operate with us in all your colonies and all ours on precisely equal terms in supplying the administrative and technical service which these people will still need from Europe until they have fully developed their own powers.

'Now as to arms. You perhaps think we are going to ask you to lay down your arms first. You perhaps think all these fine words are just a trap. Not at all. We propose that our arms should be destroyed at the same time as yours. You come and watch ours destroyed, we will watch yours. And such arms as we retain—what about looking after them together?

'Don't you think, you German soldiers, that you and we could get on rather better living in the same barracks than living in opposite trenches? Would it not be worthwhile to try to get to know each other—and the French, and the Russians, and the Danes and the Swedes, and anyone else who would come in—know each other as friends and not as enemies? Do you not think that we, the common soldiers,



might succeed in making the kind of world in which our different governments would not send out their common peoples to murder each other like this.'

I am not expecting that one moral sermon will miraculously break the control of the Nazi machine over the German people. But if, while resisting the Nazi attempt to impose their will upon us, we could put ourselves in a position to speak to the world on the lines I have suggested, then at some stage the Nazi machine would no longer control the German people.

We cannot say when this would happen. But it would happen many months and probably many years before we could hope to reduce the Germans to military or economic surrender while holding out peace terms which to them meant at best a return to the conditions of 1927.

Three great advantages would then follow. First, and most obviously, millions of lives and untold destruction would be saved. Secondly, we cannot rule out of account the fact that every year of the war contains within itself the unpleasant risk that some development (secret weapon, diplomatic coup) might prevent our winning the economic or military victory at all. Lastly, a peace imposed after military victory is almost bound to be a peace based on hatred containing within itself the desire for revenge. Peace won on the lines I have suggested would be wholly different. It would arise through the active co-operation of the new governments of Great Britain, France, and Germany to carry into practice the terms that would have already been agreed between their peoples.

*The Hon. David Astor*

THE PRESENT EUROPEAN WAR is probably the most complex single enterprise that humanity has ever involved itself in. Prophecies about its outcome and consequences are bound to be crude and likely to be mere soothsaying.

There are many alternative solutions to that of a straightforward fight to the finish between Germany and the Anglo-French Alliance. The warlike Hitler made several demonstrations in the early months of the war which were known as 'peace offensives', and even now he may prove to be less of a warrior and more of a political hoaxer by, so to speak, letting go of his end of the rope. You might one day read, under the headlines 'I HAVE BEEN DECEIVED—ADOLF HITLER', that Ribbentrop has been shot, the Soviet Pact disavowed and an order given for the withdrawal of German troops from all occupied territories. The triumphant jubilation with which such news would be received up and down the country and amongst the armed forces would cause a good deal of sprinting about in Whitehall. If there were even a short truce it could be made very difficult for us to start the war up again in cold blood. Then there is the possibility of indefinitely prolonged siege warfare. And there are a hundred and one other possibilities. Occasionally to recall the extremely problematic nature of the course and exact outcome of the war itself is a useful corrective to those who are inclined to imagine that a complete agenda for the peace conference should be drawn up at once.

Now, let us consider the significance of this very general demand, at the outset of the war, that the governments of the Allied countries should declare their war aims and even their peace aims. The phenomenon is unique to this war.

Its principal cause is, surely, disillusionment. In 1914-18 it was believed that could Prussianism but be defeated, and the principle of self-determination be applied to Central and Eastern Europe, a lasting peace would be achieved. People believed they were fighting in 'the war to end wars'. Not even the most conscientious and habitual cynics foresaw that in a few years we would be faced with another war and an ironically similar war. Far from feeling, as in August 1914, that it would be a short war followed by a long period of peace and plenty, in the summer of 1939 the mood was one of almost stupefied amazement that we, the people of Europe, were to be put through the folly and horror of another modern war. Willingness to resist the Hitler menace to the bitter end was there, but no exultation, and certainly no optimism as to the consequences of the war. Victory, it has been amply proved, is not enough.

The secondary cause for the demand is a belief that well-stated and well-chosen aims would help us win the war. They would give us a positive cause to fight for, which, it is argued, is as essential as the knowledge of what we are fighting against. Such a pronouncement, it is further held, would seriously affect our enemy. A new vision of Europe as a single community, with its common cultural heritage and its fear of repeated internal strife to unite it—some such Promised Land must be envisaged if our people are to fight keenly and if the Germans are to be converted from followers of their false Messiah into citizens of Europe.

Before further considering these notions, I would like to point out that the public deliberation upon our aims, to which all sections of the Press have given prominence, and even the currency of such terms as war aims and peace aims, are themselves symptomatic of a new attitude to war. The most pronounced manifestation of this new attitude is the calm and unemotional way in which the people both of this country and of France have set about the actual fighting of the war.

Is it justifiable to see in this matter-of-fact, reasonable, yet determined temper (which has outmoded Jingoism) an embryonic sense of duty as Europeans? Is not this spirit identical

with that of a policeman setting about an awkward job? Will historians detect in this struggle some elements of a European Civil War? Is not Germany's real transgression in our opinion that she has reverted to the doctrine of complete national sovereignty and broken those ties and contracts which were destined to limit that sovereignty? Are we beginning to think of ourselves as not only Englishmen and Frenchmen but also as Europeans?

No. Such optimistic deductions from the peculiar war spirit of our people and the general interest manifested in the reconstruction period are not justifiable. Nevertheless, even if positive signs of a sense of European citizenship are but faint and infrequent, there are plenty of negative signs that nationalism of the nineteenth-century type is evoking little enthusiasm. Of particular importance is the fact that this is true even of the Third Reich, every report from which confirms that actual enthusiasm for this war exists only amongst the professional enthusiasts of the party, while the majority of the people accept it, more cheerfully or less cheerfully, as one of the burdens fate has imposed on them. In spite of seven years of physical and spiritual preparation, it is clear that the only class in Germany who can be made to see war as a romantic and glorious adventure are the adolescents. This was not the case in Germany, or even here, in 1914 when war still had considerable glamour and its outbreak was greeted with gaiety.

This slump in chauvinism, which is manifested in varying degrees throughout Europe, is not in itself any safeguard against war. It has to be converted into a new and wiser enthusiasm before it will have a positive value to Europeans in their search for security.

I am strongly of the opinion that a statement of the general principles of an intended New Deal for Europe would be of great value to the Allies in the business of winning the war. First, it would be a sign or emblem in the political maelstrom of to-day to which our people could rally. Secondly, it would be a precise and urgent reminder to the neutrals of the difference between us and our adversaries (they being inclined to become over-interested in the immediate threat

from Germany and to lose sight of the overwhelming ultimate importance to themselves of our victory).

To such a statement of principles should be added certain promises to Germany of what we will *not* do after the war, with the intention of allaying the fear that this time Germany will be 'destroyed', which fear is absolutely essential to Hitler for the maintenance of morale. (Unlike positive promises, which are difficult to believe and difficult to execute, negative promises are both more credible and easier of fulfilment.)

It has to be admitted that for various reasons there has been no statement of war aims by our rulers capable of either diminishing German belief in our malignity, of binding neutral sympathy closely to our cause, or even of evoking enthusiasm amongst our own people.

I am not so bold as to attempt this formidable task, which represents the greatest political need of our time: that is to say, a restatement of the principles of democracy, of Christian ethics and of the essential qualities of Western civilization in terms of to-day and of to-morrow. The future of Europe seems almost to depend on the ability of the Western democracies to evolve such a political creed which would be, so to speak, a counter-pole of attraction to those of the demagogue-tyrannies.

One may say for certain, though, that the two vital necessities for a New Deal for Europe are: (1) a political formula for substituting the anarchy of Europe by some rule of law which can be enforced, and (2) a correct diagnosis of the severe disease afflicting the German people and an effective prescription for their treatment in the future.

The political formula which seems to be most generally looked to for the solution of our international anarchy is federalism. Apart from divergent ideas as to the actual governmental machinery implied by this term, there are, also, very different ideas as to the procedure by which it should be approached. For instance, some people advocate an Anglo-French federation only. Some would like a federation of Western democracies, great and small, as the nucleus to which other political units may be added when they adopt the internal system of the original member-States of the

union. Others consider that the first nucleus should be England, France, and Germany, arguing that unless Germany is co-opted before the small powers, she is likely to become a permanent outsider and a source of intrigue, jealousy and, perhaps, ultimately of disruption. Yet other people interpret the conception of a Federal Europe in terms of blocks of Federal States—say, a Western block, an Oslo block, a Danubian block, a Mediterranean block, a German block—linked together in a European Confederation.

Naturally the principal difficulty in realizing any of the above dreams is the heritage every nation has of anxiety, suspicion, and of actual experience. An equally grave obstacle is likely to be the attitude of the British Dominions to such plans, as well as the whole problem of the position of colonial possessions, if their metropolitan countries enter a federation.

In spite of the enormous difficulties that would attend any move towards an even partial European Federation and in spite of the *prima facie* improbability that Europeans could ever understand a federal framework to their lives, I do not see how this thickly-populated little continent is ultimately to organize itself except by some form of federation.

In considering the future of Germany, let us assume that the Nazi régime has suffered a total eclipse, for unless this is so it is no use thinking of Europe as anything but a permanent armed camp. We must, then, neither impose a system of government which is so unsteady, because so hated, that a punitive expedition has to be made every few years to prevent the Germans from throwing it off, nor must we allow them such independence that they are free within two short decades to repeat their armed excursions into neighbouring territories.

Broadly, the aim of the Allies must be to recapture the Germans and their admirable country for Western civilization, while at the same time taking every precaution against a revival of militarism amongst them. Ultimately, both of these purposes will be best served by inviting them into some form of political partnership from which both peoples should gain many economic and cultural advantages, not the least of which might be the imparting of our peculiar and slowly-

acquired political sense and standards of behaviour. This task might prove of great spiritual value to both giver and receiver.

The plains, peninsulas and islands of Western Europe, which have cradled the Latin and Germanic peoples, are the metropolis of the world. This most civilised little area, inhabited by people of the same religion, whose development has moved forward in the same general progression, is battering itself to ruin. We Englishmen are very much part of Western Europe—culturally and geographically. To place our hope for the future merely on strengthening our Imperial ties and avoiding commitments on the continent of Europe is to mistake a dream for a possibility. The problem of organizing Western Europe into some kind of body politic is our vital problem as much as that of any continental country.

*Major Victor Cazalet, M.P.*

DURING THE FIRST FEW MONTHS OF THE WAR I had on many occasions the opportunity of talking to large numbers of soldiers. These comprised, for the most part, pre-war territorials and volunteers. On every occasion, after talking for about half an hour, I devoted the rest of the time to answering questions. Apart from one or two questions dealing with isolated matters such as Japan or Spain, the great bulk of the questions were always about the future of Germany and what peace terms we should impose or accept. In no single instance was half an hour sufficient to deal with all the points which they desired to raise. It is perhaps not uninteresting to analyse some of these questions and it is, I believe, very germane to the subject of this book.

Let no one misunderstand the temper of these questions. There was never the slightest suggestion that we should not be prepared to go through with the struggle whatever the cost. For the most part the men who asked questions were just intelligent citizens who had volunteered to join the Army because they wished to help to defeat Nazism. They were all intensely interested in, and many were well informed about, foreign affairs. They were puzzled, like many citizens, about certain aspects of the war. Hardly a meeting took place without the question arising as to why, if we were fighting Germany because she was an aggressor, did we not also fight Russia, who was equally an aggressor? To this conundrum I had a stock answer—which, if it was not very convincing, was at least safe—that although I agreed about Russia being an aggressor, I thought our policy ought to be 'one enemy at a time'. I fear many of them were no more convinced than I am that this is wholly satisfactory. After all, who is prepared



at the present moment to state categorically what we ought to do about Russia, beyond what we are doing—namely, making it as difficult as possible for Russia and Germany to feel any confidence or assurance in their mutual treaty of friendship and to give all the assistance we possibly can to the enemies of both? Events will inevitably shape our policy, and no doubt one day the issue will have to be fought out. Whether Finland will become another Crimea and a possible cancer which may destroy the Russian military machine, and whether Germany will eventually break with Russia, or become more closely related, are questions filled with possibilities which are no doubt giving those who control Allied war policy 'furiously to think'.

The answers to these questions are of course only pertinent to our arguments in so far as they must necessarily be factors which seriously complicate the final peace issue. It is difficult to see how any permanent peace can be established in Europe without the co-operation in some form of a Russian Government, and for me it is utterly impossible to imagine that we should be content with any peace terms which do not restore everything to Finland. For the time being we must content ourselves with the thought that when we have dealt with Germany, we may be able to see more clearly what should be done about Russia. Yet so unexpected have been the events of this war that it may well be that the surprise attack of Russia on Finland and the magnificent defence of their country by the Finns may alter the whole trend of the war by showing up the Russian weakness. The war may yet be won by an attack from the North.

The Finnish struggle may not only give a different orientation to the war from a military standpoint, but it may well have repercussions far beyond that. After the war is over, the economic systems of many countries will have to be changed. Up to the present the capitalist system has been fighting a losing battle. The Right Wing has always been in retreat. The Left has invariably derived tremendous strength from the fact that Soviet Russia, rightly or wrongly, was held to have founded a new economic order. To-day once and for all this has been exposed. There can be no

longer any illusions about the Soviet régime from a military, economic, or an ideological standpoint. The ideals of millions of people have been shattered. What an opportunity this is for a constructive and progressive body of young thinkers to put forward an attractive programme of planned capitalism which will draw to its standard masses of disillusioned individuals who have lost their Lode Star which hitherto received its effulgence from Soviet Russia. The Finns, by their heroic struggle, may have laid the foundations of a new order. This, however, opens up a new theme which it would be out of place to try and develop here.

There are a good number of people who, whenever the question of peace terms is raised, immediately shake their heads and say they see no point in discussing it now—what we have got to do, they affirm, is to get on with the war and defeat the Germans. That is all very well, but you can hardly expect intelligent people, especially those who are prepared to give their lives in the struggle, not to be interested in discussing the objects for which they are fighting. I take the view that it is absolutely essential, if you are going to keep public opinion interested and united, that there should be the fullest and freest discussion as to both war and peace aims. The whole *raison d'être* of being a democracy is that we can discuss, and if necessary disagree about, our ultimate aims and objects, while at the same time remaining united in our efforts to continue the struggle.

Theoretically speaking, I should like to see soldiers discussing and arguing the issues involved right up to the front line. I am certain it would not make the slightest difference as to the effectiveness and determination with which they would finally go over the top. What we want are soldiers who fight not because they are told to, but because they passionately believe in the justice of their cause and are intellectually convinced as to its rightness. I regard it as a lamentable attitude towards the war to try and curb in any way free discussions as to our peace or war aims. All too soon we begin to imitate the habits of the dictatorships. Perhaps the worst aspect of any war is the intellectual poison that it injects into the minds of otherwise perfectly honest men and women.

Hate, false propaganda, wishful thinking, and violent passions are among the most easily digested poisons. As long as freedom of thought and discussion—and there cannot be one without the other—continue, we can still hope to avoid some of the ugliest consequences of Armageddon.

The average Englishman's approach to this war has been arrived at by a slow and definite process. He has never been quite certain about Hitler. He has been in turns amazed, shocked, and disgusted at his actions and achievements. As long as Hitler had some basis of legality for what he did or some shred of argument on his side, the average Englishman was not deeply stirred. In any case the danger to himself appeared remote.

Suddenly Nazi policy began to affect and actually interfere with his own life. Austria became German. He was accustomed to go to Austria for his holidays. He liked the Austrians. He actually knew an Austrian whose brother had been interned or disappeared. This was almost a direct personal attack—in any case it interfered with his holiday. He became bored with Hitler. Business was upset. Week-ends could not be relied upon. He kept meeting more and more people who knew a Jew from Austria who told a very upsetting story. Some of his friends already felt so passionately about the ill-treatment of the Jews that he himself was beginning to worry and wonder whether something ought to be done about it. Even now the danger to himself was neither obvious nor immediate.

Then came September 1938 and Munich. Horror, terror, relief, remorse—all these in turn shook the entire nation and undermined the complacency of the most tolerant and peace-loving people in the world. Slowly public opinion began to awake. Self-righteousness and self-protection—moral indignation and an acute sense of overwhelming danger combined to convince, convert, and finally arouse the passionate resentment of the ordinary man.

Hitler, with almost uncanny skill, had united at least 95 per cent of the country to feel and think alike. The noblest principles of Christianity were involved, together with the most primitive reactions of self-protection.

It is not to be wondered at that every thinking citizen, whether he wears khaki or not, is vitally interested in peace terms. It is his war, perhaps the most 'popular' war in the correct sense of that word, of all time.

In discussing what we should do when the war is over, we assume of course that we are the victors. What British subject ever contemplated any other conclusion? Whether we negotiate peace with the vanquished, or dictate it as we did in 1919, would not, I think, alter very largely the main and generally accepted principles upon which the peace treaties must be founded in so far as they affect Europe. There is little, if any, divergence of views on the main terms. We are all agreed that the nations which have been invaded must be restored. They must be economically and militarily capable of being independent sovereign powers. We would like to see a plebiscite under international control taken in Austria. Above all, Germany must be disarmed, and in so far as it is humanly possible, steps must be taken to see that she cannot rearm within any reasonable measure of time.

Beyond these few definite, and in a certain sense limited objectives, I think it would be very unwise for the Government to declare its peace aims to-day. Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax have outlined in admirably simple phraseology the objects for which we are fighting, and at the moment it is difficult to see how they could go much further without laying up for this country unnecessary complications in the future.

As regards the boundaries of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland, I would like to put forward the following suggestions:

The minority population problems have been a source of constant worry, friction, and international concern ever since the last war. Minorities appear to have been no more content under the Czecho-Slovak Government, where they received reasonably good treatment, than they were under the Poles and the Yugoslavs, where their claims were not even acknowledged.

It would seem that many European countries are not prepared to regard any minority in their midst with anything but hostility and suspicion. The toleration

of the minority by the majority is a late fruit of mature democracy.

Is it possible to devise some method of avoiding this problem in the future? I rather think the Germans have shown us a solution.

Let us take, for instance, Czecho-Slovakia. Some of the same principles which no doubt influenced those who framed the Treaty of Versailles must naturally apply once again when she is re-created after this war. The case for a defensible frontier will in fact apply in the future with even greater force than in 1919. I should like to see the northern frontier of Bohemia re-established exactly where it was during the last twenty years. To the Sudeten Germans who inhabit that territory I would offer the alternative of deciding within two or three years whether they wished to become Czech citizens or, if not, arrange for them and their families to be transferred into Germany. As far as their estates and property are concerned, they would be given a generous deal. In other words, they would be offered the opportunity of accepting full Czech nationality with all its rights and obligations or, in accordance with the latest German policy, of being transferred to their own native land. As regards certain other parts of eastern, southern, and western Czecho-Slovakia, I would not restore them where there was clearly a majority of people who were neither Czechs nor Slovaks.

The reconstitution of Poland will present some very difficult problems, particularly if Soviet Russia is still in possession of that part of Poland which she is now occupying. Knowing something of Polish national feeling, I cannot imagine a Polish Government in the future which would ever rest content with frontiers appreciably less extensive than those which she has enjoyed in the last twenty years. Certain adjustments there should be. Vilna should remain part of Lithuania. Danzig and part of the Corridor might well go to Germany. The Silesian frontier should be rectified, and in compensation for these territorial concessions to Germany I would seriously consider giving the whole of East Prussia to Poland. Here again I would offer the Germans the option of becoming Polish citizens within a definite period of

time or, if they preferred it, of being transferred to Germany proper. Such decisions both as regards Czecho-Slovakia and Poland would no doubt create new difficulties, but they would very largely do away with the problem of minorities which has been such an insuperable barrier to European peace since the Treaty of Versailles.

I do not intend in these few pages to enter into any further discussion as regards the various other frontiers of Europe, which no doubt will change during the war or as a result of it. I feel that an observation or two on the future of Austria cannot be avoided if we are to face the problem of a new Europe with a realistic outlook. No one supposes that Austria will be reconstituted with exactly the same status—political or economic—as she has enjoyed or endured since the last war. As such, she was a perpetual problem to herself and her neighbours. It stands to reason that she must by one means or another obtain some form of international connection and support. I picture a possible solution along these lines. Why not create Austria into an international free State within whose boundaries a strong international police force would always be maintained? In other words, make her into a Geneva on a large scale. The Austrians, who in some ways are less nationalistic, or one might say more internationally minded than any other nation, could pursue their arts and crafts supported by international guarantees and maintained financially by the influx of considerable sums of foreign money with which the international force would be maintained. It might be that a restoration of the Habsburgs would consolidate the internal situation. This idea of a free international State, in which all nationalities could feel themselves citizens when they visited it, has, in theory at any rate, much to recommend it.

Failing a solution along these lines, one has to fall back on a Danubian Federation, which, if it had been made to function during the last twenty years, might have saved us from the present struggle. It is still a possibility, but I doubt whether the Balkan States would ever really welcome Austria with her German affiliations into their political and economic sphere. It is equally difficult to envisage a Balkan Entente

extending sufficiently far north to include Austria and Czecho-Slovakia. It is just possible that she might be the nucleus of a central European Power with Catholic Bavaria as her northern boundary.

This leads on to the complicated question of how far it may be possible or wise to break up Germany. Few can doubt that if such a scheme is possible, the arguments in favour of it are overwhelming. It may be easy enough temporarily to divide up a conquered Germany. Can you, however, maintain artificial boundaries, even with mass emigration? I doubt if you could ever divide her up economically for any length of time. Politically, however, I would not hesitate to try to separate Prussia from other parts of Germany. I should welcome a return of all the Grand Dukes and Princes to their little kingdoms, even including a Hohenzollern to the throne of Prussia.

Another of the problems about which I was invariably asked concerns the old problem of whether the Germans have or have not an extra dose of original sin. Is it possible to conceive of a German Government with whom you could make peace unless you had first won a military victory over them? Is it possible to keep eighty millions of people down for ever? Could you ever rely upon the word of a German Government if its army and air force were still intact? These are some of the variants in which the problem was put. To be honest, I am not quite sure what the right answer is. The easy reply is to say that until we have defeated the German military forces, we can never trust the word of a German Government. However right this answer may be as regards the Nazi Government, would it equally apply to a German Government which came into power by overthrowing the present régime? Would we, for instance, refuse to deal with a Government in which Brüning was the Foreign Minister? The consequence of accepting this direct, and in my opinion easy, answer is that we must be prepared to sacrifice two or three million lives to defeat the most formidable military machine in the world, and it may be necessary. If it is, we shall make the sacrifice of lives and wealth entailed, and what the result may be at the end should perhaps not colour

our determination, but it is a bold man who rules out every other possible method of achieving our end.

Entertaining as it is to speculate about the future, it is obvious that the circumstances of the war may so radically alter the situation as to make speculation, however entertaining, a somewhat profitless occupation. One of the chief difficulties in dealing with after-the-war problems is to isolate any one question from every other. All war problems are one; and to only a slightly lesser degree will the problems of peace be interdependent one with another.

At the beginning of the war there were comments on M. Daladier's statement to the French Senate on December 29. Perhaps too much has been read into his sympathetic references as regards the possibility of some federal organization between European States in the future. Who has not dreamt of some Pan-European Federation—a real League of Nations in which all members are prepared to make some sacrifice of both their economic and political sovereignty? We have to-day with the French a degree of unity as regards trade, currency, and supplies which may serve us so well in war-time that we may be tempted to utilize it in peace. At any rate it shows that if there is sufficient goodwill co-operation is a practical reality. Let us hope that, if not for any other reason, the common danger of universal bankruptcy and poverty will arouse in us the same degree of willingness to co-operate after the war as we are doing to-day. If England and France can work together in Europe, it follows that co-operation between the French and British Empires must also be worked out. This leads me to one other field of thought, namely, the question of colonies and their future status and position.

I recognize in dealing with this subject that I am treading on somewhat delicate ground. There are two very distinct schools of thought on the subject of the British colonies. There are those who hold the view that every inch of territory which remains a hundred per cent British, and preferably under the control of Westminster, makes not only for the prosperity of the British peoples, but also for the peace and prosperity of the world. Some of those who hold this



view believe also in what is known as Empire free trade, with its corollary of building up a tariff barrier against the rest of the world. However pleasant such thoughts may be, they do not bear practical examination. On purely material no less than on moral grounds the British Empire could never hope to survive such a policy.

Then there is the view commonly voiced by Labour speakers which would give complete independence, both political and economic, at the very earliest moment, to almost every part of the British Empire, including various native territories—in other words to create a number of Pocket Dominions. I fear such a policy would result in nothing except misery for the inhabitants and disaster for the Empire generally. Can we find the happy mean between these two extremes?

No doubt many of us will have to adopt a very different view about our colonies than we have done in the past. Flexibility and evolution have ever been characteristic of our constitution. The war may test the former and hasten the latter. It is true that we have made a few rather vague declarations as to our willingness to discuss the distribution of raw materials; but unless we make a far more specific statement, we are not likely to persuade people that we mean business. The important thing to note is that we, who have by far the largest colonial empire, must be the first to make a gesture.

To imagine, however, that we can hand over a large portion of our colonial empire to the management and control of any international body would not, I believe, command the support of the majority of people in this country, or, in itself, be of real value or help to the colonies or the world outside. The truth is that although the inhabitants, white, black, or coloured, may grumble at times about British rule, they still prefer it to that of any other country.

Is there any method by which we can banish once and for all the belief, which many countries still entertain, that England keeps her colonies principally for the sake of her own trade and is loth to share their wealth with others, while at the same time we preserve for the native the benefits of that

rule which on the whole they regard as both fair and just? I think there is, and although it may not be possible to foresee all the steps by which such a policy can come to fruition, we can perhaps indicate their direction and even define the first steps. I should like our attitude on this subject defined before the war ends.

It has been said by more than one organization, with varying emphasis, that the interests of the native must be paramount. As the man in the street understands this, it means that in certain localities emigrants or white settlers will not be allowed to trespass upon the area set apart for the natives, nor should they pursue a policy which, while profiting themselves, works to the detriment of the natives—a wholly admirable sentiment. As always in dealing with the British Empire, every colony has its own history and its own problems. In some parts of West Africa the ownership of land by the white settlers is ruled out; in Kenya it is restricted to certain districts.

The phrase 'interests of the natives' sounds highly laudable, but it is not of course always a matter of general agreement as to what their best interests are. Even the native himself is not necessarily willing to accept those steps which others may believe will ensure his progress. It is clear, however, that for many years to come the British Government must have a final say as regards the policy to be pursued in most native communities. Both the pace and the nature of this development must vary according to local conditions. In due course, no doubt, the natives will be in a position to take an ever-increasing share in shaping their own policy. For the present some authority with economic resources must have a final decision if the areas are to be developed in both the most economic and most efficient manner. If I have perhaps laboured this point unduly, it is only because I wish to dispose at once of the idea that there can be any immediate transfer from British rule.

If in the political realm any startling changes appear difficult, and even unwise, there is surely ample scope for action in the economic sphere. For instance we should, I maintain, be willing to be far more specific about raw

materials. It is no complete answer to say that we are always prepared to sell these in open market to any purchaser who will pay the world price in a currency over which we have control. Difficulties as regards control, exchange, and transport have to be taken into account.

I should like to see something along the following lines. For example, let us take our African colonies. I cannot believe that it is beyond the capacity of our statesmanship to devise a method by which large areas of Africa should be united for certain specific purposes. A start might be made with tariffs, currency and air transport, which cries out for amalgamation and unity of control. The Congo Basin Treaties already provide some guide for action such as I suggest. Under this system, introduced at Brussels on 2 July 1890, none of the interested Powers having territories in the affected zone is able to give any preference to imported goods; any agreed duty within 5 per cent. maximum can be imposed, but it must apply to all. The Powers primarily affected are Great Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, Egypt, and Italy, but some fourteen nations in all are parties to the principle stated, which was confirmed in the Treaty of St Germain-en-Laye in 1919. Prior to the Brussels Act, the Berlin Act of 1885, which created the Congo Free State, laid down certain humanitarian principles to be applied in African colonies. They are still valid to-day. Three articles then approved may be quoted:

ARTICLE 1.—The trade of all nations shall enjoy complete freedom. . . .

ARTICLE 5.—No Power which exercises, or shall exercise, sovereign rights in the above-mentioned regions, shall be allowed to grant therein a monopoly or favour of any kind in matters of trade. . . .

ARTICLE 7.—All the Powers exercising sovereign rights or influence in the aforesaid territories bind themselves to watch over the preservation of the native tribes, and to care for the improvement of the conditions of their moral well-being, and to help in suppressing slavery, and especially the slave trade. . . .<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Bulletin officiel de l'État indépendant du Congo* (1885), No. 1. The language of the definitive text is French (Ed.).

I suggest that these ideas should be consolidated, extended and brought up to date.

I am fully aware of the difficulties that immediately arise in contemplating such a policy in Central Africa or for that matter anywhere else. Some of them have always presented themselves when sovereign rights are challenged. The United States of America experienced them over a century ago and are still discussing Federal and State rights. So long as each geographical unit maintains economic or political sovereign rights and puts them into force against its neighbour, so long will you encourage local vested interests to seek their livelihood by taking in their own washing.

The longer the barriers exist, the higher they will become. All the time everyone involved is the poorer. Therefore I take the view that the enunciation of a colonial policy which welcomes co-operation on a broad scale will not only be a moral gesture of immense value, but will also be one which will greatly benefit the inhabitants concerned.

Naturally, we cannot go very far in a policy of this kind unless other nations play their parts. It would, I think, be too much to hope that in ordinary peace-time any nation would be prepared to take the requisite steps and make the necessary sacrifices to enable an economic federation such as I have suggested to become a working reality. It is just possible that a world war might do it. We could scarcely have a European Federation without it influencing our colonial possessions.

If other nations are hesitant to play, it does not mean that there is not within the British Empire ample opportunity for a strong and forward colonial policy. In the past we have failed, not through wickedness or the power of vested interests, to develop our Colonial Empire as we should have and indeed as other nations might have done had they possessed our opportunities. We have failed partly through negligence, partly through those in authority being too occupied with other matters, and partly because it was easier in the good old British manner to let things alone. We have had a few rude surprises in the West Indies; and if war had not come, we might have had some more in West Africa.

As usual there is every argument against doing anything, and although the war might provide an excuse for still further delaying reform, it might and should on the other hand be utilized for changes which would be accepted at no other time.

To turn to another part of the British Empire, I see no reason why we should not, in Asia, have some understanding with the Dutch East Indies. Conditions in the Malay States are not dissimilar from those in Java and Sumatra. The time has long gone by when we should have combined for mutual defence, if for no other reason. We may shortly be compelled to do so, whether we like it or not.

As regards the West Indies, we still await the report of the Royal Commission. I would like, among other things, to see two recommendations result from this Commission. First, I should welcome the appointment of a Governor-General for the whole area, who, in spite of local constitutions, would have power to overrule local legislatures when he thought fit. Secondly, I would like to see a port, with the necessary surrounding territory, transferred, with full sovereign rights, to the United States of America. Both would have immediate and far-reaching effects on issues far beyond the confines of the Caribbean Sea.

Limited as may be the field for political changes of an international character which can be effected either during or after the war, there is one proposal which borders on the political which should not be impossible to carry through. A definite pronouncement on our part that we would be willing to take into our colonial service a small percentage of non-Britishers would be a tremendous step forward. Why should we not welcome in the course of the next decade a few Swiss, Danes, Swedes, or any other foreigners who might make a real contribution to our administrative service? Obviously the suggestion would be met with great opposition. Nevertheless there could be no better proof of our willingness to co-operate with other nations in developing our colonial possessions. In the first few years only a very limited number should be accommodated, but the fact that even one was admitted would, to my mind, be a real

indication of our desire to move forward in the right direction.

I have often discussed these points with various authorities and have always met with this same question—"Have you thought out the implications of your suggestion?" My answer is yes and no. I realize the difficulties. I can well foresee the problems; but if one concentrates solely on the difficulties, one will very soon fall back on the good old habit of doing nothing.

On the whole, the mandated principle, with the exception of Palestine, has not worked out too badly. Yet I am quite sure that when the idea was first suggested that the British Empire should report what had been done in the areas under its control to an international body at Geneva every year, it was considered a national humiliation or just so much international eyewash. My idea is in course of time to extend and elaborate the principle of mandated control; and, on the whole, I believe the public in this country would accept the principle, even if at first sight national dignity and national sovereignty seemed to be involved.

The Colonial Empire must play its part in the peace treaties, not only for the purpose of allaying once and for all the suspicions and hostilities of other countries, but because it is a vital part of the British Empire without whose firm and energetic lead peace can never be established in or outside Europe. To propose and carry through such a policy will require great courage and great persistence. I only hope our war efforts will not make us feel too weary to embark upon a series of reforms which, I am convinced, will alone re-create the Colonial Empire to be not only a source of pride to the Mother Country but a permanent contribution to the peace and prosperity of the world.



*Capt. Alan Graham, M.P.*

AS THE PURPOSE OF THESE FEW PAGES is to consider the future of Europe and the world after the present war, the reader may be surprised at the space devoted not to the future, nor yet to the present, so much as to the past. This is due to the writer's profound conviction that it is only by a close study of the past that statesmen can avoid mistakes in the present and build with any degree of stability a future of happiness for their peoples. Nothing is easier than to spin Utopias to delight both the intelligentsia and the mob; but those who are sycophants of neither must dig deep, if the foundations of their future world are indeed to be well and truly laid.

\* \* \*

Out of all those who gave their lives between 1914 and 1918, no less than one million were from the British Empire. For what did these million men die? Did they die in vain? What benefits did they win for us? What mistakes during the last twenty-one years have prevented humanity from reaping the full guerdon of all this sacrifice? What sort of a future world is to merit the repetition now of similar sacrifice? Such are the stern questions which the outbreak in 1939 of a second German War forces us to find and face the answers.

## § 1

To crystallize the basic aim of the activities of any Anglo-Saxon is not easy, since they are ever governed more by vague instinct than by conscious and precise thought. Also, in a democracy mental allegiance is all too often and too



readily given to some noble-sounding slogan, without its intellectual corollaries ever being realized, let alone accepted.

We were told in 1914, as we are to-day, that it was for 'democracy' that we were fighting and against autocracy, and yet we had for our faithful ally the Russian Tsardom, while the German Social-Democrats, having voted in 1913 for that year's colossal increase of the army of the German Empire, continued to support it as long as ever it looked like winning! In those four years of war the average British soldier was certainly not consciously dying for 'democracy', whatever epitaphs demagogues may have placed upon his memorials. The average British soldier of 1914-18, if able to give any articulate reason as to why he was then fighting, would have said 'To stop Kaiser Bill from "bossing" the world!'

Such an answer, translated from the primitive personal into the more developed political phrase, would mean that he was fighting to maintain that form of civilization under which he was living and which he preferred to that which a victorious Germany would impose. In other words he was, although most probably unaware of it, not being 'a political animal', fighting for British and against German Imperialism. He certainly, unless singularly ignorant of human nature as well as of all recorded history, could not have imagined that he was fighting 'a war to end war', the other popular and equally unreal slogan of those days.

## § 2

Thanks then to the sacrifices of 1914-18, we were free to enjoy for a space of twenty-one years the benefits of British Imperialism. This meant that, as a consequence of these million deaths, the British way of life, with its freedom for the development of the individual 'wherever the Union Jack flies,' did prevail over German Imperialism, but not yet permanently nor yet universally. German Imperialism, which is simply magnified Prussianism, now in its newest 'Nazi' form, having menaced Central Europe for four years already, has again, by embarking on the course of events which necessi-

tated the Munich Conference of 1938 and the actual outbreak of hostilities in September of last year, thrown down the gage of battle to British Imperialism. There are yet those who shy at the word 'Imperialism' and who question whether the British Imperialism, saved by the men of 1914-18, is a benefit to the British or to the world, and whether to-day it is worth similar sacrifices. There are those Socialists who, having no real experience of the Empire and being the slaves of a phrase, can only interpret British Imperialism in its Moscow, proletarian sense of 'the economic exploitation of the coloured colonial peoples by the London capitalists'! And some timorous Conservatives have consequently grown fearful and ashamed of the words 'Empire' and 'Imperial'.

The truth, however, about British Imperialism, while far from affording grounds for complacency, does give every unbiased and non-ignorant person who cares for human progress cause for considerable satisfaction. Were the British Empire simply a materialistic affair for business purposes, very few would be found to volunteer to come from the furthest Antipodes to fight and die for it, since an empire which has no moral justification for its existence is doomed. But men in three successive wars in the last forty years have volunteered and come from the ends of the earth to fight and die for it, because, in fact, it is the opposite of any such pagan conception. The keynote of the Christian, in contrast with many other religions, is the infinite value it insists upon for each individual human soul, no matter how humble or deformed or of what colour the body may be. And it is precisely this essential Christian principle to which, with varying degrees of success, it is none the less honestly sought to give expression both judicially, administratively, and politically in the form of civilization which flourishes throughout the British Empire. The absolute equality before the law of all classes, creeds, and persons is a special characteristic of British Imperial rule. In no country in the world have the Social Services, or care for the individual by the Administrative Services, reached the level attained in Britain. The degree to which the franchise in the United Kingdom has been extended, even if too widely in some respects, does attempt

to reproduce before the ballot-box at least that equality of persons which we are told to expect at the Day of Judgment, the vote of the humblest citizen being equal to that of the millionaire. Indeed 'privilege' has been turned so 'topsy-turvy' that peers are ranked with children and lunatics in not being allowed to vote for Members of Parliament ! But it is from this very regard for the liberty and rights of the individual, with freedom from arrest and 'Habeas Corpus', that there has come through the conflicts of our history the sense of the value of the liberty of worship, the toleration of all forms of religion, provided that they do not offend against public order and decency. This shows itself not merely in the toleration of Nonconformity of all kinds, but in the very bosom of the Anglican Church itself, where toleration is carried to the point of making heresy itself very difficult to attain ! Yet the Anglican Church in itself exemplifies what has become one of the guiding characteristics of the whole British attitude to life and of the form of civilization in the British Empire—namely, 'Unity in Diversity'.

This principal characteristic, even if wellnigh incapable of explanation to foreigners, is in reality one of the main factors of the strength of the Empire. It is so because it essentially accords with life and natural growth and is the reason why the Empire's roots all over the world cannot be plucked up and destroyed. If the Empire's foundations were artificial, depending on either military constraint or legal parchments, they would long ago have cracked and the whole edifice would have crashed into the abyss where lie the ruins of other mighty empires. Local patriotism and sectarian devotion in all the various Dominions, except in Ireland and among a primitive faction in South Africa, have ultimately recognized the predominant community of ideals throughout the Empire based on Christian teaching, and the rulers of our Empire both in the Dominions and at home have recognized, after the sharp lesson of the American War of Independence, that uniformity of control which took no account of local patriotism or local creeds was a source of weakness and not of strength to the whole fabric. Hence it comes that the growth into nationhood of those Dominions which are of sufficiently

Anglo-Saxon stock has meant not a separate independence but a far greater consciousness, especially in times of danger, of their joint interdependence within the Empire. His Majesty the King is not looked upon by French Canadians or by the vast majority of Dutch South Africans or the other non-British races in the Empire as an alien tyrant, but as the beneficent father of all his varied peoples whose intrinsic unity is symbolized in the Imperial Crown. He is essentially the conservator of the several liberties of all the various parts of his vast Empire and the visible guarantor that no one part shall exercise its will unduly over another one of his scattered Dominions. Such is briefly that British Imperialism which the men of 1914-18 fought to maintain and which is worthy of similar sacrifices now, since it alone can hold out the greatest opportunities for the future for the healthy development of the greatest number of human souls. And its example has spread. In spite of the Latin's natural love of uniformity reinforced by the strongly centralizing bias of Jacobin and Napoleonic administrators, French Imperialism is also taking on this newer outlook, thanks to the lessons imparted by that great ruler, the late Marshal Lyautey. Morocco, Tunisia, Madagascar, Annam, and Tongking, each can bring her individual national gifts to the altar of a French civilization intimately shared by them all. Similarly, the Dutch colonial administrators seek now to conserve and not to destroy the indigenous national characteristics throughout their East Indian Empire. Western Europe, therefore, is giving world-wide daily evidence that, in spite of many failures in the past and failings in the present, its conception of Imperialism is basically Christian in its regard for the individual value of the millions of human souls who compose these vast empires.

As a result also of the sacrifices of the men of 1914-18 a similar intense regard grew up for local patriotisms in Europe, so that many new States were made and frontiers altered in order to give effect to the principle of 'the rights of nationalities'. Unfortunately, the dangerous boomerang slogan of 'self-determination' was chosen as a rallying-cry for those who voiced these aspirations, and it is in their fulfilment

that we see some benefits certainly, but more mistakes, and mistakes which have largely contributed to this second German war.

### § 3

From 1916 onwards nationality in Europe became God and ethnography the Ten Commandments, and in their name whole blocks of economically interdependent peoples tried to raise unsurmountable tariff obstacles against each other's products.

While it was unquestionably better for the development of the individual Czech that his restored national liberties should give him greater self-respect and greater responsibilities, it was self-condemnatory and suicidal for that liberty to be used by Czech nationalism, in spite of the greatness of Masaryk, through the tyranny of its minor officials, to pay off old scores against their German minority—the Sudeten folk, themselves also stirred up by the aggressive expansive Nazi nationalism from Berlin. Again, the Czechs never granted to their nominal partners, the Slovaks, that autonomy promised by Masaryk and Benesh at the Pittsburgh Convention which first announced the new Czecho-Slovakia. Instead they tried to Czechify every minority within their borders, and Slovak discontent rendered doubly easy the Nazi absorption of Czecho-Slovakia in 1939.

The Serbs, too, our valiant allies in 1914 and the creators of the new Yugoslav State, were culturally less developed than either their Croat or Slovene cousins whom they absorbed out of Austria-Hungary. Serbian centralization, carried out by heavy-handed and often ignorant officials from Belgrade, created bitter discontent in Croatia, which was fanned up for its own purposes by Nazi Germany, and only a last-minute realization by the Serb Government of the danger of Croatian secession and a consequent German advance south-eastwards brought them finally in August 1939 to respect Croatian local feeling sufficiently to grant it enough autonomy to make relations possible between Belgrade and Zagreb. Even worse disregard for national feeling was displayed by the victorious Serbs in 1918 to their Montenegrin

cousins, whose independence, which had been proof against 450 years of Turkish attack, they ruthlessly snuffed out. Thus both Serbs and Czechs gave evidence of a brutal and stupid disregard for minority feeling similar to that shown to them by the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and which had been their one real justification for fighting to destroy it!

Due regard was paid to Polish nationalism in 1918 by the resurrection of the Polish State, but excessive regard by Mr Lloyd George for German nationalism in Danzig, which had only been under Prussian rule for 160 years, confronted the newborn Polish State with a potential threat which brought disaster in September 1939. It was not easy for Poland, after the Soviet invasion of 1921, to give much scope to the nationalism of the Ukrainians within her south-eastern territories, owing to the proximity of Sovietized Ukrainians across the border and the consequently easy infection of Soviet ideas. At the same time a greater regard for her minorities would have been of greater advantage to Poland.

The treatment of Hungary by the Treaty of Trianon outraged the Magyar sense of nationality by transferring so many of the lands of St Stephen to other nationalities. This was particularly so in the case of the Rumanians, to whom the Magyars considered themselves culturally superior, who, in recovering the lost Rumanians of Transylvania, received also too great a Magyar minority for relations between the two countries ever to be easy until this problem is settled.

The tragic mistake of these succession-States of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire was that, having recovered or created a position of respect for their own nationalities, they used their newfound liberties to oppress their own national minorities and to pay off old scores and to hamper each other's development by erecting competitive tariff walls. With time, perhaps, these inner discontents might have been healed as their rulers gradually developed statecraft, but unfortunately Nazi exacerbation of German national feeling and of minority discontents everywhere left Central Europe no time in which to settle down.

The Treaty of Versailles, while it treated Germany all too leniently for European security in the matter of territorial

adjustments in Europe, had inflicted enough smarts to German pride in the loss of Prussian Poland, Danzig, Memel, Southern Schleswig, Eupen, Malmedy and in the loss of the overseas colonies to enable the Nazis easily to inflame German nationalism to a pitch of readiness for a war of recovery certainly in Eastern Europe and, if that were successful, then perhaps a subsequent war for the recovery of the colonies against an isolated and 'decadent' England. The subsequent recovery of territory from weak States such as Denmark and Belgium would present no difficulty. And here we see the supreme mistake made by the treaty makers of 1918 which might well have rendered entirely vain all the sacrifice of blood and treasure in the four years of that earlier war. Instead of splitting up at Versailles the one main cause of general unrest and danger in Europe—the Prussianized German Reich—we first gave it the strength of homogeneity by removing all its alien elements (except the luckless Lusatian Sorbs) and then surrounded it with a string of weak little States, not one of them strong enough to be a real check on a revived unitary German Reich. This ballonet system, so quickly to be punctured, we further created out of the ruins of the one State which by geography and historical tradition could have served, with certain modifications, as a real barrier and rival to the Prussianized, Nazified German Reich—namely, the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The memory of Gavrilo Princep, who murdered the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Dual Monarchy, at Serajevo in July 1914, should be execrated by all good Europeans for having lit the initial spark, not merely of the conflagration of the war of 1914-18, but in some degree of this one too. The problem of whether Slavdom or Germanism was to prevail in Eastern Central Europe, which may be said to have been the chief cause of that earlier struggle as it was also among those of this second German war, might well have been solved equally for both races in the view of the murdered Archduke by his intended policy of Trialism. Whereas the Habsburg Monarchy had hitherto been a dual monarchy, with the Germans supreme in the Austrian part and the Magyars in the Hungarian part of the imperial dominions,

Franz Ferdinand had wished to raise the Croats and South-Eastern Slavs to an equal position with them, and thus not only to check the Pan-Serb movement, but to exercise a strong counter-attraction thereto. A similar scheme would have been worked out for the Slavs of Bohemia and Austrian Poland. Indeed, to weld together all the peoples of the Danube basin, nothing but the Habsburg Monarchy could or can be effective. Because Dr Benesh would not see that unless a Habsburg re-entered the Vienna Hofburg, Hitler must be its occupant, he is now in exile and his Czechs groaning in chains.

The Dual Monarchy had many faults: not nearly enough self-expression was allowed to the local patriotisms of other parts of the Empire than German-Austrian and Magyar, and the dead hand of bureaucracy under the octogenarian Franz Josef stifled initiative in internal affairs. But the Habsburg Empire stood essentially for that very thing which so many are striving to bring about in the Europe of to-morrow—a supra-national state. Its basic component idea was to be imperial, universal, and missionary. From the days of Charlemagne it stood as the Eastern fortress of Christian Europe against the barbarians from the East, with the mission also of instructing and civilizing these same barbarians and turning them into Western Christians. That mission it continuously strove to fulfil, whether as the Holy Roman Empire battling against the Turks or after Austerlitz as the Austrian Empire combating Russian intrigue in the Balkans. Its latest step forward, the annexation in 1908 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, though frowned on by the Entente Powers, was in reality a gain of two provinces from the dead hand of Turkish misrule for modern civilization and Christianity.

Vienna especially had become the refining crucible for all those races breaking in through the centuries from the East upon the heart of Christendom, and through the wide dominions of the Habsburgs, Italy, and Spain too, with its infantry, lent the influence of their art and customs, politics, and blood. This refining and digestive process went on throughout the centuries, and was an organic process. The Magyar, the Croat, the Ruthene, and the Pole became in



the Habsburg Empire representative of more than his mere nationality, he became Austrian, or a civilized Eastern European<sup>1</sup> who recognized the supra-national claims of the Christian Church and of international law based on Christian teachings. Who can truly assert that such an institution was not of immense benefit to Europe and the world?

The Habsburg Kaiser was the spiritual inheritor of the Christian Cæsars. This noble rôle was, however, first weakened by Napoleon, and then, from Sadowa onwards, filched away by the rival Hohenzollern House, representatives not of any Christian or truly imperial idea, but simply of the pagan robber State of Prussia. This family and this State of Prussia, every step of whose rise had taken place at the expense of the Holy Roman or Habsburg Empire, had and still have the most directly opposed state-idea to that of any supra-national imperialism, whether Habsburg or British. The Prussian idea, from the time of Frederick II, forced on Germany by Bismarck and whipped into a flame by the present Nazi rulers of Germany, is simply a swollen, aggressive, all-devouring nationalism, which ruthlessly blots out by violence all the differences of creeds and local patriotisms into one drab uniformity of soulless slavery to the ogre-State.

#### § 4

It is precisely in this struggle of ideas for the possession of the soul of the Germans and consequently of all Central Europe that we touch the very heart of the problem of the future Europe and the world. The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, after the exhausting Thirty Years War, had left Germany a political mosaic perhaps, but one in which all local patriotisms and forms of Christianity were free to flourish under the general aegis and very indirect administration of the supra-national Holy Roman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy. Germany, like all Christendom, had unfortunately been split in two by the Reformation, with the consequent lessening of

<sup>1</sup> Even the pre-1914 Bulgar, though geographically a member of a European State, would speak of going to Vienna from his own country as 'going to Europe'!

the two great supra-national influences of the Pope and Emperor and the strengthening everywhere of nationalism. But the blood and tears of the Wars of Religion had finally created the *modus vivendi* of 'Cujus regio, ejus religio', or a State's religion being that of its ruler, and the Germanies had peace. Further, the very smallness of these German States gave a greater opportunity for the 'little man' of those days to develop. The proper pride and sense of individual responsibility in a burgess of the Free City of Hamburg or Lübeck, or of a Minister of the Court of the Duchy of Deux Ponts, made him conscious not so much of his German nationality, but of his qualities as a civilized Christian European. His native patriotism was healthily merged in a supra-national consciousness, which bore no jealousy or ill-will for his neighbours of different nationality, and indeed Germans of those days very easily adopted foreign nationality, such as Handel in England, and Marshal Saxe, and even a Brockdorff-Rantzau in France

Smaller units of government also give far greater scope for the development of the individual as a conscious political man and critic than do huge political units. The inner tragedy of the German people since the days of Bismarck is their incredible facility for submitting to the yoke of any ruler, no matter how unscrupulous, and for supporting his every action, no matter how criminal, with blind obedience, until, like the Gadarene swine, he and they all rush over the steep place into ruin and, so long as they remain a large unit, their impetus is so great as to drag Europe down with them. Unlike the British and French peoples they are not used to the exercise of political liberty over a long period, and cannot therefore criticize or control their rulers. Therefore, until they can do so, they must be rendered innocuous to the rest of Europe. This can only be done by smashing for ever the control over the German soul of the Prussian, now Nazi, idea.

The French Revolution and Napoleon performed a double and immense disservice to Europe. France, and later Europe in self-defence, then first turned from the small professional armies of the *ancien régime* to the 'nation-in-arms', which has meant conscription, intensified nationalism, and integral war

between peoples, with misery and ruin on a scale bigger than ever before. Secondly, by the steam-rolling of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, the healthy divisions and soil-pockets for the tender plant of German political individualism were for the most part flattened out, and the way was prepared for Bismarck. It was especially the War of Freedom, *Freiheitskrieg*, against Napoleon undertaken by Prussia from 1812-15, and the victory of Waterloo, which had given her great prestige amongst the other States of Germany as their potential protector against another outbreak of French militarism. It was with this in mind, and also in order to counterbalance the then French preponderance of manpower, that the victorious Allies, after Waterloo, placed Prussia in charge of those Archbishoprics and other formerly independent Rhenish territories which now constitute Rhenish Prussia, with its bridges over the Rhine, and the easy means for Germany to invade Belgium and North-Eastern France at her pleasure.

The ousting of the Habsburgs from the control of Germany by the Prussian victory of Sadowa in 1866 and the consequent substitution of Prussian hegemony therein, together with the ineptitude of Napoleon III in constantly alarming the smaller rulers of Germany, further inclined them to see in Prussian armed strength and organizing skill their surest protection against French aggression. Consequently, in spite of Bavarian misgivings, the new Hohenzollern Prussianized German Empire was proclaimed at Versailles on 18 January, 1871—to Europe's future distress! This meant that tens of millions of industrious, brave, God-fearing, peace-loving Germans were absorbed into the pagan Prussian militarist machine, which had no God but the insatiable material aggrandizement of the Prussianized Reich. This 'Brigand Empire', in order to continue its existence, had to go on expanding in accordance with the motto 'Weltmacht oder Niedergang', since indeed no other alternative lay open. Hitler's Germany defiantly snatching back the Rhine bridgeheads, then raping successively state after state, is merely continuing the same Prussian brigand tradition popularized to its disciples by the earlier successful rapes of Silesia and Poland by

Frederick II in the eighteenth century, in spite of all the most solemn public promises to the contrary.

What should a people of slave mentality, mostly serfs until 1811,<sup>1</sup> and only Christianized originally at the point of the sword in the thirteenth century,<sup>2</sup> reckon of international law or public behaviour based on Christian teachings? Their whole rise to power had been achieved in defiance of the laws of Christendom, just as their present domination is that of anti-Christ. The one vital remedy, therefore, for the ills of Europe is the definite ending of the control of the German spirit by the pagan power of Prussia, wherever that is incarnate. The Prussian spirit, inherited and developed by the Nazis, being material, has material roots for its power. It has grown up and lived on booty and its neighbours' fear of its violence. In the past it was fear of an aggressive France which cast Germany into the Prussian maw, but this fear no longer exists either in Europe generally or amongst the German people of to-day, who recognize that France, like Britain, is a satiated Power with an overseas Empire to develop. The German people also know that, unlike Prussian Nazidom, France allows the fullest freedom to all forms of religion and that the Republic is no longer hostile to Catholicism.

There is no need, therefore, or justification for the province of Rhenish Prussia or the whole left bank of the Rhine to be controlled any longer by the pagan Prussianized Reich. They and their all-important bridgeheads over the Rhine at Cologne, Mayence, and Trèves should pass under a French mandate for an indefinite period. A somewhat similar proposal urged by Foch in 1918 was refused by Mr Lloyd George, and the Anglo-American Joint Defensive Guarantee for France was substituted. When the United States Senate rejected President Wilson and all his works, including this Defensive Guarantee, Mr Lloyd George short-sightedly followed suit, and France was left without either the territorial security desired by Foch or the guarantees given by the Anglo-Saxon

<sup>1</sup> The Prussian serfs were liberated only in 1811 as part of Stein's scheme to persuade them to fight against instead of for Napoleon.

<sup>2</sup> The Teutonic Order on the invitation of the Polish Duke of Masowia carried out the forcible Christianization of the heathen Prussians between 1226-34, only three centuries before the upheaval of the Reformation.

Powers. The security of Belgium and France and the peace of Europe cannot again be left without positive material guarantees and Prussia must be put back where she belongs—on the north-eastern march of a re-Europeanized Germany.

If in 1918, for the sake of the peace of Europe and of international justice, more than 100 years after the loss of her independence, Poland could be re-created and justice done to her at last, it is merely silly and pusillanimous to plead lapse of time in favour of leaving Prussia, the arch-criminal both against Poland and against Europe, in possession of the booty she obtained either at the Partitions of Poland, or after Waterloo, in 1864, in 1866, or subsequently. Besides, the rightful owners of all this stolen property are still in existence, Poland, Denmark, and those rulers whom the peoples of Germany loved and respected before they fell to worshipping the Prussian Moloch and the unity enforced by the strait-waistcoat of militarism and Nazidom. Throughout History the natural tendency of the majority of Germans has been Conservative and monarchical. Consequently, if Europe wishes to have a future Germany where all the local patriotisms can be healthily encouraged as an alternative to the uniform, steam-rollered, materialistic, Prussianized, German State, its most obvious duty and practical step is to restore the 1914 ruling houses and separate kingdoms of the Reich. These monarchs, ruling constitutionally, will afford in their several dominions far greater opportunities for the individual German to become politically conscious and critical, and thus gradually to acquire his greatest necessity—political moral courage—than would ever be possible in the gigantic uniform absolutist Prussianized German State, whether Hohenzollern or Nazi. Further, all the strength of local history and tradition, whether secular or religious, can far more easily gather round and build up an hereditary monarchy than a republic, and it is in the nature of the Germans to prefer monarchical rule, whether despotic or constitutional. Revolutionary Communism, too, can far more easily overturn the rulers of one absolutist State than it can the successive and various obstacles provided by a series of States

with their several liberties and differing conditions of life. The Royal House of Hanover, if its dominions<sup>1</sup> were restored to it, would form a rallying-point for Protestant North Germany and would keep Prussia away from Hamburg, that great Free City and home of free thought, as well as giving Holland security at last on her eastern border. The Wittelsbach family is still beloved in Bavaria, and their restoration to the throne would at once provide both a rallying-point for all Catholic Germany, at present groaning under Nazi persecution, and a real counterpoise to any revived Prussian political influence. A similarly restored Saxony would relieve Polish apprehensions and release Dresden and Leipzig from the thralldom of the pagan Prussian spirit.

Geography might preserve the separatism of Baden and Württemberg, or, on the other hand, economic necessity might compel them and the other smaller German States of 1914 into a union with one or other of the non-Prussian German monarchies. These several German monarchies, with a Prussia of post-Jena proportions, possibly under a Hohenzollern, will probably tend and should be encouraged to retain a federal free-trade area between themselves and in association with a newly-formed Danubian Federation of Czecho-Slovakia, Austria, and Hungary, under the only possible supra-national link of a Habsburg monarch and also with their own federal free-trade area. Two such Germanic Federations should be of sufficient strength, either separately or still more in temporary alliance, to withstand any further Slav drive to the west, and with a strong Catholic Poland reconstituted and satisfied within its own borders and rid of the Prussian menace in its rear, any westward lunge of either a pagan or an orthodox Russia would be foredoomed to failure. A Poland with Danzig restored to her, as it should have been in 1918—with German citizens allowed to opt either to return to the Reich or to become Polish and stay—with a real control of her alimentary canal, the Vistula, and with her western frontier on the Oder and with complete

<sup>1</sup> The Prussians in 1866 stole not merely the dominions but actually the family silver of the House of Hanover, which was coolly retained by the Hohenzollerns.

control of the Silesian industrial region, should be assured henceforward of permanent life. If Lithuania, by being given a generous measure of autonomy, could, with her port of Memel, be induced to join Poland, with which in earlier centuries she was so closely linked, both peoples and Europe as well could only gain from such a union. It is probable, too, that a Poland rendered free of both the Prussian and Russian menaces to her independence would be the better able to be generous towards the local patriotism of her minorities, whether Ukrainian or Ruthene, in her south-eastern territories.

The future of unhappy Russia is indeed difficult to forecast, except that it can only lurch from one autocracy to another. It is interesting, however, to observe that the Soviets have dealt cleverly with the various nationalisms in their huge territories, by giving them all the supra-national gospel of Communism as the unifying link of empire, into which their separate nationalisms are merged. It is probable that losses in the war against Finland, and Japanese strength in Manchukuo and Mongolia, will suffice to curb any further Russian aggression, unless Stalin tries some mad gambler's throw to support his failing prestige; but the 'clay feet' of his 'Colossus' are once again very apparent and he is sure to lose his 'throw'. What is certain, however, is that Russia is now so utterly non-European in spirit, as indeed it must remain until Christianity reasserts itself there, that it is utterly unfitted to take its place in any European Areopagus such as a reconstituted League of Nations. How could an outlaw-State, as any Communist State by its nature must be, be expected to uphold International Law? It is to be hoped that we shall never again see admitted to a Council of Nations, supposedly expressive of the highest morality, the representatives of militant godlessness and of a bloodstained Asiatic despotism, while the Pope, the recognized leader of the largest Christian body in the world, is carefully excluded therefrom!

With both Russian and Nazi influence removed, the Balkans should be better able to develop in peaceful harmony and feel freer in consequence to give greater autonomy to their own various minorities, where these cannot have their

lot improved by peaceful exchange of the populations on the last Greco-Turkish model. This should be possible between Rumania and Bulgaria in the Southern Dobrudja, as well as between Hungary and Rumania in Transylvania, in both of which territories the peace of Europe positively demands some readjustment, and many had hoped that Italy, with her special interests in Albania and her general concern for South-Eastern Europe, would show herself truly Roman once again in helping to consolidate European civilization, peace and order in all these regions. Once her relatively minor differences with France in Tunisia and Djibuti were settled, the Fascist Empire could surely have developed her territories with no thought of further expansion by aggressive means. Although to admit it would be contrary to the healthy doctrine of her youthful urge to spread her wings, the fact is that Italy has now joined the ranks of 'satiated' Powers, at all events in relation to her digestive capacity of the next twenty years. Her foreign policy is certain to draw closer and closer to Spain through the link of the anti-Communist militant Catholicism common to both peoples, as well as her interest in having one of the gatekeepers of the Mediterranean on her side, and the advantage to both in having France's other neighbour as an ally in any disputes concerning either Europe or North Africa.

The future of Spain constitutionally is not easy to foresee, as it is particularly hard for Anglo-Saxons to gauge the course of any fanatical crusading spirit, and to what heights or depths the Falange may lead Spain is still a mystery. It should be remembered, however, that her monarch was not King of Spain so much as King of the Spains, and that her geography makes Catalonia, the Asturias, Navarre, Aragon, Castile, and Andalusia far stronger conceptions to the average Spaniard than any centralizing Castilian can make of Spain.

The true political solution for Spain as well as for the German States would seem to be a federal union based on the only two really unifying influences—the monarchy and the Catholic Church. Once her inner harmony can be thus restored, the way lies open for that great development of



'Hispanidad' which naturally colours the vision of the enthusiastic followers of General Franco.

That development must come through reforging and developing by means of culture and trade every link with the Spains of the New World. Their nationalistic urges have now been so gratified by over a hundred years of independence that religion and language will link them closer again with the mother from whom they sprang and to whose future increased strength they could so largely and so naturally contribute.

In spite of talk of Iberian union, Portugal's national pride consists so much in not being Spanish, that she is more likely, in that increase of her strength and hopes which has come from the model rule of Dr Salazar, to look overseas to her Colonial Empire and also to Brazil and North America, than to Spain, for co-operation and development. It is to be hoped that Dr Salazar will put the natural coping-stone on the splendid edifice of national self-respect which he has given back to his country, by restoring the House of Braganza, either in the European or the Imperial Brazilian branch of the family.

Turning to Northern Europe, the Scandinavian monarchies and Finland have shown increasing tendencies to act externally in a common direction, while preserving intact their separate nationalities, and after the war they should do so still more, since Denmark, who proved the weakest link in the chain owing to her proximity to the Nazi Colossus, will, presumably, no longer have anything to fear from a future North German Federation of small non-aggressive German States, with Prussia relegated to her proper proportions and place on the Baltic. Danish sovereignty might advantageously to Europe be brought down to the northern banks of the Kiel Canal and over Sylt and the other islands off the Schleswig coast. It would also be more conducive to the maintenance of European civilization in the Baltic if Esthonia and Latvia could come into closer union with the Scandinavian Powers and thus help to keep off Russian barbarism from that sea.

Holland and Belgium and Luxemburg should continue

very much as before the invasion, since strategically and politically they form the nexus of so many conflicting interests in Western Europe. In the face of common danger the Low Countries drew together, and while they were fighting there was no talk of Flemish separatism in Belgium. If a French monarchy were ever to be restored in the Bourbon or Orléans line, a personal link might well add Luxemburg to France.

But in any event, the links, both strategic and economic, formed to-day between France and Great Britain, may well continue after the war. We are the twin chief upholders of the temple of European civilization. For it to stand for ever, let us be unbreakably bound together. There were those who, before Mr Baldwin and like him, said that our frontier was upon the Rhine, and who, unlike him, were eager to take action to make that frontier the more defensible. After victory ends this war, such action must be taken and extended, not merely in the removal for all time of the menace to France and Britain of a united, Prussianized, Nazified Germany sitting astride the Rhine, but in the peace-time pooling of the resources of the French and British Empires. Just as the development of modern communications, particularly the aeroplane, has placed Britain's frontier on the Rhine, so are the French and British Empires more closely welded together and increasingly with every year that passes.

The pooling of the resources of the British and French Empires and an approach to closer economic union between them has already a foundation on which to build in the shape of the Anglo-French African Agreement, by which the West African colonies of the two Empires are not allowed to accord preferences to the goods of the respective Mother Country. Some modification, therefore, of the Ottawa Trade Agreements in favour of France seems necessary and desirable, if closer political union with France is also desired. The Ottawa Agreements were arrived at for two fundamental purposes. First, when the world was in economic chaos in 1931 and sentiment, the condition of currencies, and tariffs were diminishing trade between foreign nations and ourselves, we had, in order to avoid ruin, to secure economically those areas of the world where these three factors were

already in our favour and could be so increased. Thus we should create one stable trading-area in a world of economic flux. Secondly, as we believe in the special merits of the form of civilization existing in the British Empire, and we wish to foster that form of civilization, it was necessary and advisable to strengthen by economic means the already existing sentimental ties between its various component parts. Without the basis of imperial sentiment, imperial economic preference could not exist. If, therefore, it should be felt in France and Britain that our civilizations should be blended in order to endure more strongly, so will the economic systems of the two Empires follow suit. The enormous advantage and weapon of closer imperial economic union might well be utilized in favour of those countries who in our view support a Western Christian civilization, and the Ottawa Agreements might even be extended to Scandinavia and the Low Countries, always provided that political sentiment in all these countries will support closer economic union. It is often forgotten to-day that Politics must be the master of Economics, if man is to reach and maintain his proper stature.

Such a Franco-British union must provide the most powerful impetus all over the world for Western civilization based on the Christian conception of the maximum development of the individual compatible with the security of the community. In Africa and the Far East, in the Near East and in Canada, the gain to the world would be immense. But, if such a union is to succeed, we must above all things not try to 'rush it,' but rather to foster in every way its natural and gradual growth. The citizens of each of the two Empires must, by improved communications, both material and linguistic, familiarize themselves far more closely with each other and recognize the many and great differences of outlook as well as the points of agreement. Internally, France should become increasingly Conservative after this war, as long as 'l'expérience Blum' and the traitorous activities of the Communists are not forgotten, and the old Republican hatred of the Church seems now to be dead. Progress will be increasingly seen to be a matter less of political allegiance than of constructive work at home and overseas. The vital

task of Britain and France in the new post-war world will be really to develop their own Empires and in such a way that every citizen, even the poorest, shall feel that he too shares actively in the benefits of such a heritage.

If the Conservative Party in Britain had been lucky enough in the days between the late Lord Salisbury and the present Prime Minister ever to possess a real leader, we should have evolved in concert with our Dominions a great Empire resettlement and development policy. The economic crisis of a world at sea did produce in 1932 the Ottawa Conference with its added economic machinery to reinforce the sentimental ties of Empire, but much more than this is needed if we are really to 'cultivate our garden' as it should be 'cultivated'. Only when Germans, Italians, and Japanese see the empty parts of our Empire being filled with more people of our own stock and its potential wealth being more actively produced, will they cease to think that they should be substituted for us who are too decadent to develop our heritage.

This applies not merely to the Dominions, but also to the Crown Colonies, where greater attention should be devoted to technical education of all kinds, since the world to-day is badly overstocked with black-coated sedentaries and equally in need of those who really can construct water-supplies, communications and vehicles, sanitary cities, healthy families, and healthily governed States. Western civilization must be more eager to impart not only 'the Humanities' but also the higher sciences from its store to those who in Eastern Europe and in Asia are seeking to build up their peoples anew. A British or Franco-British University to develop in the Near East those rudiments of Western lore hitherto imparted by Robert College might well be set down in the lovely surroundings of the island of Cyprus, birthplace not only of Aphrodite, but of the Stoic philosopher Zeno, and the historic meeting-ground of so many ancient civilizations.

If Indians can be great enough to settle justly between themselves their communal discords, they will then have shown that capacity for self-control which alone can justify and achieve their claim to self-government and the assump-

tion of Dominion status. Otherwise there would not seem much hope for democratic institutions in that country where climate, temperament and tradition point far more naturally to autocracy.

In Britain herself it is to be expected that the war will inevitably even out still more the possession of wealth, and there will probably, until many new inventions are discovered, be less leisure for all, since everyone will have to earn a living somehow, owing to the increased intensity of the struggle to live. Consequently, there must be a decline in artistic creation, in sculpture, painting, drama, and music, which can scarcely thrive without leisure and wealth. The industry, however, and skill of our people can be relied upon in time to breast even the difficult period of payment for this war, and the fine flower of our civilization will rise again out of the drabbery of the lean years of over-taxation. This same growing difficulty of the struggle merely to live during the next twenty years will probably further reduce the quality of the House of Commons. Of those who can afford to be Members, more and more of them will have to give increased attention to their businesses in order to live, and less and less time to pure politics or to the necessary acquisition of a sufficiently wide knowledge to see political problems in proper perspective. More and more influence will consequently be exerted by the bureaucracy, whom the average M.P. or Minister will now be quite unable to control or direct, as in our theory of government he should be able, and the skilled servant will ever increasingly become the master of his too busy amateur masters.

The House of Lords, however, particularly if it should be reformed, should tend considerably to increase its influence. It possesses, as at present constituted, a far greater number of really knowledgeable and really independent persons than does the House of Commons, since the heads of practically every profession are to be found in the Upper Chamber. Further, as it has within its portals more of those who have already acquired or inherited wealth or position than of those who are still actually busy in its acquisition, it has more time to devote to the actual business of politics, and by

its greater knowledge it is also better enabled to control the bureaucracy.

Throughout the country, class divisions, through the spread of education and the levelling out of wealth, will gradually almost entirely disappear, with great gain to us all except the professional agitator! The voluntary hospitals and the Church are bound to suffer heavily financially from the results of the war, although the latter's influence, if it seizes its opportunity, may well increase.

Finally, we turn to the Far East and the United States. A strongly united Britain and France, undisturbed in Europe by any German or Russian peace-breaker, will be in a position to control the future relationship of China and Japan in accordance rather with the ideas of Western civilization than those of Asiatic despotism. Already in both Eastern countries these ideas have spread strongly, though in Japan they are, at present, held under by the power of the army, but with the breaking of the army's prestige by military failure, or even by inconclusiveness in the China campaign, Japan would be readier to treat China in a manner more equitable both for China and for all the world. Nothing would do more than this to make her relations easier with the United States of America.

That great country, torn by the conflict between her superstitious belief in the possibility, in modern days, of 'Isolation' and her consciousness of moral and material interests across both the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, could act, if she chooses to exert herself, as a great world-pacifier, but only when 'Isolationism' is really dead. The further increase of communications of all sorts in the central States of the great Republic should help, in time, to kill this outworn and rather unworthy fetish. Its place, however, may still be partly taken by great absorption in the internal problems of the future, particularly those of Labour, social services and soil fertility. It is therefore unlikely that in the next twenty-five years United States action will be exerted in any large measure outside the American continent and her own overseas insular possessions.

## § 5

We have seen how Europe, having at the Reformation thrown over the authority of the twin supra-national rulers of Christendom, gradually surrendered itself to the worship of Nationalism, a process dangerously speeded up by the French Revolution. In the last 150 years we have seen the British Empire growing organically through an intensely nationalistic adolescence into its present supra-national maturity, with enough scope left to its component nationalisms to keep them healthy and attached to the Crown. During the same period in Europe we have witnessed the diminution and final destruction of the great European supra-national State of the Habsburg Empire, primarily because, unlike the British Empire, it did not leave enough scope for its various component nationalisms. These component nationalisms, flowering into nationhood as a result of the sacrifices of 1914-18, have largely fallen into the same vice as the State to whom they succeeded. During these same 150 years there has arisen, as the deliberate supplanter of the Habsburg Empire and the would-be supplanter of the British Empire, not a supra-national, but the ultra-super-nationalistic State of Prussianized, Nazified Germany, as moulded by Frederick II, Bismarck, and Hitler. Under this ogre-State no other nationalism can live; they have to die, together with all forms of independence and human liberty. It is not a natural growth, as was that of the British and Habsburg Empires. It is the artificial product of dishonour, and blood and iron, and by blood and iron the dishonour it has wreaked on the German soul must be removed and the older and more natural forms of state-growth be permitted and fostered. Then indeed can we hope for Europe's greatest need—a change of heart in Germany. Only then can the human soul in Germany and Central Europe reach the full stature of civilized man, and only then can the rest of civilized men feel secure from this recurring menace in the midst of them. 'Nulla est victoria major quam quae confessos animo quoque subjugat hostes.' No victory is as great as that which prevails even over the enemy's heart and he admits it!

Central Europe, then, forming two Federations, the one North German and the other Habsburg or Austro-Hungarian-Czecho-Slovak, with federating tendencies in Scandinavia, the Balkans and perhaps the Spanish world, and with a closer Franco-British union than ever before, the way should lie open for a reconstituted League of Nations, since Europe certainly still needs a supra-national Areopagus. But let this new League not be too ambitious, lest like the old one it 'o'erleap itself and fall'! It should not try to be universal, but it should be united in its loyal adherence to Christian principles. Let what primarily concerns one of the new federations be dealt with by that group, without calling in Denmark to discuss, much less expecting it to *act* in, a Bolivian-Paraguayan quarrel! Action and sacrifices whenever necessary can only be expected from those States which feel themselves intimately concerned. It is not right either, even were it still practicable, for Britain or any single Power to police the world. All must acquire a sense of moral responsibility.

As the Pope has well said in the last of his five postulates for a just and honourable peace:

'Rulers of the peoples and the peoples themselves must become imbued with that spirit of moral justice which alone can breathe life into the dead letter of international instruments—with the sense of responsibility which measures human statutes according to the rule of Divine right.'

This moral justice demands above all that Germany's neighbours can live without fear. Then and then alone can this world become what it was intended to be—a place where all humanity can know and love God.





## *The Earl of Listowel*

THE PROBLEM OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE in the post-war world will obviously be the prevention of future wars. This is surely the demand every people will address in its own language to its Government; but whatever reply may, after prolonged consideration, be vouchsafed by those in authority it will necessarily depend on the political and economic conditions prevailing throughout Europe at the time. Uncertain as any forecast about unpredictable, far-off events is bound to be, let us try to get a rough idea of the state of affairs immediately after the present war.

It is a truism of history that a war can finish in any one of three ways: defeat, victory, or stalemate. If the Allies were likely to be beaten to their knees, I and my fellow-contributors would have been unpardonable idiots to waste our time on this book; for in that event the future of Europe for many decades would be decided by the iron will of a Teutonic conqueror. This eventuality, for reasons that will soon appear, may be dismissed as unlikely, though there is one danger looming ominously ahead that might conceivably upset our calculations. I mean a war with both Russia and Italy. But the magnitude of this danger is fortunately as obvious to most French and British statesmen as it is to the man-in-the-street; and, despite their sudden access of chivalry after the invasion of Finland, their generous enthusiasm will probably stop short of those last, irrevocable steps that would inevitably bring Russia into the war on the German side. So long as we do not carry provocation to the point of open warfare against the Soviet Union, we may rest assured that our territory and vital interests will be respected by the Russians. Stalin is terrified at the thought of becoming embroiled in a

major war, and having recovered those strategic outposts of his vast empire forfeited after the *débâcle* in 1917 he is likely to return with fresh gusto to the Americanization of the moujik. There is less hope of Italian neutrality. Few can doubt that the first reverse sustained by the Allies will transform Italy from a non-belligerent enemy into an active foe.

So it is pretty safe to assume that if this and other major strategic or political blunders are avoided by the Allied leaders, they can reasonably hope to avert the disaster of military defeat and to escape the humiliation of unconditional surrender. But the prospect of an overwhelming victory, in the sense of dealing our opponents a 'knock-out blow', or leaving them prostrate after 'a fight to a finish', appears even more remote than its appalling antithesis. For military success can only be engineered by the joint action of the Allied armies on the field of battle, or of their navies on the ocean highways, or of their bombers paralysing the nerve centres of German industry and cutting the main arteries of her mechanical transport. But the superiority of the German army, still the most formidable military instrument on the European continent, obliged the land forces of the Allies to incarcerate themselves until recently within a network of subterranean fortifications, and forbade them to sally forth in the hope of taking the enemy stronghold by storm.

It is doubtful whether the Air arm alone can be a decisive weapon in modern warfare, and more than doubtful when the system of defence against air attack has been well equipped with A.R.P., anti-aircraft batteries, and fighter planes. In China, where for a long while the defence was negligible, the Japanese failed to force a decision by means of their invincible and unscrupulous bombing squadrons. Finland, too, was finally conquered by crack infantry, not by planes. Many people therefore pin their faith to the two-way economic blockade that dries up Germany's supplies of foodstuffs and minerals from overseas. But however vigilant our naval patrols may be upon the ocean highways, they can unfortunately do nothing to stop merchandise

transported across land frontiers by road or railway. We cannot easily close doors opening on to Russia and the Balkans.

For the land route eastward lies wide open from Poland to the Pacific; and there, buried deep in the subsoil of Russia's plains and mountains, lies the treasure that will give movement to Germany's engines of destruction and life to those who make or man them. An unbiased neutral observer, Professor Hopper of Harvard, has maintained that after two years have elapsed Russia will be fully able to meet German requirements of grain and oil, provided only that Hitler does not indulge meanwhile in the tempting luxury of costly and ineffectual offensives. By that time Russian transport and extractive industries will have been worked up to concert pitch by German machinery, directed by German technicians, while Germany will not have been prevented by the colossal wastage of active warfare from producing the manufactured articles with which she will pay for her precious imports. Professor Hopper concludes his interesting article with this sentence:

. . . But if the present siege war lasts for two years, without major battles, so that there is a minimum expenditure of war materials in the field, and granted that Germany has time to accumulate war stocks and reorganize Soviet industry and transport, then Russian aid might well be decisive in determining the military outcome in the West.<sup>1</sup>

This will not be the first time in history that a deadlock has resulted from a duel between a great military power, supreme on land, and a great maritime power possessing an invincible navy. In the past, this deadlock had usually been broken, after many years of indecisive engagements, by the naval defeat of the maritime power or the defeat of the military power on the field of battle. Thus Athens, after resisting the Spartan legions for nearly thirty years by means of her supremacy on the waters of the Mediterranean, was finally vanquished when the other seafaring cities of the Grecian Archipelago equipped a combined fleet to assist

<sup>1</sup> *Foreign Affairs* (January, 1940).

Sparta. Napoleon was defeated after twenty years of varying fortune when the whole of Europe had united against him on land, and William II of Germany, after only four years, when the fresh man and machine-power of the United States turned the scales in favour of the Allies. But there is no sign at present of the necessary accession of strength on either side to break the deadlock in the second great European war.

The even balance of force between the combatants is therefore likely to produce a stalemate after many years of warfare have reduced both sides to a condition of extreme exhaustion. But it will be a long while before the belligerents have been sufficiently knocked about to feel that honour is satisfied, and to realize that a smashing victory is beyond their grasp; the official 'Three Years War' is surely the invention of some erudite recluse who had been vegetating peacefully for at least a quarter of a century in a National Museum when he was abruptly removed last October to complete the mystic number of nine hundred and ninety-nine at the Ministry of Information!

Let us hope that, when this state of honourable deadlock has been finally recognized, the leaders of the belligerent nations will have the good sense to set about the conclusion of a peace based on compromise between conflicting claims. On our side it would be risky to refuse consideration of any reasonable terms. Quite apart from the terrific strain of prolonging the duration of a bitter and protracted struggle, if we did succeed in driving our enemies into the last ditch they might in desperation call in the Russians at the price of a puppet Communist Government actually controlled from Moscow. And even if we were lucky enough not to find ourselves on the threshold of a third European war in the twentieth century, it would be difficult indeed to resist the temptation to impose a Carthaginian peace. There is little doubt that, in the name of their own security, our French friends would be inclined to demand conditions which the common enemy would regard as the acme of humiliation. How hard it would be for us to refuse our connivance! We should find ourselves in a condition of almost organic de-

pendence on our ally, and public opinion at home would almost certainly be in a mood of frenzied hatred of the foe after its cruel ordeal.

It has sometimes happened that a statesman of mature experience has succeeded in putting a brake on the vindictive instincts of his supporters, but a mob is swayed always and exclusively by the emotions of the moment; that is why the Treaty of Versailles was so much less reasonable and more ephemeral than the Treaty of Vienna. It may be argued by the modern Carthaginians that if you can destroy your enemy he will be unable to attack you again; but they forget that their forerunners were dealing with ancient city states which were so small that they could be burnt to the ground and their inhabitants carried off as slaves. We, on the other hand, shall be concerned with the future of a homogeneous bloc of 80,000,000 people, which no less populous nation will have the strength to pin down indefinitely by force of arms. They also forget that the total destruction of Germany's military might would give a fatal shock to the Balance of Power in Europe. If she remains neutral throughout the present war, Russia will emerge at the end of it the most powerful continental State, and the Allies will therefore be well advised to keep a solid Teutonic buffer between themselves and the giant Slav.

The path of wisdom for the statesmen who will gather round that shadowy conference table, somewhere, sometime, to turn over a new and unspoiled page in the history of Europe, will surely be the path of moderation, compromise, and common sense. If they desire to invoke the assistance of impartial neutrals in an advisory capacity, so much the better for the prospect of a reasonable settlement; but the onus of decision will rest upon the belligerents, and the spirit animating their plenipotentiaries will determine the character of the peace. The conflicting claims and interests they will certainly voice can only be reconciled in the long run by an overriding desire to give their peoples a holiday from war and a chance of repairing its ravages.

Let our own representatives beware of indulging their native propensity to academic idealism, for it would probably

lead to a speedy breakdown in the peace negotiations, and result anyhow in a dismal failure to stabilize long-term relations between the major European Powers. I am thinking of projects to revive the unhappy experiment of a League of Nations, and the yet more startling chimera of a Federation of States which would have gracefully and unanimously abdicated their sovereign rights. No one supported the League more steadfastly than I in the days when it was still effective as an antidote to violence. At Oxford I soon succumbed to the magnetism of Professor Gilbert Murray, made my pilgrimage as a neophyte to Geneva, and spent at least one vacation inflicting the niceties of the Covenant on stolid and long-suffering British audiences. But the high hopes we cherished of the reign of peace through law were shattered, one after another, in the sad years between 1931 and 1939.

Had we been less intoxicated by the champagne of an incomparable ideal, we might have discerned the vices that were to encompass its downfall inherent from the very first in the structure and policy of the League. For it required two indispensable conditions to accomplish the purpose it was created to fulfil: its members must include at least the seven great World Powers, and these preponderantly powerful nations must be genuinely willing to use their might for the prevention and defeat of aggression, instead of employing it as heretofore for the furtherance of their national interests. But neither of these conditions was ever realized. The League failed to achieve even this degree of universality because it failed to overcome the centripetal force of collective egoism, and the national self-centredness that defeated the greatest effort in history to extend the boundaries of the rule of law will be far more deeply rooted after the present war than it was in 1918.

It will therefore be impossible in the days that follow the war to resuscitate those principles of international behaviour on which the League was built. No one can seriously imagine that Germany, Italy, Russia, or Japan, for all of whom drastic censure has been the mildest treatment meted out by the League, will revise their present policy of aggres-

sive nationalism, and forget the insults that have been heaped upon their heads, in order to oblige France and Britain by returning meekly to the common fold. As for the small European nations, they have already lost whatever illusions they once cherished about the maternal qualities of the Great Powers who proclaim that they will fight to defend the weak. They have mostly therefore adopted an attitude of absolute neutrality *vis-à-vis* their powerful neighbours, in the hope that thereby they may avoid becoming pawns in someone else's game. There is no good reason to suppose that these small countries will change their present line after the war is over; and if on occasions they do emerge a bit further from their shells, it will be to arrange for some degree of mutual assistance with small contiguous territories menaced by an imminent and common danger. As a political force the League has now become, and is likely to remain, a useful counter in Anglo-French policy.

But if the League has proved a failure as an alternative method of organizing peace to the old plan of maintaining a rough equilibrium of force between the Great European Powers, it has been a striking success as an international clearing house for economic information, and a cosmopolitan organ for co-ordinating separate national energies directed against the common enemies of civilization. I am referring to the unimpeachable work of the International Labour Office, of the High Commissioners for Refugees, and of the various humanitarian committees engaged in stamping out the vile trade in women and children, in terminating the ravages of epidemics, and in cutting down the poisonous growth of illicit commerce in opium, cocaine, and other soul-destroying drugs. The future of the League lies in the steady development of its humanitarian activities to meet the varying needs and circumstances of the years that lie ahead.

But the latest and most fashionable remedy for war has been prescribed by some philanthropic intellectuals who have suddenly discovered that unlimited national sovereignty is the root of all the trouble. There is unhappily nothing that social groups—whether savage tribes, city states, or modern nations and empires—have guarded more



jealously than the right to do as they please without interference from anyone; it is the hallmark of their insatiable and lawless egoism, and any encroachment on the unrestricted liberty of the group evokes such resentment among its members that they are ready to die to the last man in defence of its honour and its interests. Besides, nothing less than a 75 per cent federal world would be strong enough to guarantee peace; and what real chance is there of this, when even the dominions of the British Commonwealth will not tolerate a Federal Parliament? The smaller federations suggested by certain writers would merely provoke a wider system of military alliances between the unfederated nations, and therefore offer no alternative as preventives of war to the old-fashioned system of preserving a rough balance of power.

Another grievous error of those who talk about the resurrection of the League or the establishment of a United States of Europe is the somewhat naive assumption that the main business of politicians is to plant the Kingdom of God on earth, or at least to lay the foundations of everlasting peace. If only they had spent a few years as a member of a large local authority or of a national parliament, they would realize that the unfortunate politician must have the patience of Job and the perseverance of Penelope to achieve even the slightest improvement in the condition of the people. Looking backward over 5,000 years of so-called civilization, they would perceive that peace has been another name for a longer or shorter truce between constantly recurring outbreaks of war, and they might possibly draw the sensible conclusion that the statesmen of to-morrow will deserve the gratitude of mankind if they can prolong by even a decade these precious intervals of comparative lucidity and calm.

Those who deny themselves the luxury of wishful thinking will therefore try to prescribe the political conditions, unpleasant as their sedative may sound, best calculated to give the maximum breathing-space between this European war and its successor. There is, fortunately, every reason to suppose that in time to come the British lion will continue to recline beside the dove of peace. He has already clawed his

way to a cosy place in the sun, and now he only asks to be left undisturbed by other rude animals on a similar quest while he basks full length in its warmth. But unluckily there are powerful denizens of the international jungle still roaming disconsolately amid its shadiest thickets, and they have long coveted the patch of sunshine monopolized by their more fortunate neighbours. To drop these somewhat hackneyed metaphors, the principal danger of a future war in Europe will probably arise from threats to the post-war equilibrium of power. And we are most likely to prevent this inevitable conflict of interests from issuing out of the diplomatic into the military sphere by a policy that will combine judicious conciliation and armed strength. We should make whatever concessions we can afford, without abandoning any of our vital interests, to Germany, Italy, and Russia—the unsatisfied European Powers—in the hope of bringing about a mutual understanding between the Great Powers of the Old World, like the Concert of Europe which kept the peace for forty years after the Napoleonic Wars.

If the Democracies cannot reach a *modus vivendi* with the Dictatorships, they will flounder into another war long before they have recovered from the shock of the present struggle. I suggest that, having secured the degree of self-determination for Poles and Czechs which we are fighting for, we should return immediately to our traditional policy of non-interference in the affairs of Eastern, Central, and South-Eastern Europe. But for the reckless irresponsibility of Chamberlain's pledge of assistance to Poland, a disastrous departure from a policy of non-involvement in Eastern Europe our country has pursued for centuries, we should not be at war with Germany to-day. Let us at any rate learn our lesson, and never again contract a military alliance with any small nation east of the Rhine. This will automatically provide Germany and Russia with the spheres of influence, or *Lebensraum*, to which they are entitled by their geographical position and their economic and military strength.

Russia should not be challenged in those areas adjacent to

her territory which she owned or controlled before her defeat in 1917, while Germany should be allowed to exercise her natural predominance in Central Europe and the Balkans. It will be more difficult for us to make any major concessions to Italy, because her demands affect our vital interests and those of our French ally. But so long as we maintain an overwhelming naval superiority in the Mediterranean, we can still afford to say 'No'.

But the determining factor in diplomacy—and in all transactions between sovereign States—is the armed strength a nation can use in the last instance to enforce its will upon a recalcitrant negotiator. Concessions given out of military weakness merely encourage the recipient to ask for more. This was the fatal policy of 'appeasement' pursued by the British Government in face of German expansion. The combination of unreadiness for war and readiness to give which characterized the foreign policy of our Conservative leaders since 1931 resulted in a failure to protect our national interests, and a loss of prestige abroad, unparalleled since the ignorant obstinacy of George III deprived us of our American colonies.

As long ago as 1935 I warned the public, in the preface to a book on German Rearmament, that Hitler was rapidly transforming his country into an armed camp ready at a moment's notice to attack. But honest Baldwin and his fellow ostriches heeded neither minor prophets like myself nor major prophets like Winston Churchill, and their complacent folly in refusing to rearm made it impossible for us either to prevent the gathering storm from breaking or to embark fully equipped upon what may be the grimmest struggle in our history.

It will be something at any rate if our political leaders have learnt from eight years of successive setbacks to our foreign policy that unilateral disarmament is the shortest of short cuts to national suicide. When the present war is over our navy should retain its overwhelming superiority in European waters, our air force should remain the equivalent of any within striking distance of our shores, and our new army should be sufficiently numerous to provide an

expeditionary force as well as to garrison and police the Empire. For my part, I hope conscription has come to stay as the foundation-stone of a great, democratic, citizen army. I appeal particularly to my friends in the Labour Party not to allow their hearts to march off with their heads about disarmament. For even if agreement could be reached with the dictatorships about a reduction or limitation of armaments, it would almost certainly be a ruse to induce us to disarm while they retained or replenished their colossal armouries. Let us never forget that the surest preventive of future wars is the fear of defeat or of a long and indecisive struggle.

So far I have advocated a speedy return to our traditional policy of freedom from commitments save where the vital interests of the British Commonwealth are concerned, plus the will and the capacity to fight directly these are threatened by a foreign Power. It would be in accordance with this policy to prolong the defensive alliances with our old friends on the sea routes over which our trade is borne, and, while sedulously avoiding entanglements in Europe, to throw our diplomatic weight against any waxing colossus that threatened to cast its stupendous shadow athwart the bulk of the European continent. But we cannot go back to the splendid isolation of the latter half of the nineteenth century, because mechanical progress has deprived our sea-girt isle of the defensive advantages of its geographical position. We must therefore link our fate permanently with that of France. The present military alliance should not be allowed to lapse at the end of the war, and it would be almost equally regrettable if the close commercial and financial co-operation brought about by the allied war effort were discontinued when conditions change.

We should be the more ready to prolong this democratic alliance because we can offer our faithful ally no other guarantee for her future security after she has had to fight for her life twice in the same generation. It would surely be futile to revive the system of alliances with small States in eastern and south-eastern Europe—the system the Germans call ‘encirclement’—because the military value of these countries for at least fifty years will be negligible, and they

will therefore be a millstone round the neck of any Great Power that pledged itself in their defence. We could, however, strengthen her position and consolidate our own by retaining the triple alliance with Turkey. If we reap any tangible benefit from our present ordeal it will be largely the strengthening of existing ties with our ancient ally across the Channel, and with the new and welcome ally who holds the balance of power in the Mediterranean.

The distribution of colonies will remain a bone of contention between the expanding and the fully-inflated Powers. That Germany would derive any appreciable economic advantage from the restoration of her colonies, or that she would be able to use them to drain off her surplus population, are, of course, part of the modern mythology deliberately invented by Nazi propaganda. Her only sound claim derives from the fact that they were filched from her by the victors in the last war. But we should not allow ourselves to be persuaded by equitable considerations, for they ignore the probable consequences of such a transfer to a highly militaristic state. There can be little doubt that Germany will be ruled by the iron hand of a Nazi or a military dictatorship for many years to come, and in either event the possession of colonies would be regarded in the main as a first-rate strategic asset; the native inhabitants would probably be pitchforked into the foreign legion of the German army, clusters of military aerodromes would spring up almost overnight, and the deepest harbours would be transformed into naval bases for submarines, warships, and armed raiders.

There are some who urge that a post-war settlement should include the transfer of all colonies to an international authority, or at least the extension of the Mandates system to cover the older possessions of the Colonial Powers. But whether or no theoretically desirable, neither proposition seems in the least practicable; and we shall render better service to the native inhabitants if we concern ourselves less with the machinery of government and more with the speedy satisfaction of their urgent and elementary needs. The appalling poverty and indescribable misery of the average in-

digenous African are, to my mind, a shocking indictment of the so-called trusteeship exercised hitherto by the European empires on his behalf. Our first duty is to provide health services to combat disease, and to help him extract sufficient wealth from his scanty resources to diminish undernourishment and to stave off starvation. It is sheer nonsense to descant on the blessings of self-government while the vitality of the average dusky citizen of our colonies and protectorates is being steadily sapped by malnutrition, which plays havoc with a body already weakened by hook-worm or malaria.

Only in India should politics claim precedence of economics. We are likely to pay dearly if we fail to accelerate the pace of self-determination in British India. The capacity of Indians for self-government has been proved by the striking efficiency with which they administered seven vast provinces under the new constitution; and the result of withholding indefinitely what has been freely granted in the past fifty years to every Dominion will be to make the British connection as odious to the Hindu as it is to the Irishman. Wise and timely concessions, not snatched but given out of goodwill, are the only hope of fostering the firm friendship and mutual respect that are sometimes born of free co-operation but invariably killed by compulsion.

If the task of post-war statesmen is mainly the establishment of a durable peace, it would be incomplete without the restoration of some degree of prosperity to the millions who have been sacrificing comforts and necessities to feed the ravenous engines of war. Belligerence must inevitably lower the standard of life of all classes of society; to what extent, and by what means, can these standards be raised again towards the pre-war level? It is unlikely that even prolonged warfare will diminish the productive capacity of capital and labour; another slaughter on the 1914-18 scale would not seriously reduce the numbers of the working population, and air raids would have to wipe out whole industrial areas to affect even slightly the machinery of production. The steadily increasing impoverishment of the masses will be due to the diversion of productive capacity from the satisfaction of

civilian needs to the supply of war materials for the State, and the total income of the community is more likely to rise than to fall.

The war need not, therefore, produce a permanent lowering of economic standards; but the extent to which recovery will go must largely depend on Government policy. I doubt whether much can be done to increase the volume of international trade. An autarchic war economy will continue to prevail in all the totalitarian countries, thereby cutting off a large area of the globe from the benefits of a system of free exchange. Besides, backward countries will continue to become industrialized behind tariff barriers, and we shall find still fewer markets for our manufactured goods. This limits the upper level of recovery to fairly modest dimensions, however hard we may try to lower tariff walls between nations not pledged to the disastrous illusion of economic self-sufficiency. Our economic system will be Government-controlled to a degree unprecedented in British history. This unique power should be used to plan a smooth transition from a war to a peace economy. The ship of state must be steered neatly between the Scylla of inflation and the Charybdis of deflation. Until private purchasing power can be restored, the Government should continue to spend at something like the rate it was spending during the war, and stabilize prices at the level they will have reached when the 'cease fire' is sounded. It should remain for the time being the best customer of industry; only, instead of buying shells, and artillery, and bombers, its purchases should include flats and cottages for working-class families, and spacious schools to accommodate their children up to the age of sixteen. Poverty should be enormously alleviated by a system of family allowances which would at once lift large families above the poverty line and encourage the production of our greatest national asset—the next generation.

It would be an intolerable ordinance of fate if the men who for long years of ennui and heartache had been risking their lives for our safety and freedom were to return from the terrors of the battle station to the peace-time horrors of unemployment, under-nourishment, and squalid slumdom.

But there is no such ordinance in the book of fate. Man alone decides; and if he chooses wisely and well, if his vision of the land beyond is not dimmed or eclipsed by the transitory clouds of war, the blessings of peace may be something more than an empty commonplace for those who have not fallen by the way.





*Hugh Molson, M.P.*

IT IS CERTAIN THAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE will have a great influence in deciding the terms of peace both because they are Great Powers and because they will have borne the main burden of winning the war. It is equally certain, however, that the chief problems which await a solution lie in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, that the countries in those parts will inevitably take a very great part in drafting the treaty, and that any peace which is not reasonably successful in satisfying them will not be of long duration.

The Western Democracies must remember that both this war and the last began in Eastern Europe and not originally nor chiefly out of a quarrel between them and Germany. The so-called Great War was a group of different wars all waged simultaneously, in which the combatants, however willing to co-operate, were in fact seeking entirely different objectives.

For half a century it had been inevitable that the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish Empires should disrupt, and all diplomats realized that if such a disruption did not quickly result from a war, it would before long be the cause of a war. In Eastern Europe, therefore, the Great War might well be called the War of the Succession to the Austrian Empire, and in the Middle East it might be called the War of the Succession to the Turkish Empire. The war in Western Europe might similarly be regarded again as two separate wars: one was a further incident in the secular struggle between Prussia and France, the other was the new struggle between Britain and Germany in which Britain sought to retain her supremacy at sea against the German challenge.

The fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was brought

about by the resolve of the Slav peoples to throw off the German yoke; hence the nature of the peace treaties of 1919. The rise of Hitler, an Austrian just old enough to have been as an adolescent a Pan-German before the last war, is the effort of the German race to re-establish its ascendancy over the Slavs and ultimately over Europe and the world; the downfall of Nazi Germany must inevitably restore the freedom of the Slavs, and not improbably their ascendancy. No academic peace plans laid in Western Europe can prevent the historical consequences of another German defeat.

It is a popular fallacy to suppose that the Treaty of Versailles was particularly harsh. It was not perfect; but the legitimate complaints that Germany has against the Allies are directed against our attitude in the years following the treaty rather than against the treaty itself. It was the excessive amount of reparations asked for, the methods of exacting them, particularly the occupation of the Ruhr, and finally the French refusal to disarm to Germany's level, which caused legitimate German resentment; but none of these was due to the treaty itself. For these blunders we are as much to blame as France. Our unjustifiable inclusion of pensions swelled the figure of reparations, our refusal to guarantee France drove her into adopting an uncompromising line, and our unilateral disarmament made it essential that she should remain highly armed.

Different as may be the outlook and the interests of the peoples of Eastern and Western Europe, they have in common their anxious proximity to Prussian Germany. If they have few other experiences in common, they both are familiar with the methods which Germany uses in dealing with her neighbours. It is the nature and record of this Prussian Germany which make it the object of universal fear and distrust.

It is a dangerous fallacy to suppose that Europe is concerned only to destroy the Nazi régime in Germany. For 350 years war has been the national industry of Prussia, and the policy of power politics which her statesmen have pursued has been glorified and justified by her philosophers and historians. There is nothing original in the Nazi creed. Just

as every one of the ideas popularized by *Mein Kampf* is to be found in previous German writings, so the foreign policy of Nazi Germany has been merely a continuation of that of previous régimes.

It was immediately after the Thirty Years War in the seventeenth century that the Great Elector of Brandenburg-Prussia began to create in his country an organized military despotism and to practise in his foreign affairs a policy of national egoism which drew unenviable notice even at that time. The militarization of Prussia was carried further by King Frederick William, who bequeathed to his son, Frederick the Great, a kingdom organized down to the smallest detail for instantaneous war, or that *Blitzkrieg* of which we ourselves have been expecting in recent months and years to be the victims. Frederick the Great has remained ever since the national hero of the Prussian people and is regarded by Hitler as his great exemplar. The seizure of Silesia, with which Frederick marked his ascent to the throne, remains even after Hitler's seven years' rule the classical example of German duplicity and treachery. Having bound himself by treaty to protect Maria Theresa's possessions when she ascended the throne, Frederick attacked her and invaded Lower Silesia. After his initial victories he was joined by France and Bavaria, but he deserted his allies to come to a secret agreement with Maria Theresa by which he obtained the cession of Lower Silesia. Having obtained Lower Silesia he rejoined his previous allies and made a further attack upon Maria Theresa and succeeded in obtaining Upper Silesia.

A similar policy was pursued by Bismarck, who achieved the unity of Germany as a result of three wars of aggression. He picked a quarrel with Denmark in 1864, with Austria in 1866, and with France in 1870. Five times in less than eighty years wars have been started in Europe by the unprovoked aggression of Prussia and Prussianized Germany.

What has been practised by Germany's statesmen has been elevated into a code of morality by her philosophers. Until Napoleon's victory over Prussia at Jena, German thinkers had almost invariably been cosmopolitans, and Lessing boasted that he regarded patriotism as 'an heroic failing'. Although

Fichte held this view as a youth, the occupation of Berlin by the French Army brought about a complete change, and he laid the foundations, not only of nationalism, but of Pan-Germanism by his 'Addresses to the German Nation'. He produced in all its completeness the legend of a great German mission, and he claimed that the German character, 'pure, deep, earnest, and bold', could alone redeem the world from its follies and vices when it had established a German domination.

Hegel, following on the same lines, deified the State. He regarded it as a divine instrument for the regeneration of the people, but denied that it owed any duty of honesty or good faith to any other country, because its sole purpose must be its own magnification. War is not good or bad in itself, but becomes good if it can increase the power or wealth of the State. This line of thought reached its culmination with Nietzsche, whose hysterical exaltation of force and cruelty and condemnation of Christian standards of value have deeply influenced modern German thought.

This code of morality became orthodox in Prussian Germany and was taught in the universities by the professors of history and notably by Treitschke. He held that the State not only may disregard all principles of honour and good faith, but he regarded war as in itself good and desirable. 'It is precisely political idealism that demands wars, while materialism condemns them . . . it has always been the tired, unintelligent and enervated periods that have played with a dream of perpetual peace. . . . The living God will see to it that war constantly returns as a dreadful medicine for the human race.' It is therefore as a disciple of Treitschke that Hitler writes in *Mein Kampf*, 'Humanity has grown in perpetual struggle, eternal peace will bring it to the grave.' The Nazi policy of aggression is merely the continuation of a Prussian policy consistently followed for two and a half centuries, and enshrined for a century and more in the teaching of German universities.

No more original is the crude racial doctrine which has inspired the persecution of the Jews. The fanciful legend of an Aryan race of blood and long-headed men, endowed alone

amongst the races of the earth with a capacity to evolve and sustain a civilization, was originally propounded by the Frenchman De Gobineau early in the nineteenth century and popularized at the end of it by the renegade Englishman Houston Chamberlain.

It was apparently during Hitler's adolescence in Vienna that he came under the influence of Pan-Germans and anti-Semites like Schönerer. It is flattering to the pride of any people to be told that they are not as other men are, and just as the Jews regard themselves as the Chosen Race, and as the Englishman prides himself on having taken up the White Man's Burden, so the Germans—who have only so recently attained to the dignity of nationhood—fell immediately under the fascination of a racial doctrine, however devoid of scientific foundation, which taught them that they were destined by right of birth to dominate and rule the whole earth. Hitler's great achievement was not in inventing this legend, but in taking it out of the books of De Gobineau and Houston Chamberlain and popularizing it throughout the masses of the German people.

It is, therefore, a superficial view to regard Hitler as the creator of a régime and philosophy which has led a gentle and peace-loving people astray and beguiled them into unwonted paths of warlike adventure. Hitler has himself sprung from Austrian peasant stock, and he has imbibed from his boyhood onwards the doctrines of Pan-Germanism. His teachings are those which, as a consummate demagogue, he knew would appeal to the German masses. In broad outline of policy and in detail of execution, his direction of the German State has followed the classical lines of German statecraft. This war, therefore, is not directed exclusively against him and his régime, but against those German characteristics and ideas which have been periodically plunging Europe into war since long before Hitler was born. The peace treaty must be such as will deprive Germany of the power, and if possible it should cure her of the desire, to continue her periodical attacks upon her neighbours.

It will be necessary for the peace treaty to achieve three results: first it must prove to Germany once and for all that

aggression does not pay; secondly, it must create some new international system which will reduce the likelihood of war; and thirdly, it must hold out a prospect to all countries of an improved standard of living. We shall not again pitch our hopes as high as in 1918; we shall not again assume that any machinery of conciliation will of itself banish war; we shall not again delude ourselves into thinking that any international settlement can be permanent. But this disillusionment will not blind us to the need for peace and economic co-operation if civilized life in Europe is not to give place again to barbarism and hunger. The new order of society will be the more firmly founded if it is based on the realism that springs from fear of disaster instead of on the idealism that comes from hope of Utopia.

The war will have to create a new balance of power in which the Slav peoples will possess an area large enough to free them from the military and economic domination of the Teutonic race. Nor should this be unduly difficult of achievement. The Slav peoples are admittedly less developed than the Germans, but the lead of the latter is already decreasing yearly. The economic development of such countries as Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and Jugoslavia in the twenty years after the last war showed that the Slavs would in time become capable of competing on equal terms with any other race. At the same time the birth-rate amongst Slavs is relatively high, while during the years after the war the fertility of the German people fell below that of France. While a net reproduction rate of 1.00 was needed to maintain a stable population, the rate in Germany in 1932-34 was only about 0.698. The stimulus given to the birth-rate by Hitler is not likely to survive the war, and defeat is likely to bring back the conditions and birth-rate which followed the last war. Germany would then become a country for immigration and not for emigration.

Finally, it may be pointed out that until now the Slav peoples have shown themselves incapable of cohesion or even of co-operation. It might have been expected that the two Slav States of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland, which owed their birth to the defeat of the Central Empires and were accorded

independent status by the peace treaties, would have seen that their security and prosperity depended on co-operation and alliance. Czecho-Slovakia took advantage of Poland's distress to seize Teschen in 1921 at the moment when Poland was fighting heroically against a Russian invasion. In 1938 the positions were precisely reversed and Poland snatched Teschen back from a Czecho-Slovakia which was about to be disrupted by Germany. But the Slavs will not necessarily always remain disunited when once they have realized that it is their common enemy alone who benefits by their dissensions. The Germans themselves were unable for centuries to sink their local differences and they only achieved unity seventy years ago; it is not unlikely that the same lessons will be taught to the Slavs by their present bitter experiences. As Napoleon laid the foundation of German nationalism, so Hitler is teaching the Slav nations the wisdom and indeed the need of standing together. The Slav race may therefore look forward to a peace which will find them increasing alike in numbers and in wealth and with a new spirit of brotherhood inspiring the mutual relations of the Slav States.

It is already a proclaimed war aim of the Allies to free the Polish, Czech, and Slovak peoples from foreign domination. It is not possible to be more precise than that, for we do not know exactly what the wishes will be of the peoples who constituted the murdered States. We do not know, for example, whether the Slovaks will wish to form part of a resuscitated Czecho-Slovakia. But whatever the frontiers and whatever the mutual relationships of the various peoples, there will have to be a bloc of Slav, or rather of non-Teutonic States, stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea. They must form a solid barrier against German expansion and they must form an economic unit with sufficiently low tariffs and of sufficient size to enable the standard of living of the Eastern Europeans to be substantially raised. Only on a basis of military security and economic prosperity for the Slavs can there be a long period of peace in the East.

It was unwise in 1919 for the Allies to forbid Austria to opt for incorporation in the Reich, for such a prohibition was naturally distasteful when imposed by alien conquerors.



Perhaps there was a majority in Austria favourable to the *Anschluss* until the Nazis came into power in Germany; but it is not improbable that in normal circumstances Austria would prefer to remain outside any Prussian Reich. Austrians are Catholics and are by temperament gay, artistic, and a little happy-go-lucky. It is possible too that Bavarians would prefer to associate themselves with Austria in a new German Catholic State rather than remain in the Reich. This should be made the issue of a freely held plebiscite during the peace conference.

When the Polish nation regains its independence, it may well be that its frontiers will be substantially different from what they were before the Fourth Partition. It must be remembered that those frontiers resulted from direct action by the Poles which the Western Democracies did not in all cases approve. The seizure of Vilna from Lithuania was never justified, and Poland would also have been stronger if her Eastern frontier had not included such large non-Polish minorities. But if in some directions the new frontiers may not be as wide as the old ones, Poland should receive substantial compensation at the expense of Germany.

Poland is undoubtedly entitled to regain the province of Pomorze, which is often called the Corridor. It is ethnologically almost entirely Polish except for the German colonists who were deliberately settled there by Bismarck in his attempt to Germanize the province. It has, however, been obvious from the very beginning that the existence of a Corridor was a perpetual danger to the peace of Europe, and in the end it was the immediate cause of the present war. We must end this eternal cause of friction and rationalize the map of Europe by a bold and resolute stroke. East Prussia must be annexed to Poland, who will thereby gain an adequate and defensible outlet to the Baltic.

It is not proposed to incorporate in Poland any alien minority, least of all a German minority, if it can be avoided. Hitler has fortunately set an example which can be followed. In South Tyrol which he abandoned to Italy and in the Baltic States which he surrendered to Russia, he has repatriated the German colonists to the Reich. The German inhabitants of

East Prussia must gradually be repatriated in a similar way.

It will, of course, be a vast undertaking to transfer and resettle a population of 2,500,000, but there is no reason why it cannot be done. It is probable that the war will have reduced the German population very substantially before peace is made, but even if this is not so, it will in any case shortly begin to decline and indeed it is already doing so in Austria. While Germany should be capable of absorbing immigrants, the high Polish birth-rate will necessitate for that nation a greatly increased *Lebensraum*. The burden and cost of resettling these repatriated Germans in the *Fatherland* will be a useful and desirable alternative to reparations. The fatal defect of reparations was that no method could be devised for transferring across the frontiers the value that Germany was called upon to surrender, but just as it was right that Germany should shoulder a financial burden to make reparation for the war launched by her in 1914, so it will be just that she should shoulder such a burden after 1939. The absorption and resettlement of 2,500,000 East Prussians is a task that might well occupy fifteen years and would involve immense expenditure of labour, but it would all be expended in Germany in exploiting more intensively her own resources, and it would leave free for the teeming Poles a new land where they would find scope for a century of progress in wealth and well-being. If there is anyone who thinks such a measure too drastic, let him study the map and ask himself whether either Poland or Germany can ever feel secure until the German enclave in the Slav belt has been withdrawn and reabsorbed into a consolidated and less expansive Reich.

The coalescence and recovery of the Slav peoples cannot fail to be influenced profoundly by Russia. It is indeed impossible to imagine any satisfactory settlement which does not bring Russia, whatever the political views of her Government, back into the comity of Europe. The position at the present time is, however, so obscure, that it is futile even to make a conjecture. All that can be said with assurance is that the alliance with Germany, if persisted in, will debar Russia from leading the Slav race in the next

peace, just as the Communist creed has done during the last peace.

It is likely to be a chastened Europe that emerges from this war. The inevitable political and economic decline of Europe was hastened by the World War, and in Britain we are well aware that in wealth and economic well-being we have not recovered from that war and never can do so. The same is true in varying degree of other countries. Driven by an urgent need to ward off the evil of war which has inflicted so much injury and loss twice in a generation, the nations are likely to seek to establish a new international order.

At the Versailles Conference the frontiers of Europe were redrawn with, in general, a remarkable adherence to the principle of self-determination. During the twenty years after 1918, fewer Europeans lived under alien rule than at any time in history. Indeed the true indictment of the statesmen at Versailles is not that they were harsh and vindictive, but rather that they were too idealistic; they respected so much the ethnological differences between the peoples that they forgot the need to give to the succession States a sound economic basis. At the next peace conference it will certainly be found that the Versailles frontiers do not need many sweeping modifications, but a *Zollverein* or at least a plan of economic co-operation amongst all the countries of Eastern Europe will be essential. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was an admirably balanced economic unit, but it exploded because it ignored the sentiment of nationalism. The disruption of the Empire into the succession States marked the triumph of political nationalism, but the economic nationalism which accompanied it impoverished them all. The next peace must aim at combining political independence with economic co-operation.

Because of the impoverishment and unemployment which will result from the war, attention is likely to be devoted primarily to an attempt to revive trade and raise the standard of living. When we look back on the last twenty years and recall the wise words spoken and the consistent and almost unanimous refusal of the countries to act upon them, we might well despair of the future. And yet in these last two

or three years the tide seems to have turned at last. It may be that in the grim penury of the early days of peace, nations will in fact have no choice but to seek help and give it by interchange of goods and services. It may be facilitated by the fact that all trade and manufacture will be under the general supervision and control of governments.

Britain must be prepared to make her due contribution to the economic reconstruction of the world. The world was content throughout the nineteenth century to leave Britain in political control of vast colonies because she did not seek to exclude their commerce by preferential tariffs. That policy of the Open Door has now been abandoned, and the policy of Imperial Preference handicaps the foreign trader in a two-fold way. Because it is made difficult by tariffs for him to sell his goods in our colonies, it is made difficult as a direct consequence for him to buy raw materials from those colonies. From the standpoint of the colonist it is most objectionable that he should be prevented from buying cheap foreign goods lest he should prefer them to dearer British articles. It is difficult to reconcile this system with the doctrine of trusteeship which we are now supposed to have adopted.

Not only should the Open Door apply throughout Africa in matters fiscal, but the economic development of Africa, especially the building of railways, should be planned as an international undertaking. When a great continent is being opened up, it should be regarded as an economic whole, and railways should not be diverted from their natural routes in order to stay in one or other political jurisdiction. There is no need for Britain to surrender her political control of her colonies; it would indeed be most undesirable that she should do so until she is able to grant them self-governing institutions and launch them on a career of self-government. The help, however, of all foreign countries which are willing to co-operate to raise living standards should be welcomed in their economic development.

It is certain that at the peace conference much attention will be given to the organization of a new international order. Will it take the form of a resuscitated League of Nations? Will it be a form of European federation? Will it be some-

thing different from both ? It is true that many of the troubles of international life arise out of the sovereignty of the individual States. The community of States is a concourse of individuals of varying physique, temperaments, and interests, who are not obliged to obey any one of their number or even the united opinion of all the rest. But anarchic as this may appear to be and is, there is no doubt that States stand less on the dignity of their sovereignty than they used to do, except in the case of those three States which have marked themselves out as aggressors. But while steady and even rapid growth has been made in developing an international community spirit, it is hard to believe that sovereign States will be allowed by their public opinion to make themselves at any time in the immediate future wholly subordinate to the orders of any true federal authority. It may be the ultimate and only satisfactory solution, but it surely still lies afar off.

We come back to a League of Nations, modified and amended perhaps, but the same in principle. The League has aroused such extravagant hopes, it has been so highly extolled and so unreasonably condemned that few people seem to understand what it is and what it aims at doing. The Covenant is in fact a treaty of conciliation and arbitration into which a large number of States have entered. It is not a super-State; it does not bind any State without its own consent except not to go to war against a unanimous recommendation of the Council; in other cases it does not even forbid war, but only prescribes certain preliminary procedure before war may be undertaken. The Covenant merely provides machinery and procedure for conciliation and arbitration; it does not seek to provide a substitute for sweet reasonableness in the minds of statesmen and in the hearts of the peoples. The Covenant is generally admitted by lawyers and diplomatists to be a skilfully designed piece of machinery. If certain provisions of the peace treaties needed to be revised after some time, the Covenant wisely provided the procedure under Article XIX by which that could be done. The Covenant cannot be held entirely to blame because no member State has ever proposed that the Article should be used. Similarly it is the case that Article XVI provides means of coercing a

State found guilty of a breach of its obligations. The Covenant cannot be held entirely to blame because sometimes States have declined to act under Article XVI or because sometimes they have acted and not everyone has approved of their doing so. What can be said, however, is that the Covenant aims at abolishing neutrality and that anyone who believes in an isolationist policy or in pacifism must necessarily be opposed to it in principle. But, strangely enough, pacifists often gave to the League vocal and unwanted lip-service which did much to discredit it.

Just as the Covenant itself provides the procedure for conciliation, so the League meetings provide the place and the occasion. For generations past Ministers have tended increasingly as the means of transport improved, and as modern inventions and methods have increased the need for international co-operation and control, to meet personally for discussions. Even without the League of Nations, British Ministers would have found it necessary to pay increasingly frequent visits to the Continent for the purpose of negotiations. The League meetings afford particularly good opportunities for these exchanges of views at a meeting-place common to all nations. The Anglo-American view has always been that the League should be used almost entirely for conciliation, and they have eyed with deep distrust the coercive powers. It was the existence of these coercive powers that deterred the U.S.A. from signing the Covenant. The French view has equally consistently been the opposite, and holds that if there was no coercive power behind the League's opinion, there was no value at all in the Council's arbitral award.

It may well be that the breakdown of the somewhat isolationist policy pursued by Britain after the war will swing British opinion round to the French view, and the support given to the idea of a Federal Union of Europe suggests that this is so. In that case the road is open for an important amendment of the Covenant: namely, to do away with the need for unanimity before a resolution can be passed or action taken. It would be a great step forward if an accused State were no longer able to hold up the cause of justice by its single hostile vote. It would be better still if a substantial

majority were able to vote down a small minority. We have already said that the Covenant is not wholly to blame, because no one has attempted to revise the peace treaties under Article XIX. It is, however, partly to blame, because any single State which was asked to make some slight sacrifice would be able to prevent anything from being done. Suppose that the revision of an existing treaty proposed were the cession of part of the Dobrudja by Rumania to Bulgaria. However general might be the belief that this was right and even necessary to avoid war, Rumania could interpose for all time her vote and no resolution on the subject could have any validity. This follows naturally from the doctrine of State sovereignty. It would be the first step towards Federal Union if a specified majority of the members of the League were able to insist upon the cession of the territory concerned.

This reform would mean the creation for the first time of an international legislature. It has become a platitude now that the League has worked exclusively to preserve the *status quo*. When Germany and Italy wanted changes made—some of which were not in themselves unreasonable—they were confronted with the fact that there was no way of altering the existing order save by the unanimous voice of all or else by violence. It would be an enormous advantage to be able to right wrongs at international law by the legislation of the League, just as a harsh or archaic law can be repealed in municipal law by national legislation.

It is not unreasonable to expect the international community to evolve on lines similar to individual States. It was a great step forward when a murder or a robbery ceased to be regarded merely as a wrong done to the victim and his family, but as an offence against the community and as a breach of the King's peace. The hue and cry was raised and every law-abiding subject of the King was under an obligation to join in the pursuit of the criminal. That is the stage which the Covenant has reached with its obligation on all member States to apply sanctions. But the lives and property of the King's subjects only became relatively safe when the State was able to provide a police force always ready to restrain and coerce the evil-doer. So it must be with States, and until there

is an effective international police force nations will not dare to disarm nor will they be secure. To create such an international force to resist aggression and protect the weak should be one of the war aims of the Allies and may well prove to be the most valuable of the fruits of peace.

Britain's chief immediate concern must be to win an undeniable victory over Germany. There must be no peace of negotiation, but a victory which will give indisputable proof to all Germans that the will to peace of Europe is stronger than their will to war, that those who prefer butter to guns can none the less use guns to ensure their security and freedom. From this victory must come the emancipation of those who have been conquered. First, all the nations who have been invaded must regain their freedom, even if their frontiers may be somewhat different. Austria must be given the option of remaining in the Reich or of resuming her independence, with or without the accession of Bavaria and other parts of the Catholic South.

Secondly, it is necessary that there should be a concerted effort to make Europe into an economic zone for freer mutual trade. It was the Great Slump that brought the Nazis into power in Germany and economic stress and discontent have aggravated all the international and internal troubles of the countries of Europe throughout the twenty years of peace. The days of Europe's greatest power and prosperity are probably in any case past, but a great effort is needed if the pressing economic evils are to be even ameliorated. It will not only be necessary for Britain to play a large part in this, but it will be in her best interests to do so, for there is no country that stands to lose so much by economic nationalism as Britain. One great contribution we must make is by means of the Colonial Empire. It will be to the advantage of our colonies to be as free to buy from foreign countries as from Britain, and this will facilitate the free flow in peace-time of raw materials from the Empire to all foreign countries which are prepared to adopt a similar policy.

Finally, we must aim at improving the machinery for doing justice and preserving peace in the international sphere. For this purpose some restriction of the free exercise of the



rights of national sovereignty seems to be needed, and a considerable step forward would be taken if the League were given a modest measure of legislative power by authorizing a substantial majority of the member States to alter the legal *status quo* without the concurrence of the parties affected. An embryonic International Police Force would add greatly to the chances of doing justice and preserving peace in a sinful world.

In putting forward for discussion and thought these peace proposals, it has been a primary objective that they should be practical. The human race never progresses by leaps and bounds and we have outgrown the idealism of the early days of the League of Nations. Neither this war nor the peace will bring a new heaven nor even an entirely new earth, and our task is merely to overcome the most pressing and immediate evils, and take some small step forward to a better society. This will not be a war to end war, nor will our victory destroy once and for all the danger of the military domination of Europe. As no man can bargain with God for the soul of his brother, so no generation by its sacrifice can win security for its descendants. All that we can hope is that Britain with her Empire and her Allies will succeed once more in preserving the liberties of Europe, and that the ensuing treaties may give to an aged and distracted world a better economic prospect and an improved machinery for solving international differences without war.

*Capt. G. Nicholson, M.P.*

IT IS PROBABLY USELESS to hope that any real measure of agreement can be reached in the discussion of peace aims, for there is no single problem, but many, and, worse still, no datum line, so to speak, from whence our process of reasoning can start. Everything seems to combine to confuse us, and to make clear thought difficult. But if any problem or group of problems ever called for clear thought, it is this, since upon our collective answer hang issues the significance of which it would be difficult to overstate. It seems to me that the aim of those who speak or write about the coming peace settlement should be, first, to guide the discussion along the path of reality, and second, to take every opportunity to limit, simplify, and clarify the points at issue. The object of this short article, then, will be to reduce the problem to its simplest terms, and to direct attention to what, in the writer's opinion, is the touchstone of success in treaty-making.

I believe that most of the confusion of thought that has occurred is due to failure to define clearly the object which we intend the coming settlement to attain. It is not enough to approach the problem honestly, scientifically, and without prejudice. Clear thinking demands something more, namely, clear definition of the objective. The objective must be possible of attainment with the means at our disposal, and must represent the minimum with which we shall be satisfied. I am convinced that if only we could reach agreement upon this we should have made a great step forward, for discussion of means and methods is bound to be more or less factual, and therefore more likely to end in definite conclusions.

At present there is a large stock of main objectives to choose from. We may take our pick of disarmament, justice

for minorities, restoration of liberty, world free trade, world federation, European federation, and dozens of patent nostrums for setting up the millennium. The 1940 spring model is called Federal Union. All these so-called objectives have one thing in common, that they depend for whatever chances of success they have upon the preservation of peace. I maintain therefore that we can have only one real objective in drawing up the coming peace settlement, namely, a durable peace.

If we intend to think clearly and honestly, I submit that our first duty is to realize that another war would put a stop to each and every one of our plans and hopes for a new and better Europe. It is axiomatic that a durable peace is the condition that governs all further progress. It may not be an exaggeration to say that without it European civilization will, relatively speaking, cease to exist. I wonder if the average man accepts the full implications of this? Is he convinced that the one overriding duty, not only of the statesmen who will be responsible for framing the coming peace settlement, but of subsequent generations, is to ensure as far as is humanly possible that war does not break out again? Is he ready for the sacrifices that this entails?

A very great deal turns upon the answers of our rulers and of our electors to these questions. If they are convinced that nothing can be achieved unless the peace endures, then the problem will be much simpler. If on the other hand they are induced by well-meaning persons to believe that a new order of things is so well worth having that some risks can and should be taken, then we are back again in the old atmosphere of wishful thinking that has landed us where we are to-day.

Part of the difficulty is due to confusion of thought over the meaning of the word peace. We are constantly told that peace is not the mere absence of war, but is something positive that can only be brought about by doing away with the causes of war. It is most dangerous to talk like this, for peace is essentially a matter of fact, and to confuse matters of fact, such as war and peace, with matters of opinion, such as the theoretical causes of war, is to court disaster both in thought and in action. Peace is a matter of fact, and the maintenance of

peace in the ultimate issue depends upon questions of hard fact too, for in this imperfect world the brutal truth is that peace, whether private or public, is preserved just so long as potential breakers of the peace are convinced that it does not pay to break it—and no longer. It is indeed probable that the ideal way is to arrange matters so fairly and justly that malcontents cease to exist, and of course to see to it that this perfect state of affairs goes on indefinitely. Even then one would be gambling on the assumption that all mankind reasons along the same lines. But we are practical men faced by ugly facts. We cannot afford to fail, we cannot afford to take the smallest avoidable risk in the coming settlement, for we must make a certainty of it this time. And the only practical way to make it anything like a certainty is to make sure that those to whom peace is vital are so strong in material force, so organized and knit together, that they can exert the strongest conceivable influence on the side of peace, or, if they fail to ensure peace, can at any rate guarantee their own survival. Of course, the peace settlement must embody the principles of justice; of course, possible causes of war must be removed; but these alone—matters, be it remembered, of opinion and not of fact—by themselves can be no guarantee of peace.

If peace is vitally necessary to us, then the approach to peace is pedestrian and unromantic, leaving no scope for experiment or for lazy thought. If I were St George, the first dragon on my list would be that immense, insinuating, ingratiating creature, 'wishful thinking.' Where the powers of evil devour one city, the wishful thinking of well-meaning but lazy people works the ruin of great empires that generations of heroes have built up. We must forswear it, and with it all temptation to gamble with European civilization. Never again must we delude ourselves and delude the electors into thinking that we can enjoy the blessings of security and prosperity without being willing to pay the price. The world must learn not the meretricious slogans of the League of Nations Union, but old principles of international decency of behaviour that were generally accepted in the eighteenth century, but have become dead letters in our own. It all comes back to the need for clear definition of our objective. If we are

to survive, we must have durable peace. Durable peace is therefore our main objective, because if we fail in that we shall fail in everything else that we are fighting for. Having defined the objective, let us now consider the factors involved. Obviously they can be classified in any number of ways, but the only classification germane to my argument is that between factors containing an appreciable degree of the unknown, and those of which we can speak with some certainty. The fundamental structure of the peace settlement must incorporate as few elements of uncertainty as possible. In other words, matters which by their very nature are susceptible only of experimental treatment cannot be allowed to affect that part of the settlement which is responsible for preventing another European war. These matters include such thorny problems as the future attitude of the German people and all schemes for the reorganization of Europe on any super-national basis, such as Federal Union.

Take the question of Germany. It is one of our war aims, and not the least important, to impress upon the German people the fact that they have been defeated, and that war does not pay. Many people feel that it is just as important to convince them that they will have just and fair treatment and the same economic opportunity as ourselves. There are, of course, other schools of thought as well. But they all have this in common, that they rest upon the assumption that the future of peace in Europe will turn largely upon the reactions of a defeated Germany. If that is true, the outlook is dark indeed; for if there is anything that can be said of Germany that events cannot prove wrong, it is that nobody can predict the ultimate reactions of the German people to any set of circumstances whatever. For the Nazis have shown us that skilful and reiterated propaganda can persuade the German people of anything, however fantastic. In the face of what has happened during the past seven years, can it be questioned that, say twenty years hence, the rulers of Germany will be able then, as now, to secure the acceptance by their people of any interpretation of history that suits their book?

The future attitude of the German people will obviously affect the peace of Europe profoundly, but if we allow any

assumption whatsoever concerning it to hold a fundamental place in the peace settlement, we shall be building upon sand. The same process of reasoning applies to all schemes for replacing the League of Nations by something more effective, for, whatever their merits, even their most visionary exponents are bound to admit that they are by their very nature experimental, that only by trial and error can a really sound super-national system be developed. By all means let us try experiments that may ultimately put an end to the madness of war; in fact we are morally bound to do so; but let us face fairly and squarely the fact that they are experiments, and that nothing even remotely experimental can be allowed to play a part in the fundamental structure of the peace settlement. Our power for peace must not be infringed by any surrender of national sovereignty, nor must the armed forces of the defenders of peace be reduced on the strength of any hypothesis of collective security. The fundamental structure itself must be built of elements about which uncertainty is reduced to a minimum.

It appears to me that there is only one unchanging and unchangeable factor in the European scene, namely, the determination of the British and French peoples to live their own lives in peace. There is nothing so little open to question or so little liable to alteration as our joint love of peace and hatred of war. What is more, we have, both of us, every inducement to spare no cost and no exertion in the defence of peace and of our conception of civilization. It is a truism to say that we live by peace and that a succession of wars would be fatal to us. The keystone of the coming settlement must therefore be a strong Britain and a strong France, bound together in the closest alliance and acting as one unit in world politics. If once this nucleus is assured and promises some measure of permanence, experiment in other fields, such as those touched on above, may be justifiable. Without this nucleus the peace settlement will be an idol with feet of clay. It would, of course, be ridiculous to claim that a common Anglo-French foreign policy backed by the full and united might of both empires would provide an absolute guarantee of world peace, or even of European peace, for it is impossible

to conceive of any system that is a practical possibility that could, for example, absolutely guarantee that neither Russia nor Germany would ever attack their smaller neighbours. But I do claim that Britain and France properly organized, and acting jointly and resolutely, would provide an absolute guarantee both of the safety of their own peoples and of the continuance of Western European civilization, and that they would furnish a nucleus round which peace-loving nations, great and small, would come together. It will not be easy to turn even the present measure of Anglo-French co-operation into the closer relationship that I envisage. For a certain surrender of independence and of freedom of action will be called for on both sides of the Channel.

It is not difficult to imagine the sort of propaganda that would be employed against the scheme by the insular and the suspicious in both countries. With us the isolationists would run riot. The French would be portrayed as a nation consumed with revengeful hatred of all things German, past-masters in continental diplomatic intrigue, both unworthy and dangerous as intimate fellow-workers. Corresponding propaganda in France would harp on the old story of England being ready to fight to the last Frenchman, besides appealing to ever latent suspicion of British commercial imperialism. It will demand immense industry and enthusiasm effectively to counter propaganda of this sort. We on our side must be made to realize that fear, and well-founded fear, is at the root of that aspect of French policy that appears to us to be based on hatred of Germany. As to anxiety that we should be involved in purely French continental policies, surely the conditions of alliance can be relied upon to safeguard our interests, even if we are not convinced of the truth that, once given security, the French system of continental alliances will be rendered unnecessary. The best, and indeed the only effective answer to French suspicions will be to prove that the British contribution to the power of the alliance will be both immediate and adequate, as it must be if the alliance is to exert overwhelming influence on the side of peace. On the sea, I hope we may be trusted to look after our own interests, even though recent administrations have not always been

above suspicion. The air contribution of the two countries must be fixed by treaty in order that it may not be influenced by considerations of party politics. The land contribution must also be laid down by treaty. We shall have to face the fact that we can no longer afford to do without an army comparable in numbers, training, and equipment with those of our continental neighbours. Compulsory military service must become a permanency in our national life. It is not the place here to develop the many arguments in its favour, but I wish to place on record my deep-rooted conviction that, quite apart from the scheme outlined, there can be no security either for this country or for the Empire unless conscription is retained. If the happenings of the last few tragic years have taught us any lesson at all, it is that had overwhelming force been at the disposal of the friends of peace, we should not now be engaged in a European war, fighting, or perhaps it would be more true to say manœuvring, for our very existence. What a price we shall have to pay for our cowardice and ineptitude ! But it is idle to deplore past mistakes unless we learn better for the future. The conclusion of the whole matter is that whatever form Anglo-French co-operation may take, the forces at the disposal of the alliance must be supreme at sea, in the air, and on land. It will be easier to ensure that than to guarantee to our statesmen the necessary qualities of courage and resolution. For unless evil-minded men and nations are persuaded that we are prepared in case of necessity actually to use our overwhelming force in the cause of peace, our constant expenditure of money and effort will be in vain. The future is in the hands of the electorate, who proverbially gets the government it deserves. No peace settlement, however ingeniously contrived, will be worth much more than the paper it is written upon unless our parliamentary democracy is alive, and remains alive, to the vital issues at stake, in the field of defence and in the field of foreign policy. The most sacred duty of those who are in a position to influence opinion, whether in the Press or in Parliament or from the pulpit, will be to extol a sense of realism as the supreme virtue when the maintenance of peace is under consideration. But this is a digression. Let



us return to the arguments in favour of intensive Anglo-French co-operation.

It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the value of such vast material strength whether looked on as a protection or as a deterrent. It is, however, worth while to give some consideration to the economic aspect, for the closer relationship between the two countries that I look for would, of course, bring with it something approaching a common fiscal policy. I attach great importance to this as leading in the direction of freer world trade, for in economics as in everything else, an ounce of practice is worth a ton of theory.

So much for questions of hard physical fact. It would be tedious further to elaborate arguments that are so easy to propound. The most powerful considerations are concerned with what is intangible, with the need for some stable element, some fixed point, some fulcrum from which Europe can be levered back to sanity. Religion, respect for law, respect for the rights of the individual, even the most elementary dictates of humanity, no longer command general acceptance. The nations and peoples of Europe are frightened of the powers of evil that have been conjured up, frightened by the decline of international morality, even though they themselves may have contributed to it. They will no longer rally round abstract ideas, call them what you will. But if we are not to sink to the level of savages there must be some rallying point for the European spirit, some impregnable citadel of civilization. Is it beyond the united efforts of Great Britain and France to provide the citadel and to garrison it with stout hearts and wise heads? Surely it is for us, joint heirs of the humanities, to furnish the leadership for which the world is craving. Even the present tragic happenings will not be wholly evil if they lead the two great Western democracies to shoulder the responsibilities that they alone can discharge.

*John Parker, M.P.*

NO POLITICAL PARTY has been a stronger advocate of peace than the Labour Party. During the tragic horror of the war of 1914-18 a great number of ordinary men and women in this country decided that every effort should be made, when the fight was finished, to build up some form of international organization which should make future wars impossible. It was this idea, existing in other countries beside our own, which was the genesis of the League of Nations. Unfortunately, although the League came into being, it never had sufficient backing from the Great Powers to become an effective instrument for keeping the peace of the world. At a very early stage the League came up against two problems which it never succeeded in solving. In the first case, it soon became obvious that force would have to be used to maintain peace if powerful would-be wrongdoers were not to bully or conquer smaller States; and secondly, no machinery had been created which gave a reasonable chance of solving satisfactorily outstanding quarrels between States, particularly if the grievance was on the part of a small State against a large one.

These two difficulties grew out of the fact that none of the States becoming members of the League of Nations were prepared to transfer to any international organization the powers which they considered essential to a sovereign State. This meant that all effective attempts at limiting armaments or at building up an international police force collapsed in failure. The Have Powers were not prepared to make any concessions of importance to the Have-not Powers, save when they were frightened by the threat of force. Twelve years had not gone by since the Treaty of Versailles before attacks on the League

of Nations were in full swing, and despite much popular demand in the world for a peaceful solution of outstanding difficulties it soon became clear that the aggressive Powers grew only more aggressive as they forcibly rectified their grievances.

Linked closely with this refusal to allow any international control of armaments or compulsory arbitration between States was the refusal to deal with the economic grievances of the Have-not States. The demand for the redistribution of colonies was motivated in part by considerations of power politics, but it had a legitimate basis in the growing autarchy of the empire-owning States of the world, which were not prepared to share the empire markets and raw materials which they controlled. So vested interests were thrown into the scale against any constructive actions, while at the same time the fear of revolution blinded the judgment of many of those in responsible positions. It can thus be said that the failure of the League of Nations was due to this refusal of the governments of the Great Powers to face up to the necessity of limiting national sovereignty if any effective international organization was to be created which would ensure peace.

The Labour Party is determined that the lessons of the last peace shall be learnt. The hatred of war is far more pronounced during the present conflict than it was in 1914-18; determination to establish a peace which cannot be broken is even more emphatic than before. If this desirable end is to be achieved, what kind of new international order can be set up which will avoid the difficulties and mistakes of the League of Nations? Most thinking men and women will agree that any new international organization set up after the peace must be one which means business; it therefore follows that it should start off by including only the powers which are agreed upon a certain number of essentials. Far better to have a small League working well and so attracting other Powers to it than one which can be destroyed from within by the treachery of would-be wrong-doers. The Labour Party takes the view that agreement by a State to some limitation of sovereignty should be an essential prelude for entrance to any new League.

The Federal Union school of thought seeks to get over the difficulties into which the League of Nations got by federating first the States of Europe and then those of the whole world. In this way its more sanguine supporters hope to see national rivalries ended, a joint federal police force created, and full economic co-operation developed between all the member States. This programme has won a great deal of sympathy among the non-thinking who prefer to ignore the difficulties rather than to try and solve them. Socialists do not believe such a Federal Union to be practical politics in Europe at the end of the war, and rightly point out that even if it were established it would leave many difficulties unsolved. For the wide extent and great resources of the existing Federal Union of the U.S.A. have not removed unemployment and numerous other economic problems within its boundaries. There is the fear among many Socialists that schemes for a Federal Union might easily lead to the cutting down of the standard of life of the more advanced peoples of the Western world and the restoration or bolstering up of capitalism within the Federal Union.

If Federal Union is not a practical or desirable solution, what form must this new international organization take? In the first place, the peace treaties should aim at giving self-government to all the peoples of Europe and to those in other parts of the world who are capable of governing themselves. Frontiers should be drawn up to leave as small minorities as possible on the wrong side. Where national passions run high, it is obviously better that there should be a transference of populations, as has been so successful between Greece and Turkey, rather than a survival of trouble-making minorities. Such minorities as are not transferred should have certain cultural guarantees, but should be expected loyally to co-operate in the running of the State in which they live. The government of colonial territories not yet fit for self-government should be controlled by the International Organization and all possible steps taken to fit their inhabitants for self-government at an early date. All members of this new League should be prepared to submit quarrels with other States to arbitration whatever question is

at issue. There should be a rigid control of all armed forces, and the manufacture of all armaments and the production of goods suitable to be used as armaments, by the international organization. This body might have its own Army, Navy and Air Force or it might be prepared to use limited and controlled national forces to carry out its orders. It would appear desirable that all these forces should be internationalized at an early date, though it is doubtful as to how soon that would be practical politics. Internationalization of Air Forces seems the easiest first step in this direction; it should certainly be accompanied by the internationalization of all civil aviation services. If these two services were taken over and the production of armaments limited to factories owned by an international commission under the control of the new League, disarmament could be safely carried out in accordance with the extent and strength of its membership. The internationalization of civil aviation and of armaments production should be nothing like as difficult as many fear. For both these 'Services' are heavily subsidized by all the governments and are already in the hands of concerns which are directly or indirectly closely controlled by governments.

Most internationalists are agreed upon the necessity of settling disputes between States by compulsory arbitration and are prepared for a rigid international control of armed forces and armaments. There is far less agreement upon the question of what form of internal government each member State should have. It seems to me that it would be undesirable in all circumstances to dictate to a particular State what its form of government should be. Members of the Labour Party naturally hope that all States will have forms of government which will be democratic and socialist, whatever particular political parties may be in power. Members of other parties no doubt think differently. The International Organization, however, should have certain rights of interference. It would not be possible to tolerate a government in office within any of the member States, such as that of the Nazis, which wanted to destroy the League and to carry out aggression against other Powers. The right of secession from

the League could not be admitted if it was ever to become a living union. Apart from the refusal to allow a State to have a government which was trying to destroy the League, each State should be left free to choose its form and personnel of government. All States, however, would be bound by international obligations into which their governments had freely entered and should be able to be taken to court in the event of a breach of any such undertaking.

There is also little agreement among internationalists upon what measure of international control is possible and desirable in the economic field. The dispute between socialists and non-socialists and the very different state of economic and social development which has been achieved in different countries of the world make it impossible for any simple solution to be put forward. Given a world in which socialism is not the generally accepted form of society and in which very different standards of life exist between countries, a wide measure of economic autonomy is essential. Socialists have no desire to see any kind of Federal Union set up which would delay the economic or social progress of any member State by allowing the continued exploitation of more backward countries or the levelling down of conditions in advanced countries to those which are less progressive. On the other hand, any new international organization must give all the peoples within the new League access to raw materials and a reasonable chance of sharing foreign markets. It is possible that certain groups of States which have common interests may be able to link themselves together closely economically, but any immediate general disappearance of controls on foreign trade by national States, whether in the form of state import and export boards or of tariffs, licences, etc., is not practical politics. The planning of industries and resources within States, whether carried out from socialist or capitalist motives, seems likely to become practically universal in the immediate future. Some measure of co-operation between those drawing up the various national economic plans and controlling the exchange of exports and imports will no doubt be possible and desirable. It does not appear practical, however, to give any arbitrary

powers to such a co-ordinating economic body in the early days of any new international organization.

It is not possible to imagine the Russian Government allowing interference with the planning of its internal economy by any outside international body, even though non-Russian socialists might have a large say in its actions. Countries such as Turkey and Iran, which have been carefully establishing an economic as well as political independence of European capitalism, are not likely easily to give up the autarchy which has given them at once economic freedom and a higher standard of living. Scandinavia, Great Britain, France, and Germany will all be anxious to maintain the industries and standard of life they have built up, even though they may be prepared to plan and extend their foreign trade more co-operatively and scientifically. Whatever form of government may be in power in these Western countries, they will not be able to ignore these necessities.

A general national control over the country's economic life by its own government is not incompatible with the development of certain forms of international economic organization. In the first place, the development of the colonies of the member States would have to be put under international control. This would aim at safeguarding the interests first and foremost of the native inhabitants, but it would also ensure that all member States had the same opportunities of trade with the colonies and the same right to obtain raw materials from them. It is likely that international cartels, owned either by the League itself or jointly by the member States, would take over the production of certain raw materials such as minerals, first within the colonies and later more generally, and would see that production either equalled the needs of the State members and their colonies or was equitably shared amongst them. Development of this kind could cover a considerable part of the economic field without radically upsetting the right of State members to plan and organize their own economic life.

It is also likely that the State members would remain in control of their social services and of the right to make social and educational experiments. In this sphere, however, it

is likely that certain international agreements would be reached at an early date which would give a bottom to social and educational services without limiting the right to experiment within the different State members. An international colonial labour code, for example, might be one of the earliest agreed pieces of international legislation. Many readers may say that the whole of this scheme sounds ultra-utopian. I agree that it is difficult to see by what exact steps it is to be reached. It is, however, in my opinion, essential that the creation of some such International Organization should be constantly kept in view and that advantage should be taken of immediate events to work in such a direction.

An important first step has been taken in the close collaboration which exists between France and Great Britain at the present time and the joint economic and financial machinery which has been set up. This joint machinery, which is likely to grow in importance and strength as the war progresses, could well form the basis for much of the work of the new International Organization which is to be created at the end of the war. If this is to be done successfully, it is important that the whole subject of the post-war international organization should be freely and fully discussed, not only in France and Great Britain, but in other sympathetic States of the world. It is necessary to remember that very similar economic collaboration took place between the Allied Powers in the war of 1914-18; this was scrapped out of hand immediately the war ended. The fact that the League of Nations appeared to grow out of the political joint machinery of the Allied Powers during and after the peace treaties produced many difficulties. The defeated and neutral Powers long looked on the League as an instrument created by the victors to perpetuate their victory.

If Anglo-French joint machinery is to be used as a base for this new League, the steps taken during the war must be criticized as affecting a structure which is intended to be permanent. Possible difficulties must be looked at in advance if this joint organization is to be prepared for expansion into a truly international body when peace comes. The Labour Movement believes that joint action between the political



and industrial labour movements in France and Great Britain should be an essential feature in the building up of this organization. Otherwise there is a danger that this machinery might be twisted to bolster up a capitalist economic system.

Another difficulty is that no one can be clear about how far the war will extend and what States will be brought in. Many of the present neutrals, under their present governments, such as Italy, America, or Russia, will probably be very unwilling to join a thorough-going League or the kind which the Labour Party aims at creating. If they are not able to come into such a League, arrangements might be made for their collaboration with it for certain limited objectives, such as the carrying out of an international labour code, the control of certain raw materials, the enforcing of some measure of disarmament, and so forth. The Labour Party believes, however, that it would be very much better for the new League to be limited to those strongly and fully supporting the ideals behind its creation, and to allow other Powers gradually to strengthen their contacts with it. Whatever the situation at the end of the war, steps should be taken to start such an international body, even if it can only be done on a limited scale.

In contrast to States unable to come fully within the League, there may also be groups amongst its members who are anxious for a closer union than the League would in the early days provide. There seems no reason why groups of States, such as the Balkans, States in the Near East and Scandinavia and the British Dominions should not form close political and economic links with one another, possibly in some cases of a federal character. Such 'regionalism' within the League would strengthen rather than weaken its effectiveness and authority. It would assist members in particular parts of the world to deal with common problems, such as the necessity of maintaining or raising the standard of life, and would enable discussions to take place on more equal terms between groups of States which were mainly agricultural or primarily industrial.

Socialists have always believed that capitalism is one of

the factors making for war; they have therefore held the view that it is essential that economic power within States should not remain in the hands of a small number of wealthy men who stand to profit from war and the possible conquest and exploitation of one country by another. The Russian attack on Finland has shown that other factors may also make for war, but it has not altered the belief of socialists that the continuance of powerful capitalist interests within different States may at any time endanger the peace of the world. Socialists therefore welcome all steps to weaken such interests. At the same time it is obvious that many persons of goodwill in the world remain theoretical supporters of a capitalist economic system but are prepared to co-operate with socialists in building up an international organization to prevent war. It would be folly if socialists were not prepared to work with such allies while retaining their desire to set up socialist and democratic forms of government when opportunities occur. Recent economic developments suggest that industry and trade are rapidly taking on monopoly forms in all countries. Socialists believe that once this is understood public opinion, if fully educated, will insist that it is in the public interest that these monopolies should be owned nationally, or internationally by bodies responsible to the peoples of the world. The choice which will have to be made will be between monopoly capitalism or totalitarianism of the Nazi or Stalinist brand on the one hand and democratic socialism on the other. Socialists believe that the latter form of government must dominate in the world if the attempts at creating a new international organization after the war are to produce a peace which can be permanent.



*Victor Raikes, M.P.*

THE IMMEDIATE TASK which lies before us to-day is obviously to win the war, and although I propose in due course to consider the future, the whole energies of the nation must now be utilized to secure the victory in what may be a protracted struggle. The wishful thinkers who first supposed that Soviet Russia would rally to the help of democracy, then later that even after the German-Russian pact mutual jealousies on the Baltic would rapidly destroy any real co-operation, have already been proved wrong twice within six months. Those who insisted that Hitler would have to attack last winter in the west or be destroyed by internal revolution have seen that prophecy fail; for the main offensive has not been launched through the Low Countries until this summer, and then with a success for Germany, achieved it is true at the expense of heavy losses. The armistice signed with France has attempted both to split the Allies and to provide a breathing space for Germany. If the war, having taken this course, seems likely to last on indefinitely, there will be those who will begin to clamour for such a peace conference and some sort of settlement with Hitler in order to stem the advance of Bolshevism in Europe. If ever we sought peace upon such premises, the Allies would be doomed. Germany might even yet accept some temporary compromise which would give her time, not indeed to fight Bolshevism, but to exploit the natural resources of Russia for her own future advantage; and the democracies, overwhelmed with gratitude at the entry of Hitler and Stalin into some new League of Nations, would promptly begin to disarm and thus sign warrants for their own deaths within about ten years.

This fight must be fought to a finish, and with the increasing strength of our Air Force, the gradual tightening of the blockade and the opportunities that will arise to create, if necessary, a new military front where there is no Siegfried Line, either in the Balkans, Near East, or northern Europe, ultimate victory is assured.

Our growing knowledge that modern Germany is as ruthless and courageous as of old, and our awakening to the fact that Soviet Russia is not some sort of democracy but simply an Asiatic tyranny with a slight veneer of Western culture should help us, when the time comes, to formulate victory treaties based upon reality rather than uninformed idealism. It would, of course, be most unwise for the British Government to lay down in detail official peace aims during a great war which is yet far from over, but it is natural and proper for individuals to speculate upon the sort of Europe they would like to see arise from the ashes of the past.

We should consider the future in the light of experience; for if the mistakes once made at Versailles are not to be repeated, we must decide in our own minds why that treaty failed of its purpose. The one-time popular idea that France, with our aid, imposed a Carthaginian peace upon Germany can hardly hold water now, in view of the fact that after only a few years Germany has created a tremendous fighting machine capable of threatening the whole world. Whatever might have been the demerits of a policy of annihilation, it would at least have prevented such a military menace from arising within a generation.

The truth of the matter seems to be that the framers of the peace treaties, faced with the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the demands of our own allies in Central and South-Eastern Europe, were obliged to acquiesce in the creation of a number of small States; and perhaps they failed to appreciate that if Germany were allowed to remain a united nation she might in time be tempted to expand anew at the expense of her weaker neighbours. It may also be added (and for this the Versailles Treaty cannot be blamed) that in the tranquil years of the nineteen-twenties and early nineteen-thirties no serious effort was

made by the League of Nations to use the treaty provisions that did exist for reconsidering rectification of boundaries and the rights of minorities in Central Europe and elsewhere. As a result of this neglect, seething unrest in certain districts of almost every small State paved the way for German intervention, avowedly on behalf of oppressed minorities, and well might Hitler boast that self-determination was the political dynamite with which he would destroy the Versailles settlement. It is tedious to stress the obvious; nevertheless the treaty-makers of the future will fall into grievous error once again unless they bear constantly in mind that the existence of a united Germany (dominated as of old by Prussia), side by side with a number of small faction-ridden nations, was the fruit of the 1919 peace treaties, and that a Europe constituted upon these lines broke up within two decades.

At the present time the foreign situation is complicated by the fact that, while acts of aggression have been committed in Europe by both Germany and Russia, the Allies, who are ostensibly fighting for the rule of law and order throughout the world, are at war with the former but still at peace with the latter. Nevertheless, it would be generally admitted that no peace settlement can be complete until liberty has been restored to all persecuted nations alike, so we can assume that the pledges made to recreate a free Poland and Czech State (although not of necessity with the same frontiers as were accepted in 1919) will be extended to cover Finland and any other countries which may be attacked during the course of the conflict. The real problem, however, at the end of this war will be on the one hand to devise methods that will prevent the future rulers of Germany from ever attaining the strategic position required for the launching of another world struggle, and on the other to abolish the kind of grievances in Central Europe which Hitler has been able to exploit so cleverly of late.

The best way, in my view, to avoid a repetition of past errors would be to tackle the minority question at the very start. Experience has shown that no paper safeguards for minorities are worth a great deal, so wherever possible steps should be taken directly after the

settlement of territorial boundaries, for the exchange of minority populations between neighbourings States even though individual hardship would be caused in some cases. Turkey and Greece since the last war have successfully solved their minority difficulties in this way, and the amicable relationship now existing between them is an example to the whole of Europe. The French will almost certainly claim the left bank of the Rhine as their future permanent frontier with the Reich, and, provided the Rhineland is cleared for good of its German population, the proposed territorial readjustment should serve a useful purpose. After all, Germany has herself accepted in principle the need for transferring populations when it suited her, and what is being done in the Tyrol and on the Baltic can be copied elsewhere.

On the other side of Germany we have the Polish question. It has been fairly widely acknowledged that the creation of the Corridor in 1919 was bound to lead to complications in due course, but obviously some outlet to the sea was vital for Poland if she were to maintain permanent independence as a free nation. The Corridor has proved a hopeless proposition, so there is much to be said in favour of ceding both Danzig and East Prussia to the Poles, while at the same time certain frontier districts further south might be given to Germany in compensation. The result of this would be to make Poland a strong State and consequently to reduce the striking power of Germany towards the east, but it would of course be necessary to exchange populations between the two countries so as to ensure the disappearance of turbulent minorities on either side of the border. It would be impossible at this stage for anyone to decide how far the eastern boundaries of recreated Poland should extend, for this must depend upon many factors as yet unknown, and we may find, when the peace treaties come to be made, that the Soviet Union will have broken down and that the Ukraine may have arisen as an independent State capable of playing a substantial part in the future of Eastern Europe. Broadly speaking, our task will be to build an enduring Poland for the Poles themselves, uncomplicated by a large minority

problem; it will not be our business to choose their system of government for them, although some of us may hope that the experience of the past twenty years may encourage them to sample the advantages of a constitutional monarchy.

We now turn to Central Europe, where many difficulties must be solved if the new peace is to be anything more than an uneasy armistice. The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was in some ways a tragedy, for it meant the creation of small violently nationalistic States, easily to be aroused against one another by any Great Power well versed in unscrupulous diplomacy. The fact remains, however, that the centralized system of the old Empire, with its suppression of minority claims, was ill-suited to the twentieth century and could not survive in its ancient form, so the great problem facing the treaty-makers will be to devise some scheme of economic and political unity for Central Europe that will receive the willing co-operation of varied nationalities. For this purpose the existence of a stable Austria is essential and, if possible, Vienna, and not Berlin, should stand before the world as the cultural and inspirational centre of the German race. In the days before annexation, Kurt von Schuschnigg strove to achieve this ideal, but his truncated country, constantly weakened by Nazi intrigues, could only exist as a buffer State and was doomed to ultimate disaster.

An Austria with reasonable economic boundaries and freed from the pressure of Berlin could undoubtedly form the nucleus for Central European unity, and the dreams of the luckless Chancellor may yet be fulfilled. The return of the monarchy would again act as a stabilizing factor and, since the Royalist Party was rapidly growing among all classes up to the very time of the Anschluss, it is probable that the demand for a restoration will be very widespread once Austria is freed from the Reich. Fortunately the Archduke Otto of Habsburg and his brothers are young men of ability and fine spirit, who have learnt while in exile to combine modern ideals with a traditional belief in their own high destiny. The Archduke himself has been condemned as a traitor by Hitler for daring to protest against the annexation of Austria, and he and his family are personally doing much



to encourage and inspire those of their countrymen who are now living exiled in France, Britain, and the United States. It may be observed in passing that, as old-fashioned monarchists are sometimes rather shocked by the progressive views of their young leader, there seems little fear that his restoration would lead to an outburst of reaction. The only enduring answer to the pagan outlook of the Third Reich lies in the Christian faith, so a Catholic king, set in the midst of Central Europe after the war, would act as a rallying point for those spiritual forces which, driven underground as they are to-day, can still save the soul of the Germanic people.

The restoration of the Habsburgs and the rebirth of Vienna as a centre of Christian culture might well have still more far-reaching effects in course of time. It is possible that from Bavaria to Prague there would arise a desire for economic union upon federal lines, although it would be fatal for the victorious Allies forcibly to impose any such scheme upon Central Europe. The peoples themselves have got to work out their own destiny, yet the system that exists within the British Commonwealth of free nations provides an example which a Central European Empire might take to heart, if, on the one hand, certain States were prepared to sacrifice some small degree of their sovereignty in the interests of mutual security, and if, on the other hand, the ruler of the key State, Austria, was equally prepared to give complete autonomy and political liberty to any people, however small, which voluntarily came into the union. Under these conditions the Western Powers would be well advised to encourage warmly a free Austrian Empire and, if federal union were successful in one part of Europe, it might easily spread to other quarters. The experience of the present war may teach the Scandinavian countries that some form of union would be more likely to ensure their peaceful development in face of danger than individual protestations of neutrality, while States like Hungary and Slovakia could either join the Austrian combination or, as an alternative, link their fortunes with those of Poland. Further problems would arise regarding the relationship of Italy to Jugoslavia and South-

Eastern Europe, and of Rumania to Hungary and Bulgaria, while any break-away from the Soviet by the Ukraine would really turn Russia into an Asiatic Power and would fundamentally change the whole Balkan position. Any attempt, therefore, to provide cut-and-dried schemes, at the present stage, for solving all outstanding European questions would be a waste both of time and of paper. The signs of Turkey and Italy coming to a better understanding were, unfortunately, not fulfilled; yet with mutual goodwill those two countries could have settled many problems in the Mediterranean. If Signor Mussolini had continued to display those high qualities of statesmanship which he once seemed to possess, the Allied Powers would doubtless have been prepared to consider reasonable Italian claims in a most generous spirit; indeed the demands for greater representation on the Board of the Suez Canal and for the control of the port of Jibuti in the interests of Abyssinian development might well be met with advantage both to Italy herself and to the wider cause of world appeasement.

There are certain theorists to-day who would like to impose federal union upon all Europe with one stroke of the pen. They forget that the failure of the League of Nations was largely due to the fact that its Covenant demanded for effective working a far greater sacrifice of individual sovereignty than nations were prepared to accept at this period of human history, so a new League, possessing even wider compulsory powers under cover of federal union, would inevitably collapse. The nearest approach to a successful League of Nations yet known has been the British Commonwealth, and our system has taken years to evolve. We have shown that it is possible for diverse peoples, spread over vast territories, to enjoy freedom and peace beneath a common flag, while sharing a common destiny, and from the success of what Disraeli described as '*Imperium et libertas*' others might learn many valuable lessons. It would, of course, be absurd to assume that the British form of development could be applied indiscriminately to Europe, and indeed our example would have found little favour there in past years; but recent events have shown so clearly the perils of extreme

nationalism and the weakness of small economic units that European statesmen are likely to examine our system with greater sympathy than ever before.

There are some who hold the view that there will always be wars from economic reasons until the whole of the raw materials produced in Africa and elsewhere by non-self-governing races are developed upon international lines, and they demand that when peace comes Great Britain and other nations should forthwith hand over their Colonial Empires to be administered by an outside body for the benefit of everyone. But while it would be very fitting that after the war a World Economic Conference should endeavour to secure a sufficiency of raw materials for all nations, it would seem the height of folly to suggest that native populations, without their free consent, should be forcibly placed under the control of some vague international body. The existing empires in Africa are all developing their backward peoples in varied ways, and if those peoples were suddenly transferred to other hands and their problems dealt with in a completely different fashion, it might put back the rate of their progress for many years. It is easy to imagine the intrigues and abuses that would arise under international management, and those races within the British Empire would at any rate bitterly resent the abandonment of our trusteeship in favour of some vague ideal by which they would themselves be the losers. The accessibility of raw materials to the world is not an insuperable problem, and we could certainly co-operate in reasonable schemes for promoting fair distribution without the necessity of withdrawing our guardianship from humble but nevertheless most loyal subjects of the British Empire.

It is easy for the ignorant to decry the work of our empire builders in distant lands and always to ascribe the worst possible motives to the men who, so they say, exploit the native races for filthy lucre; but it is impossible for anyone to confute the evidence of loyalty and affection to British rule displayed by the peoples themselves since the outbreak of war, and we should be quite unworthy of their gratitude if we were to desert them afterwards at the behest of our misguided sentimentalists.

In the above essay I have tried to sketch in brief outline the sort of peace aims which in my view might make for a happier and more ordered Europe. Many of the suggestions put forward will doubtless prove impracticable since no one can tell what turns the war will take, or who will be our friends when the curtain finally falls. At the same time I fear that if, after our ultimate victory, we leave Prussia in control of a unified Germany bordering upon small States with turbulent minorities, the history of these days may be rewritten before the twentieth century is over—with this difference, that next time the aggressor may be strong enough to win.



*The Baroness Ravensdale*

WHERE HAVE WE ALL FAILED that after twenty years' struggle for peace, based on the high hopes of 1919, the world is once more plunged in bitter conflict? Does the explanation perhaps lie in the ineffectual feebleness of our attempts to search out the relationship between politics and spiritual values? The things of God must be related to the things of Cæsar; yet we seldom hear spiritual values mentioned in public utterances, except for emotional appeal; and politics and diplomacy have been as it were kept in a closed compartment away from the breath of truth and spiritual insight by which alone they could truly hope to live and grow. No new world-order after this war, whether Federal System, United States of Europe, or reshaped League of Nations, can evolve if we try to build it from without only. Economic expediency may eventually lead nations to abolish tariffs, to stabilize currency, and to internationalize communications; but self-interest, however enlightened, is neither the surest nor the speediest foundation for lasting co-operation.

Much is heard everywhere of the eradication of Hitlerism, but little is said of the part played by our own errors and faults in causing this colossal tumour in the body politic of Europe. I fear that there is a great tendency to-day to want to wash up everybody else's dishes, with admonitory explanations as to how they got dirty and broken, without first cleaning our own crockery and noting its cracks and chips.

We believe that we are fighting for freedom in its highest sense, and there are many who are prepared to die for their belief, which is a Christlike action—'for greater love hath no man than this'. But there are others amongst those left at home who seem to have but little sense of their own responsi-

bility, both personal and national, in this armageddon. Such people imagine that the defeat of Germany, if it comes about, will leave us safe and sound as before; though they visualize the possibility of a few minor 'hold ups', which they dignify by the name of sacrifices. They will not face that our world for the rest of our lives and the next generation's cannot be the same. To save freedom and liberty will entail bitter sacrifice, and sacrifice that is fundamental will be our daily companion in our home, in our business, in our amusements, and in our comforts. Therefore we must readjust to new conditions, keeping those traditions which were worth saving and fighting for, and scrapping the dross. A new and better national life must evolve, based on new values. But it must not be left to hazard, lest the weeds of material self-interest spring up from without and choke the growth of the inner spirit. Spiritual values transcend all boundaries and form part of the Divine that permeates every moment of man's daily life, if he will but choose to see it. Without an inner order, a renewal of our own faith, a very purging of our own souls, it will be impossible for us to re-form a shattered world, build a federation, avoid a repetition of Versailles, or try to set Germany on her feet. It is our own feet that need reshoeing, and though there are signs that our national conscience is stirring, there are still too many whose chief concern is their own material convenience. They are preoccupied with butter shortage, possible rationing of clothes, and black-out difficulties. They do not pause to ask themselves: 'Have I been one of the atoms that has contributed to this cataclysm? Have I taken for granted the precious heritage of freedom, personal, religious, and political, whereby I can truly call my soul my own?' The smug buttress themselves with the thought: 'All this I have heard before; it is very true and wrong that spiritual values are neglected and that the poor are hungry, but what can I do about it?' And like the rich young ruler of the New Testament they go away sad, temporarily, for they have great possessions. It is just because millions have done nothing about it that we are where we are now; and if we again do nothing about it the flicker of goodwill that might grow into a flame for nobler peace aims may

peter out, and anger and indifference build a new world that will crash again in twenty years.

Is it enough stressed that this is the greatest issue ever fought over—that it transcends all questions of material powers, colonies, minorities, nationalism, and internationalism? None of these words will retain any significance if those who stand, however imperfectly, for spiritual values of freedom are conquered by a Totalitarian power that claims complete control over the souls and bodies of its subjects. Let us face that Christ may go down before Antichrist unless we—every one of us—put on the invulnerable armour of sacrifice, of faith, and of a clear sense of values.

There has been a tendency, now lessening, to be chary of bringing spiritual beliefs into daily life, particularly into public life. The British, even those who hold convictions, tend to pass lightly over them, either because it is 'not done' to reveal serious feelings, or because of a distrust of institutional religion. But you will never get a new world order if you depend only on intellectualism, however brilliant and scintillating. It will be as dry as a bone, unconvincing and barren unless you can inspire it with a breath of idealism, a fire of conviction that can sweep away all difficulties. We must make spiritual values penetrate the new world order, and that means concentrated spiritual effort on the part of every individual.

Have we thought out sufficiently the problem raised by the slowness of action of our treasured democracy, which frequently acts too late, when the die is cast? To some extent delay is inevitable and inherent in a machinery which calls for consultation where a dictator simply orders. But this is not so entirely. Lethargy and a vague trust that we shall 'muddle through somehow' too often blight our actions. We express moral indignation at the behaviour of other countries and shake the governess's umbrella; but we do so uneasily, conscious that, if the delinquent prove too strong, the umbrella might crack and the remnants remain useless in our hands. Would it not be well to try preventive methods against the sinner before attempting to inflict chastisement with an uncertain weapon? This vacillation is a terrible condemnation



of the democracy for which we are fighting and in which we so passionately believe, or rather it is a condemnation of the lethargy and slackness of the individual voter, who holds the winning card in his hand and too often fails to produce it until the game is lost. No new order, nationally or internationally, will emerge from this war through panaceas, short cuts, quack remedies, or disdainful aloofness on the part of those who hold themselves guiltless of the muddle. By these we should betray our God, our democratic heritage and our very selves. Nor must we claim for this or that political peace aim the exclusive blessing of religion, hoping thereby to enlist emotional appeal for our cause. If that cause is not based on fundamental truths, religion must not be introduced as a purely bargaining factor to weigh the scales and justify shirking clear thought on the pros and cons.

Surely we should also attempt to set our own house in order before we preach to Europe, and should endeavour both to set an example and to learn from others. Six millions sterling a day comes from Sir John Simon's rabbit-producing hat for war purposes and we never murmur: six million pounds a day for home reconstruction would cause the fall of the Cabinet within a few hours. What false thinking ! We can produce that sum because our liberty and safety are at stake, but it is not available for improvements and reforms that we all admit to be drastically necessary. It is true that social progress has been steady, but it has been too slow. Other countries have surpassed us in many respects, in some of which we were pioneers. Evacuation has shown up that all is far from well in the education and the housing on which we prided ourselves, and that the self-propaganda dear to authorities, both local and central, bears careful scrutiny no better than commercial advertising. We seldom want to learn a lesson from anyone else, and yet every country has something to teach and to contribute. Sweden's good housing is universally acknowledged; Norway has reduced her infant mortality rate by nearly half since giving her school children the famous Oslo breakfast; Russia is making citizens out of illiterates; Italy's Nursery Schools are her pride. Such examples can be multiplied indefinitely. Germany, who

under Bismarck led the way in social insurance, has under National Socialism introduced the *Kraft durch Freude* movement, youth camps, holidays for mothers, and so on; and Hitler can say with at least general truth: 'We have cleared the slums; we have no verminous heads.' This shames our democracy and gives a handle to those who say, 'A Totalitarian State has succeeded where a Democracy has failed,' and proceed to the false inference that success and failure are inherent in those particular political systems.

The right use of leisure is one of the problems crying out for attention and becoming every moment more pressing as the mechanization of existence increases. More and more people are becoming machine-minders and demanding in their lengthening leisure hours a creative outlet for their brains and hearts and hands. They must have the chance to see, conceive, and create things of beauty, and to mould their own minds and spirits. Individual men and women and voluntary organizations are tackling the question, but the State makes no provision for leisure and has apparently given little serious thought to it. Russia has catered for it in her pleasure parks, with their theatres, cinemas, and entertainments of various grades. There, training of the mind is provided by speeches, lectures, and radio talks, on a propaganda basis. Though we deplore its political bias, such a planned system merits our respect; it is for us to see that a method of training mind and body is evolved in this country on lines of liberty, and that the filling of the all-important leisure hours is not left only to commercial amusement caterers, who gain more from the passive acquiescence of the many than from the active participation of the few. Misspent leisure debases the outlook and warps the vision. In pre-war Germany the educational film, which always accompanied the melodrama, formed a much more essential part of the programme than it does in this country. Could we not here, while avoiding the propaganda bias, work out a system for teaching young and old the why and wherefore of many ordinary things? A carpenter's work, for instance, would be enriched if he knew where the wood he uses comes from, how it was lumbered, floated down swift streams, sawn into planks, sailed across the

seas, and so brought within reach of his able fingers. The specialization inseparable from modern industry makes it all the more vital that the spirit of craftsmanship should be kept alive by making those who work on repetitive detail familiar with the history and nature of the material with which they are dealing.

It is well known that over-drilling by physical or military training tends to stultify the mind and produces robots incapable of clear and independent thinking. The totalitarian States would do well to ponder this scientific fact. The Cardinal of Lyons, when addressing a convocation of young priests at Paray-le-Monial, emphasized their grave responsibility in this matter of leisure, and urged that their flock should be influenced to give some part of it to the things of the spirit. Inner resources are a mainspring of the outer life. The education for solitude has been neglected, and consequently people are bored or frightened by it. There is a wild rush to be in a crowd at the cinema, to be with friends at a dance, to avoid one's own self and the necessity for thought by letting others whirl one along with the tide. Serious thought means taking trouble, facing up to unpleasant issues, and working out one's own philosophy in inner silence. If you cannot be alone, there is little chance of your forming yourself into a capable citizen.

We all know that another armed peace cannot be tolerated, but it is for every individual voter to think out the implications of that knowledge, to make sure what he or she means by such terms as democracy, federation, commonwealth of nations, and to weigh up the sacrifices that must be made for them. It is so easy to repeat catchwords and to indulge in wishful thinking. Almost any panacea will appear plausible and consoling if the costs and difficulties are not considered. Governments will go no faster than the voters who keep them in power. The thought and impetus for a new world order must therefore come from public opinion, lest economic necessity impose irksome fetters on our freedom. Let us remember those who are dying for that freedom, so that no effort and no sacrifice may be too great for us to make for it. It is the crusader's burning conviction that in-

spires the masses, and it is his faith that removes mountains.

Totalitarian countries have understood the extreme importance of a faith: theirs is a faith directed to the worship of the State, which to us nullifies its value as a spiritual force; but the faith is there, and it is alive in countless young people, who are backing it with their lives, and who will, if they live, carry it on. It is the great creed of Totalitarianism that youth is valuable and that rulers should be young and vigorous: that is what gives Nazism its strength and makes it an inspiration as well as a doctrine. There is a fire behind the system, and I deplore that democratic countries like ours cannot kindle their youth with some great vision, seeing the state not as a god and master but as a servant trained to put their ideas into practice.

To call for sacrifice of a life in battle is justified by one thing only—if by death comes resurrection; if the life that is surrendered lives through the reconstruction of a better world. The efforts since 1919 have been so poor and ineffectual, and so many hopes have foundered and not been revived! Must we forever learn our lessons by repeated conflicts that destroy more than they ever build up? Since 1966 we have not been invaded and our portion of suffering has therefore been comparatively less than that of other European countries. Terrible suffering may lead to bitter revenge, but had we suffered more we might have been richer in understanding of the difficulties of others. Even now attack might bring us to our senses and make us realize from the highest and not the lowest motives that international strife must cease for ever. We may protect the weak against the strong by a terrible loss of our young manhood; but the guilt of those at home who have the vote in their hands is fearful if they do not put their shoulder to the wheel and give of their utmost, now and after the conflict has ceased, to create a better world.

We seem to be at the cross-roads and must choose our path, for religion may die out for ever unless we choose to serve the world by it. Our faith is now centred on the visible and on the mechanical, and spiritual forces seem to be at a low ebb. But the visible must be backed by an inner sense of citizenship by

our common heritage as children of God and citizens of His kingdom. Our beliefs are coming to mean less and less to us; and as we hold them less sacred we make less effort to carry them into practice. This deterioration of attitude towards the sanctity of beliefs may be one of the causes of the present decline. Our daily lives and institutions seem no longer to coincide with our beliefs, which in its turn weakens the beliefs and may cause their ultimate disappearance.

The last fifty years have witnessed a vast and encouraging improvement in the standard of living of the people; but in the rush to grow rich and comfortable spiritual standards have weakened and mercenary interests prevailed. The business men of England and other countries to gain fat profits sold to Germany before the war metals and chemicals that she is now using in armaments against us. The outlook is serious if nations have a double standard of morality, one for home consumption and another for export. Do we consider that high moral standards apply within our own nation only and that the criterion of conduct towards our neighbours is its effect on our own safety and interests; in other words that we can rob and ruin for our own advancement where it is safe to do so? This perpetual clash of interests was one of the failures of the League system, for every gain reported by a Government to its people was likely to have been made at the expense of other governments and peoples. Is our great democracy, based on Christian standards, failing because we have been such poor expounders of a great principle? Has Christian liberty and the happiness of the individual been allowed to continue as long as it was an harmonious and quiescent element in the working out of our democratic system? We have for centuries been privileged to be looked on as defenders of the weak and to hold the torch of protection to weaker countries; and that right and responsibility was accorded us because we upheld Christian principles. Our errors are many, but we have been given a high heritage on which we have, I think, the right to pride ourselves, but the inner order must not fail or the whole organism will die of moral starvation. Freedom and liberty will lose their validity if intense nationalism and sovereign rights become the main

props of foreign policy. Aggressive nationalism was the evil genius of the League of Nations, born in the cradle of such high hopes; and aggressive nationalism will doom again any peace plan from whose christening its specious gifts are not excluded. There seems to me to be a great distinction between aggressive nationalism, by which states seek wealth and aggrandisement at the expense of others, and that internal nationalism which treasures traditions and customs and sets store by its cultural individuality. The one is a canker gnawing at the vitals of Europe, the other a bud which in full flower adds variety and beauty to a world that suffers from drab standardization. When the canker prevails, all the flowers wither and our Christian order must once again admit defeat.

Many people feel that it is too early to discuss peace aims or a possible new world order. 'Let us get on with the war,' they say, 'and finish that before we consider peace and reforms.' And they often add: 'In any case who knows what the situation will be after the war?' They are, I think, wrong; for every new effort needs tending and watching like a plant which must not be withered by the blast of abuse before it has had time to show what blossom it will produce. Moreover, if we wait until men and nations are weary and embittered, what sort of plan can we hope to establish? And should peace come sooner than we dare hope, are we ready for it? Or shall we, lacking foundations, perforce erect a makeshift improvisation—and then for twenty years complain that we have missed another opportunity? In 1851 the Prince Consort spoke of progress that he deemed inevitable—a Parliament of Men, a Federation of the World. Was such a prediction naïve and pathetic, or was it a vision of something that one day may become a reality? The League of Nations was a noble attempt. Why should not a new system emerge, profiting by the League's experience, avoiding its mistakes and faults, co-operating with the good that has survived and yet evolving on individual lines adapted to a changed world. Where is the evidence of those noble words 'Glory to man in the highest, for he is the master of things'? The powers of evil are formidable. Sin, self-interest, greed

and ambition are constantly holding up social reform. And if we are not stirred to social responsibility towards things close at hand, how can we hope to extend it across the Channel?

Science has put into our hands gifts that can be used for good or evil. Milk that nourishes our babies can be used for glycerine essential in bombs; the aeroplanes that carry medical supplies to distant outposts carry poison gas to defenceless cities. Something is wrong: some application of Christian thinking is out of date and evil has been allowed to get uppermost. Yet the social progress that has been accomplished shows that the human race does not lack heart and a sense of its common humanity. Christ was quite clear-sighted about human sin, and the Gospels show plainly that then as now moral evil was an inescapable fact. The cloaking of sins and the search for scapegoats are not purely modern habits. Christ has given us once for all the greatest precepts for applying spiritual values to daily and public existence. How pitiful if thousands have again to die, dazedly obeying Government orders, mutely wondering at the why and wherefore, unless from this Gethsemane the Christ be lifted up, unless evil be torn from its stronghold and a new era initiated. Whether the new era take the form of a federation or a commonwealth of nations, it must be based on sacrifice of sin, pride, and self-assertion, and on an inner conviction that God's children must be given a chance to live gloriously instead of groping in a slough of despond. Leaders must guide us; but they must trust the people and by that trust develop their judgment and sense of responsibility. And the people must think for themselves, must consider facts objectively, must be conscious of the significance and implications of democracy. For if they will not think for themselves they will deserve to have a Dictator to do their thinking for them. We must also overhaul our religious beliefs. To many people religion has become identified with the churches and the churches with conventional institutionalism. But if we feel that religion has failed us in this conflict, it is for us to go out on our own for a better order. We have worked too long under the wrong control, and we have allowed materialism to hold the wheel.

The difficulties inherent in a new world order must not be shirked. Politicians can promise panaceas, prophets can fire enthusiasms, economists can formulate reforms; but hopes that a recognition of the rights of man will or can possibly descend like dew from Heaven after an armistice are mere dope for the public. It may take years of faith, idealism and hard work to set up a federation. That is all the more reason why we should begin to prepare for it now, studying problems and possibilities and facing up to the sacrifices involved. Preparation we must have. Christ Himself took thirty years to prepare for a ministry of three short years. I want to consider federation on its widest basis of international co-operation, disregarding for the moment its technical aspects, which cannot at present be formulated; and I want to be very sure that it conforms to Christian standards. If it does, then it must be expounded simply and sincerely so that the ordinary Englishman, and not the politician and the economist only, can learn of a new world for which to work, vote, and pray. Nor is it any use to work out a plan from the purely British angle only; we must sound and consult the Dominions who are bound to us by such close ties of blood and tradition, and France, the ally with whom such an excellent nucleus of federation has already been formed. The present economic, military, and political union with France is a good omen for the future and must be maintained as one of the foundations of the new order. In 1919, when the danger from the common enemy was removed, the limited measure of co-operation that had been achieved between the Allies was immediately relaxed. This time the union has been infinitely closer and must be infinitely more durable. Seeing the success of the Anglo-French experiment, other blocs of countries might be encouraged to federate, some soon, some later, according to their outlook and training. It is easy to say glibly that Germany and the U.S.S.R. must be included from the start in a federation; but I feel that there must be some standard of liberty and Christian principles demanded from the countries participating and that, lest the success of the whole be jeopardized, the Nazi and Bolshevist states must be excluded for a time from a share in rebuilding a



fabric that they have used every weapon of Antichrist to destroy.

We must be ready to offer constructive peace proposals and not leave the initiative for further suggestions to Germany. Our Government missed an opportunity in December 1939, when they failed to counter Hitler's preposterous peace terms by concrete alternatives acceptable to the Allies. We might, for instance, have stipulated the return of Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, and possibly Austria as an essential. Even the partial acceptance of our proposals would have provided a basis for discussion; their refusal would have clarified the issue. And whatever the outcome, such a policy would have cleared our conscience, justified us in the eyes of the neutrals, and been a proof of our sincerity that might carry weight with thinking Germans, if not now, then at least later when the day of settlement approaches.

Personally, I feel that a distinction must be drawn between war and peace aims, and that only a decisive defeat of Germany can bring about conditions in which a lasting peace can be built. Either there must be an overwhelming defeat of Germany's armed forces or invasion of her territory, otherwise later the German people, embittered but not crushed, will rally round a leader who makes them believe that Germany was never fairly beaten, that she was stabbed in the back by disloyal elements at home, or that she was starved into submission by a cruel enemy waging war on women and children. At the moment, though there may be grumbling, the German people are still behind Hitler, whom they consider their saviour, and only military defeat will disillusion them. 'Chamberlain wanted the war. England has long hated Germany and her blockade is aimed at starving our children.—Stand by Hitler and he will win the war.' Such examples of German propaganda displayed in stations and restaurants show the type of poison with which we shall have to contend in the German mind after the war. Violent nationalism, which has smouldered in the German mentality since the time of Bismarck, has flamed up through Hitler's propaganda and only crushing defeat can be expected to extinguish it. In 1919 we shilly-shallied between the policy of

stern repression advocated by the French and our own easy-going tolerance; we did not march to Berlin, but we permitted the settlement of the Ruhr with Moroccan troops, and later we allowed Germany to enter the League, but we humiliated her representatives. The result was the fall of the Weimar Republic and the advent of Hitler. France's outlook, understandable after the loss and destruction that she has suffered from her neighbour, has always been that Germany must ultimately be beaten to her knees, broken up into small states, her territory possibly mandated, and the will of the Allies enforced by a colossal army of occupation.

My view is that, once crushed, Germany must be reinstated, and that French policy might only breed a new Hitler, a prophet calling on a suppressed people to unite in throwing off the foreign yoke. Perhaps it will be possible, as Mr. Chamberlain has suggested, to bring the neutrals into the peace discussions, so that the onus of dictating terms does not fall on France and England alone. It is true that some neutrals have kept out, leaving the others to fight the cause of democracy which is as much theirs as ours, and that having avoided the brunt of conflict they cannot claim any right to interfere in the settlement. Nevertheless their detached collaboration would be of immense value and indeed essential if federation on any extensive scale were envisaged. The Archbishop of York has made the valuable suggestion that the permanent settlement, to be reached through allied and neutral conference, should be postponed until passions have cooled. This, as he has himself says, goes little beyond the statements of Mr Chamberlain and Lord Halifax and should therefore be acceptable to the British Government at any rate. It would calm public opinion here and in neutral countries and also would give confidence to our own youth.

Many solutions have been put forward for the stabilization of Europe, such as the revival of a great Central European Catholic bloc on the lines of the Christian Holy Roman Empire that replaced the secular domination of Rome. Such a combination of spiritual and temporal forces might be a strong bastion against Prussianism tainted by Bolshevism. Let us explore every avenue with an open mind, realizing the

need for sacrifice and facing up to uncomfortable issues. Let us avoid confusing stability and the *status quo*. For instance, the vile manner of the Russian invasion of Poland raises righteous indignation, but it must not blind us to the fact that the territory reappropriated was before 1919 nearly 100 per cent Russian in population and tradition. At the time of the Versailles Treaty many people had doubts as to the wisdom of establishing Polish domination over districts so obviously Russian, but zeal for sovereign rights, and still more terror of Bolshevism, led the Powers to overrule their own doubts. The end of Hitlerism does not necessarily mean the immediate dawn of a new day. Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, Austria, and the rest cannot be patched up like broken toys. Lack of co-operation has brought this war on us, lack of harmony between States, between elements within the nations, between individuals, and between the conflicting forces in every human being. Since the roots of the evil dig right down into individual personality, it is there that we must tackle it and dedicate ourselves with thought and work and sacrifice to making this war an opportunity and the new order that we visualize a reality.

Pessimists argue that the difficulties of economic reorganization are almost insuperable and that the world will require at least a generation to recover from the economic dislocation of this war. As an answer to the first objection let them consider how the whole food supply of this country has been reorganized in a few weeks under pressure of necessity in a way that would have previously been thought impossible. If expediency can achieve such results, what cannot good will accomplish? As for the economic dislocation arising from war, statistics show that after the last war there was redistribution of wealth but that the normal steady increase in the general standard of living persisted, even in defeated Germany. Air attack would of course lead to the destruction of some of the means of production, factories, power stations, railways, and so on. But such objectives are small compared with the total area of the country and are therefore unlikely to be damaged to any crippling extent. True the last war left us a grim legacy of unemployment, but economists are

divided as to whether this is a necessary outcome of war. In any case, other countries attacked and solved this problem on the lines of home reconstruction, an example that we might well follow.

There are hundreds of thousands to-day who care passionately about the building of the New Jerusalem and feel that it can only come through a quickening of the Spirit. They seek for a lead, but Governments are afraid, and Churches hide-bound and disunited. The failure of the Churches to rise to the people's need has been one of the great tragedies of this tragic time. We ask for bread and are given a stone. We are given arid services, theological jargon, preoccupation with dogma and ritual, when what we ask is a fire of conviction in the Christ who can save the world and His guidance in the right ordering of our daily lives. Jesus said, 'Love thy neighbour as thyself'—yet His professed followers refuse their church to another denomination, which, through evacuation difficulties, has nowhere to hold its service. Our Lord would have been stunned by such a result of His teaching, which was originally so vital, generous, and free from restricting conventions. The beauty of priceless pearls has been concealed by a setting that is too often dreary and second-rate. But it is of no use for us to blame the Church and relapse into apathy any more than it is of use to lay on the shoulders of the Government alone the guilt for the evils revealed by evacuation. Every single one of us is to blame, and on every single one lies responsibility for uniting in great spiritual dedication to reshape a better world. Otherwise we shall stand convicted before the throne of God of the greatest betrayal in history since that of the Founder of our Faith nearly 2,000 years ago.



*The Earl of Rosse*

MEN OF DIFFERENT RACE AND TONGUE have existed throughout the world since the dawn of history. Their differences have led to disputes and to wars on countless occasions, and yet never until recent times have these struggles between rival nationalisms reached such proportions as to constitute a problem which can truly be said to threaten the continued existence of civilization as we know it. Let us examine how the natural and laudable pride and love that all human beings feel for their own countries should have been instrumental in giving rise to the major political evil of modern times.

From the period of the break-up of the Roman Empire until the eighteenth century means of communication throughout Europe were rudimentary. Contact between places even in the same province was often severely limited, and rivalry was felt between neighbouring towns and districts, rather than between countries. The ordinary man and woman had no means of forming an opinion on the men and women of other countries; therefore, while being proud of their own country, they did not necessarily feel superior to foreigners, who were beyond their horizon. Only members of the limited class who had the monopoly of power and education were in the position to judge of foreign peoples, and they were the sole arbiters of any disputes or wars which took place between nations. The eighteenth century was a period during which the evil inflicted by wars was strictly limited, because the rulers remembered the terrible devastations wrought by the religious wars of the last two centuries, and were wise enough to realize for the most part that, once passion is allowed to enter a struggle, the damage ensuing

becomes uncontrollable and therefore limitless. They were sufficiently enlightened to understand that it does not pay to devastate a country or to cause unnecessary suffering to the civilian population in that such actions are bound some day to recoil on the heads of those responsible. For the same reason they considered it better policy to aim in war at some limited objective which might be attained with moderate ease, rather than to set themselves some tremendous task, which would call forth the utmost limit of resistance from the enemy, and so produce a war to the death which would probably ruin both combatants.

An interesting example of this restraint can be found in the manner in which France allowed a defeated England to retain Canada without question under the Peace Treaty of 1783, although she had lost it to her only twenty years earlier. France considered that by successfully aiding the American colonies to achieve independence she had tipped the balance of power sufficiently in her own favour. In addition England had shown political wisdom during the twenty years of her rule in keeping her word to the Canadians by allowing them complete liberty in matters of local government and religion. In consequence the Canadians were contented and offered the French no moral cause for which to fight. It must meanwhile be admitted that these eighteenth-century rulers acted but rarely, in point of fact, from strictly moral or humanitarian reasons. The same English Government that was willing to grant religious toleration to the Canadians acted in a very different manner towards the Irish, because they thought that toleration would be good policy in the one case and bad in the other; the question of toleration, religious or otherwise, as a virtue in itself concerned them but little. Consequently we find the strange paradox arising that, just at the period when war was waged most cynically, and often for merely personal reasons, its effect on mankind in general was most mitigated; its conduct developed into a convention, governed by strict rules, which were kept by both sides because they knew that their opponents could just as easily break them. Only the actual personnel of the fighting forces was allowed to be affected

directly; it was usually possible for civilians to travel, or even to reside, in an enemy country in complete freedom during a war, and the general outcry when Napoleon interned all enemy civilians proves how contrary to the accepted rules of war this action was considered by contemporary opinion.

One would have imagined that, having progressed so far in mitigating the horrors of war, men might have been expected to grow to realize that this mitigation was an object worth striving for in itself, rather than a means of promoting their own selfish ends. Instead of that, however, struggles between nations have taken on an increasingly bitter form, until now they bring untold misery to the whole populations concerned, and are proving a very real danger to the structure of our society. What were the reasons for this unexpected development?

These reasons may be discovered in the effects of the great forces of democracy and industrialization, both of which began to exert their full influence towards the close of the eighteenth century. Although the idea of democracy was taken from ancient Greece, in practice the privileges in a community whose economy was founded on slavery had always been limited to an oligarchy, and it was left to us to attempt to carry the theory through to its logical conclusion; industrialization is a concept entirely peculiar to Western civilization. It is a strange fact that these forces, which should have proved immense powers for good in the world, the one on the moral and the other on the material plane, should instead have resulted in the twin evils of political and economic nationalism.

If we admit, as we must, that we owe the essence of our Christian religion to the spiritual genius of the Near East, we may probably term democracy the highest conception of Western civilization; it postulates equal freedom and rights for all men, and envisages a brotherhood of all mankind in universal fraternity. Nothing in such an object need necessarily conflict with the principles of the Christian or any other of the great religions of the world, and it would appear to be a fully worthy goal for our endeavours. But we have failed signally in the achievement of it. The all-important fact that



this brotherhood must essentially be universal has been forgotten and ignored, and each group of mankind has been too prone to consider that more liberty and more rights were due to itself than to other groups. This arose largely because the ideas of democracy were resisted in most countries until too late, and it is a well-known fact that all inevitable changes become the more violent in their incidence and in their results the longer they are delayed.

In England democracy was allowed to come gently and gradually, largely through the instinctive genius for compromise of the English people. Even when this slow progress towards democratic government was not entirely peaceful, such as in the Civil War or in the Revolution of 1688, the passions of the vast majority of the people were never seriously aroused; dislocation of normal life even at home was limited, and the effect abroad negligible. Matters had proceeded very differently, however, and had produced quite another state of affairs in most European countries when the French Revolution broke out in 1789, a century after the principle of constitutional government had finally been accepted in England. The same rulers, who had shown political sagacity in setting a limit to the evils of war, had not sufficient insight to realize the advisability, even in their own interests, of giving up willingly some portion of their absolute powers in answer to popular demand. The continued suppression of this demand could only result in a violent explosion, which happened to occur in France; by this time passions had been so aroused that class-feeling was intense, and culminated in the murder of large numbers of the ruling classes and in the emigration of most of the remainder. Before long, as a result, a democratic and republican France found herself faced by an array of autocratic governments more determined than ever to resist any assault on their powers in view of the example set by the French revolutionaries. Meanwhile these latter had associated the Church, as one of the established institutions, with their enemies, and had enthroned the State as the embodiment of the supreme authority and the fountain of life and power which man should worship. The fact that they worshipped their State as

a deity induced Frenchmen to view themselves as superior beings, having prior rights to those of citizens of other States, and the war which they started with the intention of bringing freedom and equality to all mankind soon turned into one of frankly imperialistic motives; in addition, their false god gave them a new moral purpose for which to fight and indeed to give their lives if necessary, so that the deepest passions of which man is capable were involved and the issues of war became once more unlimited. Passions of such intensity call forth a similar response from opponents, and the infection, once started, spread rapidly, until now the peoples of most countries of the world are implicated to a greater or lesser extent in the worship of the National State, even though not realizing for the most part the appalling heresy into which they have fallen. Of all the countries of Western Europe, Germany has carried this heresy to the greatest lengths, as a result of her political and cultural immaturity.

Industrialization also has immense potentialities for the good of mankind in that, by enabling the systematic exploitation of all the resources of the world in the most economical manner for the benefit of humanity, it could bring to us unexampled prosperity. Western civilization has always shone particularly in the practical and scientific fields, and its achievements in this direction have enabled it to perform a feat never before accomplished—the linking together of the whole world as a single and indivisible unit as regards the external conditions of life. England was far in the vanguard of industrial progress, partly because the pioneers of science were mostly Englishmen, partly because of her geographical position and consequent sea-power, and also partly because, at the time when the Industrial Revolution began to gather momentum during the eighteenth century, she formed the largest free-trade area in Europe, other larger countries such as France being hedged with tariff barriers between neighbouring provinces and even towns. It paid her to open up her whole Empire to world trade, and this in its turn also brought a great increase in prosperity to other countries. With her long lead, she soon established pre-eminence as an economic Power, and gradually an unofficial economic and

financial world-order came into being under British leadership; and for so long as this leadership was allowed to remain with her, the effect of industrialization was largely beneficent and the standard of living tended to improve throughout the world.

But it was not long before other countries began to ask themselves why England should be allowed to take for herself the lion's share of the wealth to be obtained through industrialization. They took the field in competition with her, but she was so firmly established in the lead that these new rivals had to impose tariffs to protect their nascent industries. Gradually the number of competing Powers grew, and consequently the number of tariff barriers, involving necessarily a shrinking of markets and diminution of world-trade; members of the British Empire found themselves compelled to follow suit in self-defence, and finally England herself, after a long struggle, gave way and adopted a Protectionist policy in 1932. Thus we find that industrialization has only served to lead us to the dead-end of economic nationalism. The enthusiastic Free Traders of the early nineteenth century, who hoped confidently that the prosperity resulting from an economic world-order would lead the world gradually but inevitably to political unity, seem to have taken the fruits to be obtained from industrialization as a free gift from Heaven. They do not appear ever to have thought that some effort might be necessary on the part of mankind in order to deserve these fruits, and even the economic order was allowed to form itself in a haphazard way and was never constituted on a sound international basis. In addition they did not reckon with the failings of human nature, as this should have enabled them to foresee that in the absence of economic and political unity, as the wealth available in the world increased, the fights between rival countries for what they considered their rightful share of this wealth would become ever bitterer; for mankind, being by nature conservative, does not yet seem to have understood sufficiently that, in a world as interdependent economically as is ours of to-day, any damage inflicted on another country recoils inevitably to some extent on the

deliverer of the blow. Of no country is this so true as it is of England, which is scarcely self-supporting in anything and whose whole prosperity has been built up entirely on the basis of world-trade, so that she depends upon it for her very existence. Since, therefore, she was for so long the unchallenged leader in the economic field, she must take her full share of the blame for not realizing in time that world-trade is necessarily dependent upon world-peace, and for not having long ago assumed the lead equally in expressing her willingness to take constructive steps, together with making any sacrifices that might be necessary on her part, with a view to ensuring the latter.

It has seemed desirable to dwell at some length on the causes which have led to the present state of the world, as it is never possible to propose remedies for defects whose origin and nature are not fully understood. The conclusion reached is that the forces of democracy and industrialization are so powerful and world-wide in their implications and results that they cannot work for the good of mankind in the narrow borders of competing national States. The only field of operations in which their beneficent influence can fully radiate is that of the whole world, while in any more limited field this influence not only ceases to be beneficent but becomes positively harmful. Therefore, unless we are to sacrifice democracy and industrialization, together with all that they imply, which at this stage of our development is scarcely possible even if it were desirable, it follows that we must somehow establish a political and economic order embracing the whole world.

There are more ways than one in which such a world-order could be set up. It could, for instance, be embodied in a world-empire, controlled by one all-powerful nation; but such an empire could never be founded except by force. England was not permitted, as has been shown, to be pre-eminent in the economic field for long, even though her power was unofficial and she did not often attempt to use it for political ends; any country which attempted to obtain economic together with political control of the world would undoubtedly have to fight a series of devastating wars in

order to assert its right to domination. In the event of such an empire coming into being, the wealth of the world would almost certainly be employed for the benefit of the citizens of the ruling nation; rather than for that of all mankind. Also, being founded on force, it would have to be kept down by force, which would mean the minimum of local self-government and the denial of equal rights and liberties to the vast majority of men. Finally, not being established on the willing consent of the peoples embodied, it could have no guarantee of permanence, in that discontent would always persist and render it liable to be overthrown by just that force which brought it into being.

A second form such a world-order could take is that of a League of Sovereign States, and is typified by the League of Nations. A great deal of condemnation has been poured of recent years upon the League and the Treaty of Versailles which gave it birth, and it does great credit to the subtle powers of German propaganda that so many English people have genuinely become convinced that this Treaty was one of the cruellest and most unjust in history. If the evidence is examined carefully this will be found very far from being the case, and it might incidentally prove salutary to some of its critics to compare with it the immeasurably harsher treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, forced on Russia and Rumania respectively by a victorious Germany. The fact that the Treaty of Versailles was less harsh would not of course necessarily make it a good and just treaty, but actually the evidence tends to show that the Allies acted less revengefully, and on the whole with better if to some extent misguided motives, than have most victorious powers in history after a long and bitter war. A smaller number of people were placed under alien rule by this settlement than had probably ever before been the case in Europe; and, although it is certainly possible to criticize some of the frontiers then fixed, it should have been perfectly practicable to make such revisions as might have proved necessary at a later date by peaceful means. To a certain extent the hands of the negotiators were tied by secret promises made by the Allied Governments in return for assistance in carrying on the

war, a practice which it may sincerely be hoped will be avoided this time. Such promises may prove impossible to carry out fully when the time arrives, as happened with regard to certain of the advantages which Italy confidently expected to secure; they may not be compatible with justice, as were the new frontiers of Hungary; again, they may sometimes not even be compatible with each other, as was notoriously the case with those made both to Arabs and Jews regarding Palestine. Another questionable feature of the Treaty of Versailles was the exaction of large war reparations from Germany, though less because of its harshness than because of its short-sightedness. It has already been stressed that, under modern conditions, no financial or economic blow can be delivered which will not bring repercussions; the effort to pay the reparations resulted in the bankruptcy of Germany, and the Allies were forced in their own interests to provide her with loans, on most of which she subsequently defaulted. The fact that she failed to repay a considerably larger sum than was ever extorted from her in the form of reparations has not prevented the German Government from continually denouncing the wickedness of the extortion, so that a great number of people even in this country now firmly believe in it; we are the losers in both respects, while a perfectly genuine, though unfounded, resentment is still felt by most Germans.

It is not intended to discuss here in detail what terms should be imposed on our opponents when, and if, victory is ours. The above mistakes, which were made during and at the end of the last war, are quoted merely to show that they must be avoided for fear of once more prejudicing the chances of a final settlement. The greatest mistake of all, however, lay in attaching the formation of the League of Nations, the body which was supposed to guarantee the future peace of the world, to the Peace Treaty which was forced by the victorious upon the vanquished Powers; it entailed that the League was psychologically compromised as regards these latter from the start, and the fact that the settlement was accepted by the German Government of the day is immaterial, since no alternative was open to it. This time the final

settlement must be kept entirely separate from the Peace Treaty, regarding which suffice it to say that Germany, having once more proved herself immature and irresponsible, must give under it solid guarantees that she will in the future abide strictly by the Rule of Law as opposed to the Rule of Force as the principle governing the relations between nations. What form the guarantees can take must necessarily depend on the course of the war and the general condition of affairs when it is over, and does not concern us now; but after the treaty between the belligerents is signed, some time must be allowed for passions to subside before a conference is called to consider measures of general reconstruction. Representatives of all nations, belligerents of both sides and neutrals also, should attend this conference, and there must be no question of any nation being excluded, as Germany was for many years excluded from the League, from participating in the necessary reconstruction and in the establishment of a new world-order, which should be the ultimate concern of the conference.

Other mistakes and accidents could be instanced, such as the refusal of the people of the United States to endorse President Wilson's promise of adherence, which all contributed to the failure of the League in practice as an instrument for ensuring peace, but the fact that it failed is not a sufficient reason in itself for condemning the conception. The manner in which it was almost uniformly successful in dealing with disputes between smaller Powers, such as the exchange of minorities between Greece and Turkey, or the issue of Greenland as between Norway and Denmark, while it was as invariably unsuccessful when the interests of a Great Power were involved, points towards the main fundamental reason why it must in any case eventually have failed. The League did not have the power, either moral or material, to enforce any decision it might make. While smaller countries might not feel strong enough to resist the pressure of majority opinion, a Great Power did feel that it could safely refuse to accept any decision that might be taken against it; again, questions of prestige were not matters of prime importance to smaller Powers, whereas the question of

its dignity as a sovereign State was considered an essential condition by a Great Power of its very classification as such. To accept a verdict given even partly by smaller States which it looked upon as inferior would be tantamount to relegating itself to their own secondary position, and therefore it reserved the sole right to judge on questions affecting its own vital interests. Had all the other members of the League been willing to take concerted action against such a Power, the system might probably have worked; but in fact sovereign national governments never have been, and never will be, willing to take action involving any sacrifice over an issue in which they do not consider their own interests to be involved. The refusal of the British Government to take any action over Japanese aggression in Manchuria in 1931, thinking, as it turned out quite wrongly, that their vital interests would not be affected, is a case in point; incidentally, it not only forced the smaller countries to the view that Britain and France only used the League to further their own interests, but it also did more than any other action, except the repudiation of the war debt, to harm British prestige in the United States, who were on this occasion more far-sighted than we. On the other hand, that country is in no better a position to adopt a superior attitude, since it has always attempted to evade its responsibilities towards the world at large, and only consented to adhere to the International Court of Justice in 1926 on condition that the Court should not, without its express consent, give an opinion on any question in which it even claimed an interest.

Actually, however, it would be far from easy for any national Government, even if it felt so disposed, to act otherwise without forfeiting the confidence of the people it represented. It is scarcely possible to see how the difficulty can be surmounted except by a mutual agreement on the part of the various national States to set up an international authority on a federal basis, that is by delegating to this authority certain of its own sovereign powers. This, then, is the third form of world-order which could be brought into being, and the only one which, once established, could undoubtedly function satisfactorily and permanently.



The federal system implies the separation of the purely local, or national interests, from those which are the common concern of all; the setting up of a Federal, or International, Government to deal with the latter interests, while the former remain the concern of the various national governments. Both governments have the right to raise taxes, and to make laws, to govern their own affairs. The Federal Government has no right to interfere with regard to the local matters, but it must have sole, complete, and compelling authority with regard to international affairs. Obvious fields which should properly be its concern are those of foreign policy, control of the defence forces and of armaments manufacture, tariffs, monetary policy, and colonial possessions, consisting of those countries whose inhabitants are not yet sufficiently advanced politically and culturally to enable them to be self-governing; it may be remarked in passing that the Mandate system has proved one of the major successes of the League of Nations organization. Although there is wide scope for disagreement as to how far-reaching the powers delegated need be, the essential minimum must always be kept in mind—that the Federal Government must have the supreme control of the defence forces, and powers to raise its own taxes direct from the people, so that in neither case can it ever be made subservient to any one national State.

A natural reluctance is felt by people of all nations at the prospect of giving up any portion of their own national sovereignty; but is not this feeling largely sentimental and artificial? Is it not due to being brought up in an age of excessive nationalism? Of all European countries to-day, Germany and Italy are probably the most extremely nationalist-minded, and yet it is not so long since, for instance, an inhabitant of Munich considered himself a Bavarian rather than a German, or an inhabitant of Palermo a Sicilian rather than an Italian. Their descendants see nothing incompatible in a feeling of pride as members of both the smaller and the larger units, and is it therefore not possible for an inhabitant of a modern national State to feel a pride and a sense of responsibility as a citizen of a world community while at the same time retaining a proper patriotism for his own country?

It must be emphasized that, while exercising absolute power in respect of matters of common interest, the Federal Government would have no right to interfere with the local affairs of its component States, each national community retaining the sole right to determine its own internal form of government and to take care of its own social and cultural life. It is very necessary to distinguish between the right and the wrong forms of nationalism, and a proper pride in one's own race and its traditions is something greatly to be encouraged; a world entirely standardized in customs, habits, and language would be infinitely the poorer, but the right to preserve these in their infinite variety would be guaranteed by the Federal Government. To-day, under the rule of the wrong form of nationalism, which demands, when powerful enough, political and economic domination over others, the weaker communities are too often assimilated by the stronger. This right to attempt to impose our will on another nation against theirs is the only form of nationalism that we should have to renounce under a federal system, and the loss of this right is scarcely one which we ought to deplore.

On the other hand, there must be no possibility of interference by any of the various national governments with the international matters which are the proper concern of the Federal Government. There can be no compromise over the irrevocability of the surrender to it of whatever sovereign rights may be deemed necessary. It has been suggested that the failure of the League of Nations was really due to the fact that every important action taken by it depended upon the ratification of the States concerned, who reserved the absolute right of final decision for themselves. Not only must a Federal Government have the power to enforce any decisions which it may make, but the delegates to a Federal Assembly must be, not nominees of the national governments as were those to the League Assembly, but representatives elected freely by the people of the component countries. By this it is not meant that they must necessarily be elected by the direct regional system in vogue in the democracies. Our democratic system appears to us undoubtedly the best of all forms of government, but many other races, whom we can scarcely call necessarily

inferior, are neither by tradition nor by temperament suited to it; to attempt to dictate to these peoples the exact form their internal governments should take would naturally cause resentment in them, and lay ourselves open to criticism on the grounds of that hypocritical piety of which we have so often, and not always unjustly, been accused in the past. It might, for instance, prove possible to make use of a corporative system such as is employed in modern Italy, or even indirect elections might under certain conditions be permitted. It must indeed be insisted upon that no pressure even of an indirect nature might be exerted by a national Government, and that the voting must be genuinely free, and not merely nominally so, as in present-day Russia; but provided that these conditions be observed, as wide a scope for divergence as is practicable should be allowed in the method of election. It ought to be made possible for all countries fit for self-government and willing to surrender the necessary portion of their sovereignty to enter the Federal Union without having to adopt political forms uncongenial to them for their own internal use.

It may be argued that by attempting to include all nations in the world responsible enough for self-government in a federation rather than by starting with two or three, an already sufficiently difficult task is being turned into an impossibility. It is perfectly true that a world-federation could not possibly be established all at once, and that a start would have to be made with a group, or groups, of a few nations only. Some groups approximate more nearly than do others to conditions suitable for federation, either for geographical reasons, or because of political or economic ties, or because of a common cultural background. Examples of such groups are the countries of Europe, excluding Russia, those of North and South America, the Moslem bloc of the Near East, and the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. But at all costs the possibility of a line-up of exclusive federations must be avoided; the very closeness of the relationship of the countries composing them would give rise to rival ideologies, and disputes between them would lead to war more limitless in scale than ever. Apart from this general danger, specific

difficulties would arise at the very outset. To take only the instance which most intimately concerns ourselves, it is very doubtful whether all the countries comprising the British Commonwealth would be willing to support Britain on the issue of joining a federation necessarily limited to Europe, and any British Government which made such a proposal, carrying with it the serious danger of a rift in the Empire, would surely forfeit the confidence of the electorate; the same objections would apply to Canada joining a limited Pan-American Federation. Apart from our personal distaste for any action that might lead to its disintegration, it would actually be highly undesirable from the general point of view, in that its wide distribution throughout all five continents renders the British Empire potentially the most valuable world co-ordinating influence that exists. If these proposed separate federations were so constituted as to be not necessarily exclusive, and any one country could belong to two or more, the objections would largely disappear; and this influence could serve as a link to draw them increasingly closer together. The connection between England and Canada would act in this manner as between the European and Pan-American Federations, while our special treaty relations with Egypt and Iraq might be very helpful with regard to a Near-Eastern Federation. Turkey could, indeed, also play a valuable part as a link between this latter and a European Federation, and many other instances could be given; but the rôle of the British Empire in this respect could, and should, be by far the most important. In this way the relations between the various federations would tend to grow ever more intimate, until finally they became merged in a World Federation.

The contention will be made that such a solution of the world's problems is merely utopian; that the success of the system would depend entirely on the willingness of the mass of individual men and women to help to make it work and that the great change in their outlook which would be necessary to make them embrace the new ideas involved is more than it is reasonable to hope for. Undoubtedly many of us would have to sacrifice some of our most deeply-seated pre-

judices, but is not this sacrifice long overdue? We have accepted the technical and economic advances due to industrialization, together with the immense improvement that they have effected in our material existence, without attempting to improve ourselves on the moral plane so as to be worthy of them. It will be necessary to apply the principles of morality more strictly to our economic and political life if we are to deserve the full benefits of the abundance of the world's wealth which industrialisation has enabled us to exploit; for although modern inventions have indeed given us greater abundance and power than ever before, these have brought with them interdependence, and the ensuing multiplication of contacts has enlarged the scale of political life to embrace the whole world. When we talk of freedom and rights, we must really mean the freedom and rights of all mankind, and not only those of our own group. We must no longer be content to pay mere lip-service to democracy, without being willing to accept its ultimate implications, since this error has been responsible for the birth of the heresy of the worship of the national State. The present German and Russian régimes are no more than manifestations of this heresy carried to its farthest lengths, their extreme nature being due to the immaturity of their peoples; and the successful establishment of them is due solely to our having failed to set the example of living up to the principles which we advocate. Their methods of government show the depths to which mankind is capable of sinking all too quickly through power being misused to impose a system founded on force and slavery, when once we cease to apply moral standards to the use of it. If each country persists in pursuing its own self-centred policy, this fate most probably will overtake us all, and ever-increasing anarchy, tyranny, and war will be the result. It is essential, therefore, that we make the effort necessary to ensure instead the rule of law, liberty, and peace. In order to accomplish this, our new world order must be constituted on a firm foundation which would enable the ever-increasing wealth produced by means of industrialization to be used strictly according to the principles preached by democracy; that is, impartially to the best advantage of mankind as a whole. The only political form

which seems to provide a solid enough foundation upon which to build with confidence is that of federalism.

The moment would appear to have arrived when the choice we have to make can no longer safely be delayed. Signs have indeed been seen of late which give rise to hopes that the right way may be chosen; hints recently given by responsible British and French statesmen that the close collaboration at present established between the two Empires may continue in some form after the war show that steps are at any rate being taken in the right direction. None the less, the constituting of such a world order, with all its attendant implications, such as is proposed, represents a colossal task; and to attempt to minimize the difficulties would be foolish. It is, however, a task which it is incumbent upon our generation to undertake, and it may not prove so overwhelming as it appears if we allow ourselves to be guided by the inspiration of a belief that there is a higher purpose in our endeavours than the continual seeking after further material advantages for ourselves. Man could never have grown to worship the national State had he retained a genuine belief in the existence of a Divine Power who controls his destinies; if he will return to this faith and accept the inspiration which it provides, no task can prove too great for him to accomplish.



*Richard Stokes, M.P.*

All States, putting aside mutual suspicion, should unite in one society, or rather a sort of family of peoples, calculated both to maintain their own independence and safeguard the order of human society.—Pope Benedict XV.

Everyone, within the limits of his mission, must keep his heart and mind ready, so that when the hurricane of war ceases and disperses, pure far-sighted spirits filled with courage may arise among the peoples and the nations. These leaders must oppose tendencies towards ignoble vengeance by the majestic and noble means of justice, which is the sister of love and the friend of true wisdom.—Pope Pius XII.

IF ANYTHING were needed to make people realize how fundamentally important it is that there should be a clear appreciation of the difference between those things against which we are fighting and the ideal peace aims which we all should desire, these two utterances (the first made shortly after the last war, the second made only as recently as 24 December 1939) should finally bring home to everyone that our peace aims are much more important than our war aims, and for that reason no justifiable excuse can exist for further delaying their publication. The Government have so far declined to publish them, which is an attitude completely bewildering to neutrals and most unsatisfying to the British public.

Peace aims should be stated, and in such a form that they will receive the support and approval of all right-minded persons, belligerent and neutral alike. What is more likely to bring about peace than a proper understanding by the peoples of all nations that they have a common cause which



war can never attain for them and which peace alone can? What all peoples desire, whatever the ambition of their rulers, is a warless world. Peace properly waged would be full of far greater adventures and hazards than any war!

Before setting out the main points which ought to form the foundation for peace at home and abroad, there are one or two considerations to which it is essential that attention should be paid if peace is to be enduring. In the first place we must make up our minds what kind of society it is that we want at home—in Britain and the British Empire—before we can suggest with any chance of attaining success what form the general reconstruction of Europe and the world should take, for the two are interdependent.

It is vitally important that there should be a clear definition between what we are fighting *against* and what we are fighting *for*. So far Government spokesmen have done nothing more than reiterate *ad nauseam* that we are fighting to end aggression and Hitlerism, and not one of them has stated positive aims. We *are* fighting against aggression and to prevent the spread of Hitlerism. We all know that. But consider what we are fighting to attain—the aims for which we are asking millions of the youth of the world to lay down their lives—and unless this is properly understood when the war ends there will be just the same disillusion and disappointment as there was after the war of 1914-18. Are we fighting to maintain the slums of Glasgow and London? To throw the demobilized soldiers on to the unemployed scrap heap? To jog along contentedly with 2,000,000 able-bodied unemployed? To keep the 'trespassers will be prosecuted' boards up all over the countryside? To maintain the ridiculous boom slump system? To leave the workers where hitherto they have always been, struggling for existence on a low wage, insecure in their employment and only receiving an unfair proportion of what they produce? We should fight to change all that and to bring in a new era of economic security and prosperity for all.

Just what is it that stands in the way? There are two main blocks to an era of such human happiness and two main

channels down which the wealth produced is now drained away—the moneylenders and the landlords. The power of both must be removed before economic security is possible; the present power which the moneylender has of privately controlling the issue of money and that of the landlord of appropriating rent—and of the two the latter is the more fundamental evil.

### *General*

At the Mansion House on the 9th January 1940, Mr Chamberlain at the beginning of his speech stated that the Empire was united as never before to do battle for 'the cause of liberty and justice for all mankind'. A high-sounding phrase—but do the Tories mean it? Do they really mean that we are fighting this war in order that all men, including our own people, may have justice secured to them in the only form that matters, namely economic security? Or do they merely mean that the rulers of each nation, including our own, may be free to go their own way provided they don't interfere with the rulers of any other nation? If this latter is all that they mean, then it is not good enough—fighting just to perpetuate the boom slump system, the moneylenders'<sup>1</sup> robbery, the landlords' monopoly, and to maintain the slums of Glasgow and London—while fourteen million workers struggle for a miserable pittance and are never sure of work—whilst millions more limp along on the dole (the anti-revolution bribe of the monopolist) in a state of utter wretchedness and semi-starvation. What we want to hear from the leader of the Tories is that they have renounced their belief that poverty and war are inevitable, and that they will here and now guarantee that in so far as in them lies, our own social system shall be so reconstructed by freeing the resources of nature and ending the money scandal, that to the limit of the physical capacity of the country to produce all men shall enjoy the full result of their effort, which result

<sup>1</sup> By 'moneylenders' I mean the system whereby the Banks create money out of nothing for the purpose of financing the needs of the State and charge the community interest for this privilege! I am not referring to those people whose genuine savings are lent to the State or invested in industrial concerns.

itself shall only be limited if nature should prove niggardly, and not by artificial restrictions imposed by dog-in-the-manger landlords and usurious and greedy moneylenders.

In passing, when people talk about 'fighting for justice', remember that you cannot have justice until you've got peace—presumably the phrase means fighting for peace that justice may follow. Let us make quite sure that justice does follow.

### *Agriculture and Food Supply*<sup>1</sup>

Have you ever seen a country with more idle acres than England? I have travelled far and wide—at one time not less than 30,000 miles a year, and, whilst thinking our country to be the best and most beautiful, no other nation would allow its natural resources to be left in idleness as we do. Travel where you like in Europe and every cultivatable inch is turned to good purpose. But Mr Chamberlain told us at Kettering that we must not grow more food for ourselves as that would interfere with the flow of manufactured goods to other countries in exchange for the food they now send us, the value of which is, in fact, far in excess of the manufactured goods exported so as to enable interest to be paid to the moneylenders for overseas investments—no doubt to the advantage of the moneylender but to the disadvantage of the home agriculturist and the people of these isles as a whole. Is the feeding of our own people from our own supplies resulting from the proper use of our own home resources more or less important than paying interest to moneylenders? The question answers itself.

Look at the balance of trade, for example, between the Argentine and Great Britain. True, a proportion of it is direct exchange of goods, but a large part of the balance surplus from Argentina is in payment of moneys invested in the Argentine. So Argentine meat and grain must be given preference over our own agriculture to pay the moneylenders. I don't believe that our export trade would suffer much if we developed home agriculture to the maximum—the extent

<sup>1</sup> Criticism here is not levelled against the farmers but against the system which permits so many acres to lie idle or to be put to improper use.

to which it did would be more than compensated for if all our own people were at work producing food they consume themselves and by the mere fact of their work providing a demand for the purchase of more manufactured goods for home consumption.

### *The Burden of the National Debt*

When the 1914-18 war started the National Debt was under £650,000,000. By 1918 it was nearly £7,000,000,000, and it is now over £8,000,000,000, seven-eighths of which is internal. Spending as we are to-day at the rate of £42,000,000 a week, that debt will grow by over £2,000,000,000 a year—against which the total savings of the people do not exceed £500,000,000 a year. If the war goes on for three years the total debt will be, say, £15,000,000,000. The service on our present debt is £250,000,000. It naturally depends on the rate of interest charged, but it would seem that £400,000,000 a year is what we shall have to pay the moneylenders when the war is over for ever unless we can finance this war on interest-free money! For what?

It's as well the people should properly understand this; the Chancellor of the Exchequer admits that he doesn't. When the Chancellor requires to borrow £1,000,000,000 for financing the war what does he do? He goes to Mr Montagu Norman and asks him for it; whereon Mr Norman very naturally enquires, 'Mr Chancellor, what is your credit?' To which the Chancellor in effect replies, 'The whole of Great Britain, all its fixed assets, all the work of all the people, and a great deal more besides.' Whereupon Mr Norman says, 'Very good, Mr Chancellor, but of course you must pay us interest at  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent.' So up goes the National Debt by £1,000,000,000 and the interest charged (without sinking fund) a further annual amount of £25,000,000, and the moneylenders get this for what? For lending the nation something which they themselves haven't got! They merely write the Chancellor up in the ledger as good for that amount. Can you understand why from the nation's point of view, it is bad business to issue free money to the amount required to finance the war whilst if necessary restricting

interest-bearing credit elsewhere, whereas it is sound finance if the nation has to pay anything from  $2\frac{1}{2}$  to 5 per cent for its own credit? How long more will the people of this country be content to allow this swindle to go on? How do you suppose Germany finances her internal requirements or Italy hers? Next time you go to Rome have a look at the ten-lire notes and you will see they are state money, not bank money, issued by Mussolini to enable him to pay for the work done in reclaiming the Pontine Marshes, free of moneylenders' charges; the only cost to the State being the printing, say  $\frac{1}{8}$  per cent in all. Money is only a means of exchange and should be created by the Government, not by private institutions as it is at present, to keep pace with the capacity of the nation to produce those things which the workers wish to exchange with one another.

Has it ever occurred to you that all the Allied nations, including ourselves, defaulted on our debts to America after the last war? Whilst there may be good reason why we should not shed ourselves of this intolerable burden in a similar manner, there is surely every reason why we should conduct this war so that we do not burden posterity further with more and more interest charges.

The burden on the 14,000,000 registered workers on account of the National Debt amounts to a dead weight of £600 per head and an annual charge of £20 per head. At the same rate after three years of war the dead weight will be £1,100 per head and the annual charge nearly £40.

It may be too difficult to tear up the existing National Debt, thereby causing injustices to genuine savers; but let us at least see to it that our annual charges are not added to by interest on loans for this war which should be financed by free money at least so far as internal expenditure is concerned.

### *Unemployment*

Why unemployment? Who creates demand? Why, man himself, not the moneylenders or the landlords, both of whom are parasites<sup>1</sup> of the first order. Man is the only insatiable

<sup>1</sup> In botany, a 'parasite' is defined as 'a plant growing upon and nourished by the juices of another'.

animal, therefore the limit to which his insatiety can be met should only be the limit which nature sets to the production of the good things he wants. Nature does not in practice prove niggardly; her storehouse is full. We burn crops in Canada, cotton in America, coffee in Brazil, and even in our own country (in war time) throw fish back into the sea or spread it on the land for manure, while people starve in the cities! The following story has its moral:

There was once a Sultan who had great difficulty in raising sufficient funds to finance his armies, so he put a tax on fig trees and the value of dwelling houses, whereon the farmers cut down all the fig trees except those which they required for feeding themselves, and the landlords allowed the houses to fall into disrepair so as to be liable for less tax, with the result that the people lived in squalor and starved in the cities, the armies went weak from shortage of food and the Sultan still could not collect enough to run his country. But he had a very wise Grand Vizier who said to him, 'Tax not the fig trees or the houses, but tax all the land of your kingdom according to its value, so that it will be unprofitable for the farmers not to grow food, or the town landlords to maintain smelly hovels in the slums.' So the Sultan cancelled the tax on fig trees and houses and put it on land values instead. Whereon all the farmers who owned land quickly grew fig trees; there was plenty and cheap food for all in the cities; the men in the army waxed strong; the town landlords had to clear the slums as they could not afford to leave hovels on valuable land, and the Sultan's enemies feared to attack seeing such strength and such a happy, contented population.

Look at what happens in England! The land is under the undisputed control of a few people and the rest of the community must pay before they may use it. Even recently the Army and Air Force have been paying fabulous prices for land, much of which has hitherto been regarded as worthless—the landlords saying in effect to the soldier: 'Come and fight for your country, but before you do so you must buy it back from us! Pay for your country before you die for it!'

All the things that man wants come from the land, and land in fact itself has no value without the presence of human beings. Based on a valuation taken in New Zealand, which is the only country in which a complete valuation of land has been carried out, the capital value of land, without improvements, in Great Britain, is no less a sum than £10,000,000,000,<sup>1</sup> which at 5 per cent should yield £500,000,000, so that if all land in Great Britain were put to its best use this latter is the sum which the landlords can collect free of all tax from the population in exchange for permission to work! Mind you, for a value which the landlords themselves, from their mere ownership, whoever they may be, never created. This amounts to almost £40 per annum per head of registered workers, which added to the toll to be paid to moneylenders means after a war of three years that the worker will have to provide £80 a year or 30s. a week in the way of toll to the landlords and moneylenders before he can have anything for himself.

But this is not the worst of it. Under our existing laws the landowner may either put land to its wrong use or not use it at all, without penalty to himself. So that you have this absurd position: a million able-bodied unemployed kicking their heels waiting for an opportunity to help themselves by their own effort to the things they need; millions of acres of land lying idle or being put to the wrong use with impunity, whilst the landlords live on the rent from such land as they are prepared graciously to allow the workers to use! The extent to which land is held idle or not used to the best advantage is the exact measure of the hardship inflicted on the people as a whole by the landlord system. Tax each piece of land according to its value and the owners of farm land will behave exactly as the Sultan's farmers did over the fig trees and the landlords over the slums. Immediately set to to get the maximum return from each piece of land and put up buildings commensurate with the value of the land on which they stand.

With these considerations before us let us now set out quite briefly the main reforms which are necessary on the

<sup>1</sup> Of this the value of land in urban districts represents 90 per cent.

home front and endeavour to formulate the main points which in principle must be accepted by all the belligerents before peace can break out.

### *The Home Front*

(1) What is morally right is economically possible. Is it morally right that, through no fault of their own, there should be millions of unemployed with no proper means of subsistence? Obviously not. It is morally right that everyone should be given the opportunity to work to supply his own wants as God meant. As God meant it, it must be economically possible; and we must above all reform our land and money system so that the two main obstacles to its achievement are removed once and for all time. The power of creating money should be returned to the State and that of collecting rent to the people instead of remaining in the hands of the landlords. This is to be speedily and justly achieved by taxing land values.

(2) Right thought must precede right action. It is, therefore, useless to continue our present educational system unless we introduce into the curriculum proper instruction in the essential terms used in political economy. How many people can correctly define the terms land, labour, capital, wealth, rent, wages, and interest? Political economy is a simple study—by which I do not refer to the mumbo-jumbo talked by our leading so-called economists. A child can understand it, as also the proper arrangement of society, if not fogged with preconceived notions, prejudices and meaningless jargon.

(3) All the tiresome restrictions on food production in existence prior to the war shall remain suspended, and the various marketing boards which are now mere price-raising monopolies shall be reconstituted with representatives of both consumers and producers whose main function shall be to organize adequate supplies at the cheapest possible cost. An era of 'cheap plenty' must take the place of the Tory motto of 'dear scarcity'.

(4) The first duty of any Government is to feed the people, therefore, until such time as everyone is in continuous em-



ployment and so able to put enough by to support their own old age:

- (i) No more food shall be destroyed until everyone has had enough. Any surpluses should be bought up by the Government at low fixed minimum prices and distributed cheaply amongst the poor and needy.
- (ii) Milk shall no longer be sold to factories at 6d. a gallon whilst the liquid consumer has to pay 2s. 4d. Factories shall pay as a minimum the amount paid to farmers, *i.e.* approximately 1s. a gallon; but all old age pensioners, persons on public assistance and the unemployed, with their dependants, shall have their fill at not more than 2d. a pint first.

### *The International Front*

It should first and foremost be realized that a negotiated peace will be a better peace than one achieved after the victory of either side and that the sooner we state terms as the basis of such a peace the better; for the longer the delay the more difficult it will be to achieve. If such terms, when stated, are not acceptable in the main to the other side, then we shall have a positive ideal for which to fight in place of our present purely negative one of 'Hang Hitler'.

Secondly, a fight to a finish between Germany, France and Britain means the complete collapse of the present European economic system and a win for the forces of violent revolution—in place of the peaceful change so many millions of people have striven to attain—so why not a negotiated peace now before the victory of any side spoils the possibility of Utopia, and before killing all the youth of the countries engaged? The truth is there has been insufficient vision amongst the old men who have ruled us, aptly put by a young friend of mine, recently joined up, who wrote: 'The galling fact to me is that the same old men who ruined the world for my father have now ruined it for me.' Don't kill the young men; give them a chance to run the world. They

couldn't make a bigger mess of it than the visionless old men have done for years.

The following general considerations should be borne in mind before attempting to define more particular conditions:

An honourable and just peace is only possible if the right of all nations, big and small, to life and freedom is recognized.

The peace cannot be an armed peace; this time there must be general disarmament, thereby freeing the masses of all nations from the groaning burden of arms production and from the danger that material force will ever again override moral considerations. We want a warless world with the grand adventures that peace can offer.

Proper attention must be given to the true needs and just demands of the peoples of all nations, as also of ethnic minorities, essentially so that all may enjoy economic security and freedom. 'The raw materials of the world must be made available for the peoples who need them', so that if we have more than our share we must be prepared to make sacrifices that all may have enough.

There must be a change of heart; all efforts will be unavailing unless a spirit of goodwill dominates the deliberations and unless those responsible for the destiny of peoples genuinely desire justice for all—a real Christian era in which the needs of the soul are placed above those of the body.

Given these considerations I would summarize our peace aims as follows:

(1) Multilateral disarmament by the Powers in Europe so that never again may this hideous slaughter break out. Such disarmament will inevitably take time, but as a gesture of goodwill all nations concerned will immediately hand over the effective material fighting strength of their air forces to a selected neutral or neutrals. And all long-range guns to be destroyed. These gestures could be made immediately.

(2) The immediate settlement of a new Polish State with ethnographical rather than military frontiers; Danzig and the Corridor to remain German, but Poland to have free economic access to the sea (*i.e.*, a railway direct to Danzig as a free port).

(3) The reconstruction of Bohemia and Slovakia as independent autonomous States but working within the German Customs Union until such time as sanity and free trade return to Europe. The Sudetenland to remain German, but the people living there to have the option of joining any one of the first-named two states.

(4) A free plebiscite for Austria, the probability being that given religious freedom she would prefer to stay within the German Reich; after Versailles she was left like a torso with a huge head but no limbs.

(5) Russia to keep those territories which are essentially Russian, but to hand over the remainder.

(6) Removal of trade barriers: the Ottawa Agreement to be abolished and free trade established between the British Empire, Germany, France, Italy, and Russia, as well as the other States of Europe, by progressive planned reduction of tariffs. Tariffs to be maintained against the U.S.A. until they choose to come in. In the modern world it is just as crazy to allow nations to erect tariff walls round their territories—walls which always need armies to maintain them—as it would be to allow the County Councils of Essex, Middlesex, Sussex, and Surrey to do so.

(7) The removal of the artificial restrictions now imposed on the production of raw materials such as tin, copper, and rubber, so that they are no longer controlled in the vested interests of the few in their desire to maintain the worn-out philosophy of 'dear scarcity'. The peoples of the world must have the raw materials they need if peace is to reign, which means that those nations who have more than their share must regard it as a sacred trust to see that those who have not enough get fair play.

(8) The abolition of gold as a basis of exchange and the establishment of an international currency based on the most suitable of existing currencies, probably sterling. Money to be issued to keep pace with the productive capacity of the countries concerned and not as now to suit the selfish whim of the moneylenders. A debtor rather than a creditor monetary policy to be the order of the day.

*Conclusion*

Above all, on no account let us permit this war to be continued for a single instant longer than it otherwise need merely on account of prestige, whether of nations or politicians. Prestige is a big danger, and the fear that it might suffer prejudices judgment and jaundices the vision of the world's leaders to an unbelievable extent. It should be obvious to all who take the trouble to think that the contribution to be made by the British Empire for the sake of a lasting and just peace will have to be considerable—far greater than the contribution of any other single nation. The main uniform contribution to be made by all nations, great and small alike, will be the sacrifice of some measure of their national sovereignty in the interests of general security, without yielding up their economic freedom or individuality. Indeed, if these two essentials are to be maintained in a warless world, some yielding of national sovereignty is inevitable. That an economically secure warless world can be attained if this policy is followed I have no shadow of doubt. The world has become a very small place due to science and invention: time and space have been effectively eliminated—neither is any longer a protection—and we must either find some way of living at peace with one another or face the extermination of every other generation. Are we to fight for monopoly and scarcity or share plenty in a peace wherein the things of the mind may take precedence? The choice lies with the electorate of to-day.

27 January, 1940.



*Irene Ward, M.P.*

IT SEEMS ALMOST INCREDIBLE that anyone of my generation, the generation that was just growing up at the commencement of the Great War and reared on the phrase a 'war to end war', should be contemplating the aims of the peace proposals to be formulated at the end of an even more formidable war. But perhaps the fact that those of my generation still hear so clearly the echoes of phrases and recruiting speeches intermingled with the bravely expressed ideas of those actively engaged in 1914-18 has prevented the recreation of the atmosphere of the first six months of the last war. Of course one still sees the excited groups of young men discussing the announcement of the calling up of their class for service and one recognizes the same bravery. But the knowledge of those who took part in the last struggle has wiped out fervour, strangled emotion, and helped the nation to understand in all its stark reality the meaning of the fateful word 'war'. The experience of four years of the most horrible war in history has been indubitably absorbed, as was evident by our behaviour in September 1939, when the present war was declared. The present war may yet render insignificant the memories of that other war which still carries such vivid memories for so many of us.

Against this, one wonders whether the people of this country have equally vivid recollection of the peace; whether the echoes of phrases such as 'Hang the Kaiser', 'Make Germany Pay', 'Homes fit for Heroes to live in', are sufficiently strong to remind us that the various peace treaties heralded as monuments of ingenuity by the victors have crumbled within twenty years, confronting us once again with all the major problems of 1919. Have we learnt

from our failure sufficiently to prevent ourselves from committing the same errors, and what is the lesson we have learnt?

These words 'what is the lesson we have learnt?' epitomize, I think, the whole problem, and even a cursory examination of the views held about the aims of the next peace discloses a wide divergence as to our aims and the way we mean to achieve them. Let me, therefore, first of all try to define my view-point of the wider meaning of the words 'peace aims'. It is not so easy to find the appropriate phrasing rightly to interpret the national view, shorn of romanticism and sentiment; but perhaps the following may be found acceptable: 'The establishment of a permanent world order in which no nation would resort to arms.'

The phrase is too dull to make any appeal or indicate that its acceptance by the nations of the world and its fulfilment would create a new heaven and a new earth. Therefore, I translate the phrase into the language of the average woman: 'The creation of a world in which she would never again be called upon to sacrifice her menfolk in the defence of their country.' This I feel would be the ideal for which man as well as woman would strive.

A foreigner, who reads this interpretation of our major concern in formulating our peace aims, will at once ask where Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Austria, and the rest figure; and how are we going to redeem our pledges. The British people, however, understand this too, because they appreciate beyond all shadow of doubt that the security of their country and empire depends on establishing international order with the surety of its maintenance in Europe. It is not practical politics yet to suggest that the British nation should fight for any other reason than the protection of its shores, but there is no question that our people understand the wider implications of the present conflict. We have only to think of the change of public opinion in this country between September 1938 and September 1939 towards taking part in a major war. In 1938 public opinion was divided and uncertainty as to our wisest course was evident; but in 1939 we can assert that on the Polish issue we had a united country.

If peace in the future is to be assured, we all are agreed that we must fight Germany with all our power.

Whatever may be demanded of us we will do. But I am bound to say that with the prospect of every kind of sacrifice being demanded of us and of the peoples of many countries, how right Mr Chamberlain was to count well the cost and explore every avenue to maintain peace before the final decision was taken. The world fabric of our modern civilization has been destroyed, but not lightly. Though I wish I could now write 'finis', one recognizes that the selfsame ideal, that of a lasting peace, inspired the creators of the Versailles treaty, and that one would make no contribution in the mere reiteration of a platitude. I must have the courage to face and examine at any rate some of the methods for achieving a world without war, an ideal which will be fiercely supported by thousands of well-intentioned men and women when the time comes, after victory has been achieved. And let me state at once that whatever may be decided in an endeavour to ensure permanent peace in the future, there must first of all be a decisive victory over our enemies. Whatever the cost, however long the time, no peace aims will be possible of achievement without a decisive and crushing defeat of the evil personified in those fighting against us.

My duty, as I see it, is to fight the German people of to-day, not the German people of to-morrow. The Germany of to-day is responsible for the evil that has fallen on the world; the nation that has produced the Nazi machine and then allowed it to wreck modern civilization cannot escape indictment. Indeed, their behaviour on sea and in the air destroys, in my view, the last vestige of pretence that we are only at war with the Nazi régime. If the older generations in Germany know of the frightfulness of the modern German war personnel and regret it, we must remember that in Germany, even as in this country, the youth of to-day is the generation that will be in control when peace becomes possible.

So many of the plans for peace are, I think, stillborn because they cannot possibly work in practice. But even so, one can still visualize a world, or shall I say a Europe, in which Germany and Russia can and will play their parts in main-



taining international order, organizing international trade for the benefit of all, and assist in establishing a world order in which small countries can thrive and develop their national characteristics and resources freed from the fear of absorption by a Great Power. One can see the growth of government in these small States in accordance with the will of the people and the right of political freedom become a reality. Is it a dream? The answer depends on the wisdom and vision of the Allies, of the neutrals, and of all those individuals in enemy countries who long for a future for their peoples.

I therefore examine first of all the possibilities of a revival of an effective League of Nations. Twice I have had the privilege of being a Substitute Delegate to the Assembly on behalf of H.M. Government, and indeed would have served a third period had war not broken out. My work was entirely confined to dealing with the humanitarian and social questions, in which field of activity the League has had such a conspicuous success. So far as wider problems were concerned, I was merely an onlooker; but my period of service covered the Sino-Japanese conflict and the Spanish War. My conclusions need not even be stated in vague terms. I am quite certain that we delude ourselves if we toy with the idea that the future peace can be maintained through the instrumentality of a newly constituted League built up on the present machine.

Of course it might have happened that, if Great Britain and France had really directed their foreign policy in accordance with their obligations under the League (though there are many factors which excuse them), the League might have proved a much more effective power than it has. Alternatively, had the Italo-Abyssinian dispute developed earlier in the twenty-years peace, before the small countries had grown fearful of their future and before the menace of another world war had become a factor, the League might have achieved a success. Without discussing the problems created for the League by the Manchurian episode, fate had decided that the testing-point should be the Far East rather than a European scene, where active intervention might have been so much easier. And I have always felt that the failure

of the League in its conception was in no small measure due to the lack of understanding of the variety of methods of government of the various component States, the possibilities of international intrigue, and the difficulties of small countries in undertaking antagonistic obligations against powerful neighbours.

Anyone who has an enthusiastic belief in the effective operation of the League machinery should study the records of 1937 in regard to the Spanish conflict. A most innocuous resolution merely regretting foreign intervention in Spain was brought before the Assembly. No real condemnation was embodied in the resolution, neither was there a hint that even the mildest action was contemplated. The delegates from France and the United Kingdom supported the resolution in well-defined speeches, but when a vote was taken two countries, Albania and Portugal, voted against it, and, owing to the unanimity rule, prevented its adoption. But what was even more significant, there were a large number of abstentions. I will not analyse here the motives which dictated the voting of the nations represented, but, having stood the volley of questions hurled at me by ardent supporters of the League, I feel I can say that no attention is paid by them to the practical difficulties of both League membership and League action, and that a great disservice is probably unwittingly done to an ideal which has much to recommend it. It is also true to say that even on the humanitarian side intrigue is not unknown. Certain League decisions have run entirely contrary to national custom and outlook, and one sympathizes with the difficulties of delegates who are anxious to give support to League activities and are yet apprehensive of the effect of promising the national legislation necessary if League decisions are to become effective.

But the value of public opinion may be gauged from the solid achievement of the humanitarian side of the League's work. One is encouraged to believe that in the long run an informed public opinion is capable of effective action. The discouragement comes from the fact that in social questions one can, though with difficulty, afford to await the creation of an informed public opinion, but that in matters affecting

peace and war events force action and decision; and because there is no time to create public opinion, an unwise policy is so often adopted as a matter of expediency.

There could be no better illustration of the way in which public opinion can force action than the Hoare-Laval plan for settling the Italian-Abyssinian dispute. It will be remembered that in the General Election of 1935 the British public had accepted (though too late) the Covenant of the League as the basis of its foreign policy; but it is true that for the first time since the League was brought into being the great mass of the people appreciated the value of the League machinery, and that right as well as left wing opinion was prepared to give it a fair trial. The announcement of the Hoare-Laval plan under somewhat mysterious circumstances created a most unfavourable impression. The public at once assumed that secret diplomacy was again rearing its head and that the responsible Government had been guilty of double-dealing. Without any knowledge of the reasons which dictated the terms of the plan and without waiting for a verdict by the League Council on their merits and their propriety, the British public, led by the Press, demanded its withdrawal, and the Prime Minister (Mr Baldwin), in accordance with constitutional tradition, bowed his head and accepted the verdict of the people.

But the full facts which prompted Sir Samuel Hoare to lend his name to the proposals have never been told to the world. It is not always possible, for obvious reasons, to disclose the conversations which take place between statesmen or through diplomatic channels as between one country and another. There are, of course, many people to-day who condemned the Hoare-Laval proposals at the time but who would now admit that the verdict of the public was arrived at without a knowledge of all the facts. Indeed many would go further, and now pay tribute to the wisdom of the plan.

I have really only introduced this particular incident to lay emphasis on—as one of our peace aims, if you like—the need for providing an informed public opinion on foreign affairs in order that there shall be no uninformed hasty acceptances or rejections of peace proposals. I am tempted to

mention in passing the Ministry of Information, which has a Home Publicity Department which might well devote time and energy to preparing a public which is equipped to give its opinion when the moment arrives. I feel, too, it cannot be over-emphasized that the foreign policy of this country has been and, I am afraid, always will be a question of political controversy. This puts Great Britain at a disadvantage in negotiation compared with France and many smaller countries. Our Parliamentary system—which, even though imperfectly understood, is the envy of the world—is based on the tradition of government with the consent of the people; therefore proposals sponsored by us must command the support of the majority. Our strength, therefore, also becomes a weakness because proposals imperfectly understood by the nation may be unwisely rejected. I have always felt we should have received greater support and understanding in these past few years from foreign countries had our democratic system and the real part played by the people of Great Britain in directing affairs been properly appreciated.

I have been privileged, as a lecturer for the British Council, to speak in many countries, and the lack of appreciation of our system by the Powers, both great and small, is in my view in no small degree responsible for the weakening of British prestige abroad during the time we have been associated with the League. But I was interested to note from a few sentences in Dorothy Thompson's book *Let the Record Speak* that she had appreciated the difficulties of conducting mass diplomatic negotiations where national constitutions and political ideologies differed so fundamentally. Dorothy Thompson's reputation is unrivalled in the United States, and her penetrating comments on this aspect of building up an effective international machine should not pass the notice of the student of practical means of maintaining peace in the post-war years.

I feel conscious I am allowing my pen to wander, perhaps with too little direction, but I feel so strongly that if we are to plan a peace which will give the world the real benefits of a settled future one cannot afford to ignore psychological reactions and repercussions. My theme therefore is that

certain fundamental facts should even now be put across to the people of this country, to the world if you like, to lessen the risk of public opinion, artificially stimulated at a time of great relief and possibly of great bitterness, destroying by virtue of the pressure it can exert the solid foundations on which the peace treaties of the future must be built.

I now turn to the proposal which is being widely canvassed as the only possible method for ensuring a lasting peace, the splitting up of Germany into small States. It is difficult within the limits of a few pages of print even to touch the vital issues arising out of proposals such as this, and I am even somewhat diffident about discussing the merits of the case with no real knowledge or experience to guide me; but one feels there are certain elemental virtues in the adoption of such a suggestion which commend themselves to the heart if they can be made also to commend themselves to the head—in my view, an essential combination.

To achieve the peace aims I have in mind I am quite certain that Germany must be crushed. 'Crush' is a hard word, but the devastation she has caused requires hard dealing. When I say that we must crush Germany I mean that we must deprive her of all that enables her to attempt to dominate the world by force of arms. But we must mitigate the hardness of the word 'crush' by recognizing that there would be no peace if this word were to mean the reduction of the standards of life of the German people to one below those of other civilized nations. In federation, or whatever the appropriate description of the setting up of individual States may be, the German people should be given opportunity to trade and to maintain a standard of living commensurate with their culture and civilization. There must be no economic or human urge to encourage individual as well as national sacrifice to revivify the German Empire of the first half of this century.

The individual contacts and friendships between Germans and Britons over twenty years of peace should be strong enough to ensure that this policy has a place in the peace aims; but there should be no compromise on the advisability of taking whatever steps are essential to prevent political

federation and the growth of the type of power which Germany has used only to destroy.

I am not qualified even to attempt to suggest what methods the French people and ourselves should employ. But whether we acquire new strategic frontiers, or police key-points to the world with standing armies until we are assured a new Germany has arisen (and however distasteful such actions may be), there must be no flinching. The responsibility of ensuring that the terms laid down for Germany are observed must be borne by Great Britain and France. Though I do not visualize, according to the accepted definition of the word, our 'ruling' in defined areas, we do understand the handling of minorities and could exercise authority without creating dissension. It is curious that this capacity is found in an island people; but that it is so is undisputed, and such a power might prove invaluable.

Next I come to the thorny question of disarmament. There can be no doubt that the decline in the power of the British Navy and our failure to create an effective Air Force, consistent though our actions were with our obligations under the various treaties, contributed to the failure of the League and the growth of the power of Germany. And had we pointed out, in the days when everyone paid lip service to disarmament, that we really had disarmed, we should have been believed. It is never popular to accuse anyone, much less a nation, of lack of judgment, but the deterioration of world affairs following the British policy of disarmament was the result of perhaps the most expensive piece of quixotism that the world has ever seen. But in spite of the disastrous results following the extent to which we disarmed I am glad we gave the world leadership. However intolerable is the situation to-day, however intolerable is the loss of valuable human lives inevitable in war and the sacrifices that all will have to make, the burden, in my view, would have been infinitely more intolerable had we decided that by withholding leadership in disarmament we had prevented the world from ridding itself of the weapons of destruction. I remember years ago, just after the last war, Lord Grey of Fallodon, who will be remembered as Sir Edward

Grey, in a moving speech saying that the piling up of armaments inevitably led to war. No truer words could have been spoken, and I am profoundly grateful, in spite of all the difficulties which our disarmament has created, that our hands are clean, that we carried out our pledges in the spirit as well as in the letter.

But now, in our future peace aims, disarmament must be an integral part, an ideal to be aimed at. This time, however, Great Britain and France must always maintain superiority; and any disarmament proposals must take cognizance of realities, and the Allies must make their contribution only if they are satisfied the peace of the world will not be endangered.

Again, on this issue public opinion could very well be prepared, so that when peace proposals are under discussion their progress will be watched by an informed nation, and the decisions of Great Britain, and indeed of France, not be subjected to alteration by a sentimental public swayed by specious arguments of the moral value of leadership. If we decide to decline to give a lead in disarmament, we will be fully justified in doing so; and such a decision should receive the wholehearted support of the nation.

And finally a word about England. I so describe the British Isles because, however illogical, there is some subtle difference between referring to the English spirit and the British spirit. The latter is easier in my view to define, but England is all-embracing and conveys something to the foreigner which differs from the word British. So I want in a few words to include in peace aims one for ourselves, for during these last few months I have been in very close contact with the people, not as a result of my political representation, but as a representative of the Government called upon to carry out the will of a nation united to prosecute the war till victory is achieved.

The British people are well aware that their husbands and their sons, as well perhaps as their daughters, may be called upon to make the supreme sacrifice; and I have had the sad task of visiting some homes where that sacrifice has already been made. First there were two old people (the man unem-

ployed) whose son had gone down with the *Royal Oak*; they said: 'It won't be so bad if we win the war.' Then there was a mother, whose eldest and most beloved son had been lost. She said: 'I have three other sons. I would give them all for my country.' The question I put to myself is: 'What is it in this country that creates such a love that sacrifice is possible without bitterness?'

That spirit is in all homes and among all classes. If it were not there, this country could not face the future with such calm resolution. It is the contribution of every man and woman, and the universal giving creates the spiritual basis that is so essential a part of the service rendered to the country, for the good of the country and, I might add, for that of the world.

These two illustrations are meant to touch the sentimental side, because proper sentiment is not to be overlooked or belittled in our national make-up; but I have also chosen them because they come from a class that has little material prosperity to thank the country for or little knowledge of the evil we are all fighting. Only imperfectly can they appreciate the value of the liberties for which we are fighting, yet among them the divine spirit is strongly felt and as openly expressed.

There must be many—and I recognize the temptation is great in view of the financial problems which face us—who see in the acute depreciation of material possessions the opportunity to abandon the progressive social policy which has been so noticeable in this country since the last war. Our misfortunes must not allow the opponents of social expansion to control the post-war internal policy and to destroy the faith and confidence of the masses of the people in the privilege of being a citizen of the greatest country in the world.

I am conscious of the futility of endeavouring to put into any words which would have value my ideas for the creation of the world in the future. Wisdom may be given to a nation, or be created by a nation out of experience or out of leadership combined with character. I believe it is given to the people of these islands to create a future; but we shall only be



capable of achievement if our aims are based on courage, humanity, and justice. We must blend the practical purpose of our endeavour with the wisdom of the spiritual conception of our duty. To sum up the present and the future in the simplest words I can think of, I cannot do better than quote from a speech at Newcastle-on-Tyne by Mr Oliver Stanley, when Secretary of State for War. He said that his only war aim was to win the war, his only peace aim to make the peace a lasting peace.